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Introduction
Recent debates about the continued relevance of postcolonial studies stake three broad
positions. In the first, Robert Young argues that postcolonial studies are born of and continually
engaged with anticolonial political struggle. Simon During represents the second argument,
which holds that Young's version of postcolonialism caricatures the fragmented and
contradictory reality of colonialism, which "moved forward fitfully" and varied from violent
expropriation to "acts of exchange and mutual benefit," rarely evincing the kind of "clear
decisionism" anticolonial movements necessarily attribute to them (335-36). Moreover, During
argues, the age of formal empires has passed, so a paradigm built on those moorings must
necessarily be swept away. Dipesh Chakrabarty articulates a third set of arguments, less in
defense of postcolonial studies than as a broad outline of their current tasks in the context of
anthropogenic climate change.
The author of Provincializing Europe writes that thinking human agency in the current
moment requires analysis across “multiple and incommensurable scales at once,” a strength of
postcolonial studies generally and its literary branch specifically (1). The first level is the
universal human subject bequeathed to us by the Enlightenment, the human that is potentially the
same across spaces and times, the subject of human rights. The second level of human agency
sits adjacent to the first but acknowledges the contingencies of history, race, class and gender
that overdetermine the rights-bearing subject. The third level analyzes humans as a parasitic
collective who have created a geological age, the Anthropocene, which has altered the climate in
ways that endanger their planetary habitat. Chakrabarty is careful to say that no one of these
views “is rendered invalid by the presence of others. They are simply disjunctive” (2). In fact,
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any effort to conceptualize the world today "encounters the necessity of thinking disjunctively
about the human, through moves that in their simultaneity appear contradictory" (2).
Postcolonial literature works across several of these disjunctures. The archive I assemble
in this dissertation take seriously the universal rights-bearing human as well as the historical
circumstances such as genocides and systemic discrimination that obviate such universality. In
so doing, these texts bring together Chakrabarty's discontinuous modes of agency into rich
palimpsests that never quite cohere. Salman Rushdie’s Midnight’s Children (1981) and Boubecar
Boris Diop’s Murambi, The Book of Bones (2000), the subject of my first two chapters, concern
genocides in Bangladesh and Rwanda respectively. In chapters 3 and 4 I take up M.G. Vassanji’s
The In-Between World of Vikram Lall and Aravind Adiga’s The White Tiger to analyze the weird
arguments offered by protagonists who claim that capitalist entrepreneurship and its attendant
accumulation constitute a mode of self-defense against the contingencies of racist states.
While Rushdie’s Midnight’s Children and Diop’s Murambi concern genocides that differ
across time and place, both novels share a concern with the overdetermination of Southern
conflicts by Northern weapons and geopolitical strategies. Written during the Cold War,
Rushdie’s novel examines the consequences of that Great Power showdown for the subcontinent.
Specifically, the novel locates in this larger global arena the 1971 war of independence waged in
Bangladesh (then East Pakistan) and the genocidal repression meted out by (West) Pakistan.
America and Europe supply weapons and political support to Pakistan while the Soviet Union
sides with Bangladesh and India’s intervention into that crisis. The 1994 Rwandan genocide, the
subject of Diop’s novel, similarly attends to the international forces abetting the genocidaires and
aiding their victims. France, which supplied Pakistan with fighter jets in 1971, provides weapons
and diplomatic support for the murderous Hutu Power militias while also taking the lead in the
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ostensibly humanitarian Operation Turquoise. Rushdie’s novel, I argue, asks what it means to
indict individual perpetrators given the international weapons and geopolitics that enabled their
crimes. In contrast, Diop’s novel critiques the narrative of global “indifference”—no one cared
about Rwanda—repeated across analyses of the genocide. Murambi, in my reading, foregrounds
the over investment of European powers, France and Belgium specifically, which belies their
ostensible apathy.
M.G. Vassanji’s The In-Between World of Vikram Lall and Aravind Adiga’s The White
Tiger continues the focus on the influence of global machinations on local conflicts. These
novels, however, allow me to turn away from Northern powers to emergent Southern powers and
their dominations of other Southern spaces. Although these novels focus on East Africa and India
respectively, they concern Southern businessmen negotiating structural discrimination in their
countries by leveraging the influx of international capital enabled partly by a neoliberal shift in
economic policy. Vikram Lall, the namesake of Vassanji’s novel, belongs to the South Asian
diaspora in East Africa, which is demonized in the novel as “Asian Shylocks,” a class of imperial
collaborators and self-interested merchants. In response, Lall weaponizes capital accumulation to
guard against a racist state. Adiga’s The White Tiger offers a parallel to this strange logic so that
its protagonist, Balram Halwai, argues that neoliberal entrepreneurship allows him to escape
India’s caste system.
Collectively these texts negotiate particular “distribution[s] of the sensible” that, for
Jacques Ranciére, constitute the basis of community. He argues, “The distribution of the sensible
reveals who can have a share in what is common to the community based on what they do and on
the time and space in which this activity is performed” (12). Communities abstractly, and nation
states particularly, begin with a shared commonsense, a field of intelligibly that delineates what
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is visible and what is not, which people may participate in this society and how they may do so.
Both politics and aesthetics earn their name with the interruption of this given distribution and
the disruption of its commonality. Midnight’s Children and Murambi both demonstrate how
genocidal violence aims to create the commonsense of ethnic or cultural homogeneity through
annihilation; however, these novels also foreground the ways such violence helps sustain
international alliances. In contrast, Vikram Lall and White Tiger posit capital accumulation as the
means by which marginal groups can protect themselves within regimes that can only see them
as pariahs. If the first two novels bespeak the violence founding a given “distribution of the
sensible,” the latter two illustrate the violence enforcing this dominant commonsense within their
communities. Taken together, the postcolonial literary fictions in this dissertation intervene in
their historical moment by rupturing the given distribution of perceptibility. Specifically, these
texts use literary strategies—hyperbole and counterfocalization—to stretch out the dominant
commonsense to a breaking point. In this way, I argue, these works advance the need for
alternate narratives that require neither annihilation nor accumulation.
In chapter 1, I examine the 1971 genocide in Bangladesh when Pakistan tried to violently
suppress the independence movement of then East Pakistan at the cost of nearly three million
lives. Placing this event at the center of Salman Rushdie’s Midnight’s Children, I argue, turns the
focalizer's the narrative in to the elaborate self-defense of a genocidaire, who claims to be
innocent of these crimes by indicting himself for the entire twentieth-century history of the
subcontinent. This hyperbolic self-indictment produces a crisis of history by blurring the
boundaries of an event and individual agency until one is forced into an infinite regress to
explain the historical origins of a war crime. This crisis of historical accountability also plagues
the International Criminal Tribunal currently being held in Bangladesh as it seeks justice for the
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victims of the genocide; as I show in chapter 2, a similar problem afflicts the United Nations
during the Rwandan Genocide. Such a crisis also works spatially to indict the flow of arms from
America, China, and the Soviet Union, along with their diplomatic support. Examining such
international networks both broadens our understanding of genocides and obfuscates the agency
of individuals as war criminals by recognizing their entrapment within overdetermining forces.
The dead, rights-bearing humans and their killers suffer from "too much history" (Rushdie 36).
In view of such international forces and their specific role in the Rwandan Genocide, I
argue in chapter 2 that we should no longer speak of “indifference.” Reading across a variety of
texts in different genres, including Philip Gourevitch's We Wish to Inform You that Tomorrow
We Will be Killed with Our Families (journalism), Roméo Dallaire's Shake Hands With the
Devil: The Failure of Humanity in Rwanda (military memoir), and Boubicar Boris Diop's
Murambi, The Book of Bones (literary fiction), I examine "indifference" as a trope that repeats
across most commentary on the Rwandan Genocide, in which 900,000 Tutsis and moderate
Hutus were massacred. The accusation of international apathy makes little sense when we
consider, at minimum, French support of the ruling Hutu Habyarimana regime, Belgian supply of
arms, as well as the humanitarian aid these nations proffered. To grasp these contradictions I use
Michael Herzfeld's argument on the production of indifference but broaden its implications to
demonstrate that the clash of conflicting forces, weapons and humanitarianism specifically,
yields this affect. The UN’s stasis during the genocide, I argue, was not the result of an uncaring
malaise but the product of an overidentification with its own bureaucracy, which clashed with its
member nations' strategic investments of as well as the needs of Rwandans. Such bureaucratic
self-preservation also allowed the UN to “distribute accountability to the point that it becomes
irretrievable,” allowing one to “point fingers in all directions” (Bennett 575). In this way, I return
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to the concerns with the difficulty of justice in view of international forces supplying arms to
genocidaires and humanitarian aid to their victims. I build on this argument in chapter 2 by
locating the key narrative term—indifference—that obfuscates these transnational forces by
distributing the blame to global apathy rather than geopolitical economy, where it belongs.
In the third and fourth chapters I develop a nascent theme in the first two chapters,
namely a shift away form North-South relations to South-South relations. In doing so, I contend
that the relevance of postcolonial studies in the twenty-first century lies in its attention to the rise
of Southern powers and their emergent informal empires. Specifically, I focus on India’s relation
to East Africa and the correspondence between India and China, both of which must necessarily
travel the routes of global capitalism. I demonstrate the allure of neoliberal capitalism and capital
accumulation within the marginalized populations of Kenya and India who use these
international financescapes to battle against or overcome local racism and the caste system
respectively.1 In chapter 3, I analyze the argument for capital accumulation put forward by M.G.
Vassanji’s focalizer in The In-Between World of Vikram Lall. The novel's namesake belongs to
the East African Asian diaspora, whose presence as traders and shopkeepers predates the arrival
of European powers. Drawing on the rich historical work of Thomas Metcalf and Robert
Gregory, I contextualize this early history as well as the impact of the British Empire, which
added to this diaspora with the indentured servants it brought in to build the Uganda Railway
and, more troublingly, as an active settler colonial population. These historical tensions propelled
Idi Amin's 1969 expulsion of Asians from Uganda who, in the novel, are slandered as "Asian
Shylocks." Lall locates in this slur both the reason and means to accumulate capital, which
protects against the contingencies of a racist state and its perpetual threats. I take this argument
seriously to understand the allure of capital accumulation within this diaspora while also pushing
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against it by attending to the radical history of solidarity between Asians and their Black
compatriots both during the independence struggle and the labor organizing efforts in the new
nation.
Balram Halwai, the focalizer of Aravind Adiga's Booker Prize winning novel The White
Tiger, posits a similar argument by claiming that an embrace of neoliberal entrepreneurship and
its impersonal calculus represents an advance for the victims of the caste system’s intimate
violence. In chapter 4, I draw on the primary theorist and hero of lower-caste struggle, Bhimrao
Ramji Ambedkar, author of The Annihilation of Caste and The Buddha or Karl Marx. In these
works Ambedkar critiques Mohandas Gandhi's conservative reformism. This allows me to
foreground the primacy of caste as an organizing principle and structure of violence, the battle
against which cannot be subsumed necessarily within anticapitalism, a position Gopal Guru
argues for. The sparse scholarly attention to this novel does not pay sufficient attention to caste
or its relation to the text's brutal satire of both individual entrepreneurship and the atomizing
freedom this neoliberal ethos promises as well as India's Socialist parties and their leaders. I
argue that these tensions help us understand the context of subaltern accumulation and its
suspicion of the anticapitalism voiced by parties who often shore up the caste system rather than
annihilate it.
In these close readings I unpack the peculiar arguments offered by Vassanji's and Adiga's
focalizers: that capital accumulation is a mode of self-defense against the hostilities of a racist
state; that adopting neoliberal entrepreneurship's profane accumulative spirit helps escape from
the caste system's sacred predestination that denies Dalits (the downtrodden) any escape from
poverty. Although these arguments reflect a concern with the neoliberal turn in their nations'
economic policy—privatization of national industries, decentralization of national authority for
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increased local autonomy, deregulation of financial markets, and concerted efforts to weaken
trade unions—these novels do not present national allegories as Fredric Jameson once theorized.2
Allegories aim to represent a totality even while necessarily failing at that task; these novels and
their focalizers, on the other hand, articulate the perspectives of a marginalized community
engaged in a civil war with other more dominant groups. They do not allegorize the nation but
fight against it.
These arguments for the virtue of international capital, moreover, help us understand the
emergent primacy of South-South exchanges. Vassanji’s novel, for instance, focuses on the
descendants of a South Asian diaspora brought to East Africa to build the Ugandan Railway for
the British Empire. This diaspora, however, also dominates the financial and mercantile sectors
of Kenya’s economy, enriching themselves through Indian Ocean trade. More troublingly, this
diaspora’s correspondence with the subcontinent now involves the massive influx of capital from
India to East Africa, which includes the purchase of millions of hectares of farmland in Uganda,
Tanzania, and Ethiopia, as well as multibillion-dollar "resource-seeking deals in exchange for
infrastructure investments" (WTO 52). India's bilateral trade with Africa ($63 billion) now
surpasses its trade with the US ($56 billion), and the difference continues to grow exponentially
(WTO 15). India imports African minerals and fuels to support its booming manufacturing and
energy needs, which if unabated, will nearly triple the value of their current trade ($176 billion)
by 2015 (WTO 15). All of this places India in direct conflict with China, Africa's second largest
trading partner ($166 billion), and its own strategic investments to access the resources that will
insure it remains the world’s factory.
Adiga’s novel takes up this rivalry through its epistolary form, in which the narrator
writes to the Chinese premier on the eve of his visit to India to tell him the real way Indian
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entrepreneurs are made, rather than the sanitized version the premier will hear from his guides.
The contest between India and China in Africa undoubtedly influences the premier’s interest in
Indian business culture. In chapter 4, we see the rise of one such businessman in India. Balram
Halwai does not address East Africa nor does it seem that Africa generally registers on his map
of the world. However, he does describe the Indian Ocean as a force that brings “light to my
country. Every place on the map of India near the ocean is well-off” (Tiger 14). When combined
with the epistolary form of the novel and its explicit address to the Chinese premier, this
laudatory attention to the ocean discloses an interest in the complex networks of exchange across
the contested waters of the Indian Ocean. Specifically, India and China, who have already fought
a month long war in 1962 across their Northeast border, now vie for shipping routes as well as
the goods traversing those routes. This is, in part, the reason why India has remained the world’s
largest weapons importer since 2010. One analyst at the Stockholm International Peace Research
Institute (SIPRI) argues that "China’s naval modernization is starting to infringe on the Indian
Ocean, which India considers its backyard," which is "why you see both countries expanding
naval forces slowly and carefully toward Southeast Asia” (cited in Pizzi).
These twenty-first century tensions depend on colonial histories, of course, but
postcolonial studies has more to offer than the back story to the current moment. Instead, they
may help us recognize the emergence of informal empires within exchanges that must be seen as
collaborative and domineering at once, and which may advance some racial minorities at the
expense of others. The lack of official colonial structures or government does not make
postcolonial studies irrelevant, as Simon During suggests, but necessary precisely because of
their absence. In this, I veer closer to Robert Young’s argument that postcolonial studies must be
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anticolonial because it emerged from and continually engaged with a decolonizing political
project. For Young,
the only criterion that could determine whether “postcolonial theory” has
ended is whether, economic booms of the so-called “emerging markets”
notwithstanding, imperialism and colonialism in all their different forms
have ceased to exist in the world, whether there is no longer domination
by nondemocratic forces (often exercised on others by Western
democracies, as in the past), or economic and resource exploitation
enforced by military power, or a refusal to acknowledge the sovereignty
of non-Western countries, and whether peoples or cultures still suffer
from the long-lingering aftereffects of imperial, colonial, and neocolonial
rule, albeit in contemporary forms such as economic globalization. (20)
I agree with much of this argument insofar as it aligns postcolonialism generally and
Postcolonial studies specifically with an ongoing anticolonial project. However, I want to
amplify Young’s concerns by attending to emergent South-South patterns of domination, which
draw on recent “economic booms” to drive “economic and resource exploitations enforced by
military power” (20).
For During, much of this is “posturing” since it ignores “colonialism’s limits and
disjunctions” (336). These “disjunctions” continue into a present in which a paradigm born of
resistance against formal colonial power cannot make sense of the “postcolonized today,” who
“find a comfortable berth in democratic state capitalism.” For instance,
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the political party that represents New Zealand’s indigenous peoples—
the Maori Party—is currently in power in coalition with a fiercely
neoliberal party. Why has it joined the coalition? Partly best to protect
the considerable capital sums that have accrued to iwi (tribes) by virtue
of their successful appeal to the 1840 Waitangi treaty by which Maori
seceded

sovereignty

to

the

British.

How

does

anticolonialist

postcolonialism apply here? (333)
One answer to the first question—why has the Maori Party joined a coalition with a
neoliberal party?—may be found in the novels examined in chapter’s 3 and 4, both of which
posit the use of capital accumulation as a mode of self-defense against a racist state. The
relevance of “anti-colonial postcolonialism,” then, lies in its ability to contextualize and evaluate
the emancipatory strategies now pursued by dominated populations. The Maori Party, if it is
anything like the focalizers I examine in chapters 3 and 4, fails to be anticapitalist in the way we
want our indigent populations to be, which is not the same as saying that they lack a radical
anticolonialist politics. This is not to argue, of course, that aligning with neoliberal capitalism
now constitutes radical politics but to recognize this strategy for what it is. Furthermore, the
anticolonial version of postcolonialism also helps point to the limits of these strategies—just as it
acknowledges the limits of an emancipatory project founded on sovereign nation states—in part
by drawing on historical examples of broader solidarities such as the Non-Alignment Movement
to inspire the creation of new projects, which like their predecessors, must bring new kinds of
South-South relation into being. If the economic "partnerships" brokered between India and
Africa constitute a new form of South-South exchanges—perhaps as part of a defensive strategy
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against reliance on, and domination by, the North—the task will be to interrogate the material
and cultural flow between these spaces as well as their impact on the 900 million people living in
extreme poverty within their borders.
Again this does not necessitate a narrow focus on formal colonial institutions, which are
less viable in part due to the success of anticolonial struggles. Rather, we must attend to the
informal. The literary wing of Postcolonial studies teaches us how to listen to the silences, the
unremarked, the unofficial, which on examination, disclose the grounding premises of the whole
narrative.
Two literary strategies characterize the otherwise disparate range of texts examined in
this dissertation. The first is counterfocalization, which doubles as a reading and writing strategy.
To counterfocalize, according to Gayatri Spivak, is to “shuttle between focalization and the
making of an alternate narrative as the reader’s running commentary” (22). This “effortful and
active” practice grounds the “‘political’ in political fiction” because it activates the “readerly
imagination”; “Literature advocates in this special way,” and such literary reading “has to be
learned” (22). In other words, literary texts do not merely offer expository prose to marshal a
particular argument and supporting evidence. Rather, literature activates readers through
strategic failures, which beg for an alternate narrative that draws from the given text to arrive at
different conclusions. This mode of advocating must remain “singular and unverifiable,” insofar
as the text cannot entirely frame the reader’s alternate narrative nor can readers be sure of their
own productions (23). While Spivak argues that such modes of championing are particular to
literature, she does not explicitly say that the prods to counterfocalize constitute a particular
aesthetic practice. I want to make this claim clearer. The literary texts analyzed in this

!

13

dissertation push readers to counterfocalize as a part of their aesthetic strategy. This is not a
statement about authorial intention but an argument about the formal practices employed.
This brings us to the second literary strategy shared by the novels analyzed in this
dissertation: hyperbole. There seems little need to argue that Midnight’s Children, for instance,
uses hyperbole, but the specific term remains undertheorized. The New Princeton Encyclopedia
of Poetry and Poetics, for instance, quotes Quintilian, who defines hyperbole as “an elegant
straining of truth” (546). The truth here can be found either in the ostensive situation—“the
pragmatic context of the utterance”—so that the hyperbole is relative to the local conditions or in
more conventional hyperbole—“I’ve told you a million times”—that “evades the necessity of
reference to the ostensive situation” (547). Within the scope of this dissertation, the ostensive
situations concern postcolonial nations experiencing various upheavals. The strategic use of
hyperbole breaks the narrative, spurs readers to counterfocalize, and produces an alternative
narrative that speculates on the divergent possibilities that were not explored or rejected. More
concretely, Rushdie employs hyperbole—produced by making allegories literal—to explore and
parody the causality between individual agency (a war crime) and the event (war), between the
actor (the nation state) and the stage (global weapon flows), during the violent suppression of the
Bangladesh independence movement. Vassanji, by contrast, uses hyperbole—caricaturing a
racist caricature—to critique the class politics of the East African Asian community relative to
their Black compatriots as well as the racist epithet “Asian Shylock,” which functions by belying
the histories of solidarity between these two communities. Such hyperbole not only relies on the
immediate ostensive situation of an annunciation but the larger political context that makes and
unmakes a given focalizer’s narrative. Moreover, the texts intervene in these contexts through
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their hyperbole, often articulated by focalizers that exaggerate or understate their relation to
those contexts, and thereby fail to realize other more desirable trajectories.
Claudia Claridge’s Hyperbole in English: A Corpus-Based Study of Exaggeration argues
that hyperbole is not a “primary means to create new lexical material or new senses” (176).
Hyperbole “is never a ‘necessity’ in that sense but always an option,” unlike metaphor or
metonymy, which may fill an “expressive ‘gap’” (176). The texts studied in this dissertation
counter these claims. Hyperbole does seem necessary to fill an expressive gap in these texts
partly to drive the production of new lexical material, which may not be found in the text itself
but in the reader’s alternate narrative. That is to say, my primary material finds hyperbole
necessary as an aesthetic strategy to produce the kind of counterfocalization necessary to engage
readers and advocate for alternate political possibilities. All of this, however, does not help us
understand why these texts use hyperbole and the resultant counterfocalization or how precisely
the contexts of their annunciations drive these aesthetic choices. Some speculative answers
emerge in this dissertation.
First, these writers may choose hyperbole as their representational strategy in part to
index the way their global English audiences must perceive them, as caricatures of Western
referents: the savage militants, the unscrupulous businessmen. The latter especially appear
rapacious and corrupt, feral entrepreneurs who do not merely emulate the behavior of the North
but make it grotesque. It is as if the adoption of neoliberalism elsewhere and the ferocity of its
agents suddenly reveals the global threat of these political economic methods; they are called
“Tiger” and “Dragon” economies because they have become apex predators.
There is little doubt that Vikram Lall and Balram Halwai—the focalizers of chapters 3 and 4
respectively—are caricatures of neoliberalism's promise of a first-world life for all if only free
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market forces are unleashed from the tethers of these formerly socialist states. However, and here
is where the trouble begins, these texts also take seriously the violent and racist underpinnings of
existing structures within their societies. These hyperbolic narratives must "balance between
similarity to the target" and critique, deforming the referent even while taking care to ensure it
remains recognizable (Claridge 257). That these focalizers look to capital for rescue, therefore,
parallels not only their state’s shift in economic policy but also the ostensible lack of alternatives
available today; remember, these are states that began with centrally planned economies. In lieu
of other political and economic models, then, capital accumulation seems desirable to protect
against local exigencies in the short term. In the long term, depending on neoliberalism for
freedom is as misguided as imagining that austerity measures will solve economic crises.
However, the local and immediate advances capitalism presents for certain indigents as they
battle entrenched hierarchies should be taken seriously lest we misunderstand the lure of
accumulation in emerging economies.
In a strange way, these arguments in defense of capital accumulation parallel the
presentism humanitarianism sometimes suffers from. David Rieff articulates this position
elegantly by outlining the problems of humanitarian aid and its exacerbation of the very
circumstances it aims to alleviate, sometimes by collaborating with the perpetrators to triage
victims. While Rieff points out the limits of such humanitarianism, he does not concede that we
simply abandon the cause due to the messy politics involved, because doing so causes more harm
than good. He holds that supplying a bed for a night still matters. Unlike Rieff, however, neither
Lall nor Halwai seem to acknowledge the unsustainability of their positions in the long term and
focus instead on the alleviation of present trouble.
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Hyperbole may also be understood as the “resource of lost causes used by speakers in the
view of formidable opposition” (cited in Claridge 219). This is evident in chapter 1 through
Saleem Sinai's use of hyperbole to absolve himself of war crimes during the Bangladeshi
Genocide by straining the borders of agency, events, history, and international networks.
Saleem's attempted exoneration demonstrates the pragmatic difficulty faced by tribunal courts
attempting to serve justice for victims when Jameson's dictum to always historicize turns
hyperbolic. This struggle echoes in chapter 2 when the UN's deputy of Peacekeeping Operations,
Iqbal Riza, argues that he ignored the faxes from the field general warning of an imminent
genocide because, “We get hyperbole in many reports” (Gourevitch 106). Roméo Dallaire, the
issuer of these faxes, suffered from the representational impossibility of announcing an
emergency without urgent language—panic without an exclamation mark—because such a
communiqué will be read as a hyperbole meant to draw scarce attention. Riza’s cynicism seems
to evince the kind of “indifference” exhibited by much of the world, an argument that repeats
across writings about the Rwandan Genocide. To undermine this commonsense I demonstrate
that the very powers supplying the peacekeeping mission—France and Belgium specifically—
also sold weapons to the genocidaires and supported that murderous regime. The international
community was anything but indifferent; indeed, the claim to indifference is hyperbolic because
it is the last resource of powers that continually intervened in these nations.
Another way of understanding hyperbole as a resource of lost causes comes through the
neoliberal businessmen of chapters 3 and 4. This mode of hyperbole is superficially
contradictory because it seems to imply weakness rather than the vigor of emergent powers.
However, these caricatures also articulate the “lost causes”—alternate modes, trajectories
unexplored, solidarities lost—overwhelmed by global capitalist relations. In this view, Vassanji
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and Adiga do not draw on hyperbole to defend lost causes, at least not overtly, but produce
readerly counterfocalization through the given narrative's deformations. In these alternate and
simultaneous narratives lie not only the lost causes of the past but also the future possibilities to
be shaped within and against formidable opposition.
Finally, I would like to note that these strategic uses of hyperbole follow some principles
outlined by the great Japanese martial artist and founder of Aikido, Moreihei Ueishiba. In The
Art of Peace, Ueishiba Sensei meditates on the responses one may have to the hostile energies an
attacker brings. Tensing, becoming rigid, or anchoring in your position to stop the partner’s force
is inefficient, Ueishiba demonstrates, and merely results in a contest of strength. This position
can be roughly equated to the historical Luddites or the current ostensibly “autonomous”
communities whose local chickens do not affect the machinations of Goldman Sachs. The
preferred response, both pragmatically and spiritually, merges with that energy, directs it, even
amplifies it toward a more peaceful end, one that takes the partner under control without hurting
them or minimally so. I imagine this method as a physical allegory of Marxism, insofar as the
aim is to take control of the massive productive forces capitalism develops toward more just
ends. Hyperbole too merges with the given material of the world, critiquing not by way of
polemic (rigidity) but by amplification (fluidity), guiding narratives to absurd ends that reveal the
faults of their violent premises.
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Chapter 1: The Midnight’s Children of Bangladesh
…morality, judgment, character…it all starts with memory…and I am
keeping carbons. (Rushdie 241)
Salman Rushdie’s Midnight’s Children investigates the Bangladesh Liberation War of
1971 through its narrator, Saleem Sinai, who commits war crimes as a member of the invading
West Pakistan Army.3 Saleem claims he suffered amnesia in 1965 just before the West Pakistani
army conscripted him into military service. However, he confesses to his role in perpetrating
massacres but folds this confession into a megalomaniac self-indictment for the subcontinent’s
twentieth-century history, claiming to be its literal embodied allegory. Saleem’s hyperbolic
memory underpins this allegory by remembering unintended and extended repercussions, and
rewriting them in causal chains that bind him in infinite guilt. But the novel succeeds because
Saleem fails to exonerate himself, pushing us toward a critique of professional armies and global
weapons flows without absolving war criminals. Placing the novel’s account of the Bangladesh
Liberation War at the center sheds new light on recent literary criticism of Rushdie’s work.
Critics read Rushdie’s oeuvre generally and Midnight’s Children specifically with
attention to the liminal, migrant, hybrid and religious, without sustained attention to the novel’s
indictment of military service. Saleem’s role in West Pakistan’s invasion and genocide of then
East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) couples soldiering and amnesia, two tropes unattended to by the
novel's critics either individually or in their peculiar entwinements.4 The novel challenges a
common sense understanding that military service epitomizes citizens’ allegiance to fellow
compatriots; it argues instead that the soldier must forget the nation and his responsibility to
fellow citizens precisely when these resources ostensibly energize fighters. Saleem’s role in the
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1971 war, then, requires attention to the relationship between memory, military service, and
nationalism, three issues woven together in the novel’s allegory of history.5
Saleem asks emphatically, “Why alone of all the more-than-five-hundred-million, should
I have to bear the burden of history?” (440, emphasis in original). His fictional autobiography
answers this question through a narrative that entwines his personal and family’s story with that
of the subcontinent. Saleem claims to bear the “burden of history” because he and India were
born simultaneously on August 15, 1947. But Saleem asks the question while fleeing Bangladesh
after serving in West Pakistan’s army as it tried to violently suppress the independence
movement. Another question precedes the burden of history. “Why should I,” Saleem asks,
“accept the blame for what-was-not-done by Pakistani troops in Dacca?” (440). This is the
primary question at hand, and the “burden of history,” indeed the whole of Saleem’s narration,
may be read as an elaborate obfuscation of his self-admitted guilt.
To demystify Saleem’s account, this essay reads the literary logics of his defense—
metaphor, allegory and hyperbole—as well as their mnemonic foundations against the historical
background of the Bangladesh Liberation War. I begin with Saleem’s conscription into and
service with the West Pakistani army during a bout of amnesia to demonstrate the novel’s
decoupling of nationalism and soldiering. Saleem participates in the violent suppression of the
Bangladesh independence struggle but tries to exonerate himself, strangely, by pleading guilty
for causing the whole war. His claim depends on a hyperbolic memory that remembers strange
and disconnected consequences, rewriting them in causal chains that render him guilty for the
1971 war, thereby obfuscating the particularities of his crimes. These weird mnemonic relations
also underpin Saleem’s claim to allegorize the nation and admit infinite guilt for all that befalls it.
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This absurdity prompts a turn to his midnight twin, Shiva, and a brief material account of Cold
War weapons flows.
In these militant shadows, Saleem’s defense rings true by lampooning atomized
indictments as caricatures of justice, blaming individuals instead of, say, arms dealing Security
Council powers. Saleem’s allegory is already entrenched in the geostrategic flow of Cold War
weapons supplied by the United States, France, the Soviet Union and China. These machinations
render individual indictments absurd without also letting perpetrators off the hook as
overdetermined victims of history. Moreover, the novel’s account of weapons trafficking
troubles the ostensible antiimperialism of national sovereignty and critiques standing armies as
the open wounds of capital unsheathed. The essay’s final section attends to this tension by
returning to Kashmir, a contested space host to the ongoing conflict between India and Pakistan,
a battle for which both nations seek weapons. Saleem begins his story in Kashmir to both
foreshadow and obfuscate the real beginning in Pakistan.
War Crimes
A few years after Saleem’s family emigrates to Pakistan, the Indo-Pakistan war of 1965
begins. During Indian air raids a bomb strikes his family home in Lahore, killing everyone, and
throwing a family heirloom high in the air and down onto Saleem’s head. This item from the past
becomes “what-purifies-and-sets-me-free”; Saleem attains amnesiac purity in Pakistan, the Land
of the Pure. Conscripted into the West Pakistani army, “emptied of history” and having learned
the “arts of submission” he does what he is told to do. “To sum up: I became a citizen of
Pakistan” (403).
Saleem seems to agree that military duty—“the arts of submission”— epitomizes
citizenship but eliminates any honor or romance such service usually confers. For Benedict
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Anderson, an imagined “fraternity” makes it possible “for so many millions of people, not so
much to kill, as willingly die” for their nation (7). Saleem, however, is “unable to remember grief,
numb as ice [and] wiped clean as a slate” (402). The fraternity produced by imagined
communities vanishes at the precise moment when it ostensibly drives soldiering. He does not
volunteer for army service but rather is betrayed into it by his (not biological) sister after
professing to love her. Rejecting his impure love, Jamila hands the hospitalized Saleem over to
the army and continues her career singing patriotic songs that serenade troops to their death.
Saleem’s army duty begins with the failed fraternity of family betrayal and requires numbness,
not the overwhelming passion for another that rejuvenates the hero to risk his life again.6 Instead,
“wiped clean,” Saleem does not even remember his own name. He takes the nickname buddha,
“old man” (402).7
When the fellow soldiers of his small unit ask, “you don’t feel bad? Somewhere you’ve
maybe got mother father sister”; the buddha replies, “Don’t try and fill my head with all that
history. I am who I am, that’s all there is” (403, italics in text). Only the numb present exists
during Saleem’s stint in the army. The three sixteen-year-old soldiers he trains with are
amnesiacs of a different sort. Too young to have those memories of “love or famine” that enable
a firm grasp of reality, they fall prey to “legends and gossip,” imagining themselves as action
heroes and secret agents (401). Unmoored from history, they, like Saleem, “obey
unquestioningly,” “seek unflaggingly,” “arrest remorselessly” (400). Together, they form Unit 22
of CUTIA—Canine Units for Tracking and Intelligence Activities.
Tasked with rooting out “undesirable elements” the CUTIA units, joining ninety
thousand West Pakistani troops, fly into the East Wing dressed as civilians. After landing they
change back into military uniforms and on March 25, 1971, begin the violent suppression of the
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East Wing’s independence movement. As the designated canine of his unit, the buddha leads his
fellow soldiers to arrest Sheik Mujib Rahman, the opposition Awami League’s political leader
who declared independence earlier that day. They watch the massacre of intellectuals at the
University of Dacca, witness soldiers raping women, burning newspaper offices and city slums.
West Pakistani soldiers seize poets and professors, shoot Awami Leaguers along with
Communists. The soldiers of Unit 22 vomit from the stench of burning flesh and turn away from
the “weren’t-couldn’t-have-been true” events unfolding around them to continue their work
(410). The buddha merely sniffs out the undesirables and leaves “the rest to the soldier boys”
(411).
The soldiers assassinate “Father Time” in a rice paddy before fleeing into the Sundarbans,
“the jungle which is so thick that history has hardly ever found the way in” (413). They emerge
months later after the monsoon season in a “drowned rice-paddy” (423).8 This journey of zero
distance draws them into “a darker heart of madness,” a hallucinatory voyage that, echoing
Joseph Conrad, figures the perpetration of genocide, not an escape from it. Freezing time,
hallucinations, the soldiers’ awakenings to guilt—these experiences are not incompatible with
continuing military service but the novel’s representation of its psychic process. Indeed, Saleem
hopes this chapter of his autobiography articulates the “condition of spirit” in which the real
world of their genocidal mission takes on the “altered light” of “absurd fantasy” (417). This
altered condition suffers from an “overdose of reality,” which gives birth “to a miasmic longing
for flight into the safety of dreams” (414). However, the “historyless” rainforest provides no
safety but instead assaults them with the “accusing eyes of the wives of men they had tracked
down and seized, the screaming and monkeygibbering of children left fatherless by their work”
(418). His fellow soldiers deafen their ears with jungle mud to mute the “lamentations of
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families”; the buddha, however, continues to listen “as though he were bowing his head before
the inevitability of his guilt” (421).
Hyperbolically (Not) Guilty
Saleem does not distance himself from his role in war atrocities although, strictly
speaking, he never pulls the trigger. Saleem, however, cannot entirely identify himself with “the
buddha” who remains a strange doppelganger that must be addressed simultaneously as “he (or I)”
or “I, he” (403). Saleem does not finally take recourse in estrangement or amnesia. Instead, he
makes the double move of distancing himself from his amnesiac double, “not I, He. He, the
buddha,” and conversely arguing that, “even in those depths of withdrawal from responsibility, I
remained responsible, through the working of the metaphorical modes of connection, for the
belligerent events of 1971” (405).
Saleem encases his admission in the literary logics of metaphor and hyperbole; his
amnesiac secession from history serves as a metaphor for the East Wing’s secession from West
Pakistan. But Saleem’s narration inverts this relationship so that East Pakistan’s drive for
regional autonomy and Sheik Mujib Rahman’s declaration of an independent state take as their
guiding metaphor Saleem’s break with the consciousness of being a “homogeneous entity in time”
(404). To these “metaphorical modes of connection,” Saleem pleads guilty. He confesses to
tracking and arresting Rahman but enfolds this admission in the larger claim to be guilty for the
very reason the opposition leader’s arrest was sought—breaking from (West Pakistan’s)
consciousness. He is guilty of the crime, its context, and the victim’s provocations. Saleem uses
memory not merely as the guiding metaphor—amnesia secedes from history—but the apparatus
of prosecution; his hyperbolic memory remembers his intimate connections to the subcontinent,
which ground his hyperbolic guilt. Such hyperbole undercuts his self-indictment by exaggerating
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guilt to the point of absurdity. Saleem actually pleads innocence by indicting himself for the
whole war, hyperbolizing the respondent superior plea until he remembers only an inverted—
because innocent—caricature of his role in war atrocities.
Remembering in Hinglish
For Saleem, memory centers self-identity and judgments of previous actions as their
secondary and tertiary consequences come to light. He defines consciousness as “the awareness
of oneself as a homogenous entity in time,” which depends on “a blend of past and present” and
holds together “our then and our now.” The homogeneity of our being depends on our memory,
which acts as “the glue of personality” because we need not repeat the same behaviors to identify
as the same person (404). Secondly, if we lose the “powers of retention,” we “become incapable
of judgment, having forgotten everything to which [we can] compare anything that happened”
(512). Indeed, “morality, judgment, character…it all starts with memory…and I am keeping
carbons” (241, ellipses in original).9
These Lockean notions recall Francis Ferguson’s argument that “romantic memory”
marks an inward turn invested in recognizing the connection between my self and my actions in
the world. Since an act’s secondary or tertiary consequences only register in the past tense,
memory obliges one to reexamine and “redescribe” the link between action and results (523).
Such redescriptions, however, risk producing infinite guilt by joining an act and all its
unintended consequences in causal chains. The resulting guilt paralyzes actors by denying them
the ability to endorse any action, fearful of all that may follow. Saleem seems to indict himself in
precisely this way, retrospectively redescribing strange and unintended consequences until he
assumes guilt for the subcontinent’s twentieth-century history. This hyperbole of self-indictment
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requires a frantic narrative form that remembers ever more events and sequences them into
causal chains.
In his preface, Rushdie argues that the novel’s narrative style attempts to create a
“literary idiolect to blend with the idiosyncrasies of ‘Hinglish’ and ‘Bambaiyya,’ the polyglot
street slang of Bombay” (xi). A part of this idiolect is repetition, of clauses—“there will be knees
and a nose, a nose and knees”—of Saleem’s self-consciousness—“And already I can see the
repetitions beginning”—and the repetition of his autobiography; he recounted his story three
times already and recites it to his lover Padma while writing, doubling the moment of
composition (96, 7).10 His first recitation comes in the Sundarbans jungle where, “incapable of
continuing in the submissive performance of his duty,” he leads his fellow soldiers in a bid to
desert the army (414). Haunted by the memories and guilt of their war crimes, Saleem ascends
from amnesia’s false Eden when a snake bites him. Saleem’s story pours out, beginning with his
midnight birth to the unholy war the buddha and his unit currently wage. His fellow soldier
replies, “so many bad things, no wonder he kept his mouth shut” (420). Rather than silence and
amnesia, Saleem defends himself by speaking prolifically, repeating his story repeatedly and
blaming himself for the subcontinent’s twentieth-century history to obfuscate his role in war
atrocities.
At the moment of his birth, for instance, Saleem’s father Ahmed clumsily drops a chair
and shatters his toe. Saleem duly indicts himself for the accident:
Yes, it was my fault (despite everything)…it was the power of my face,
mine and nobody else’s, which caused Ahmed Sinai’s hands to release
the chair; which caused the chair to drop…the falling chair shattered his
toe. (130)
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That Saleem would blame his infant self for another’s awkward handling of a chair is strange
enough, but utterly bizarre when one considers that he is not the infant. Rather, it is Shiva, his
midnight twin with whom he is switched at birth. The drive to create this illogical causal link
pauses with the parenthetical “(despite everything),” which both insists on the causal chain and
breaks it apart by acknowledging that these events (birth and broken toe) do not cohere.
Ferguson terms “circumstantial memory” such events that cannot link together but must stand
alone and retain their vividness. Saleem drives to overwrite these moments through a hyperbolic
memory that trumps its own disintegration by insisting “it must be true; because what followed,
followed” (474). These circular arguments recur when he cuts out the newspaper headline,
“After Nehru, Who?” for the question mark (298). The answer indicts Saleem:
And my grandfather was the founder of my family, and my fate was
linked by my birthday to that of the nation, and the father of the nation
was Nehru. Nehru’s death: can I avoid the conclusion that that, too, was
all my fault? (319)
Despite the absurdity of Saleem’s final claim to responsibility for Nehru’s death, the moment
offers an insight into the way he produces guilt. Saleem’s grandfather, Nehru, and his own fate,
are brought together in a narrative arc, the keystone of which conflates “father” and “founder.”
Aadam Aziz, Saleem’s grandfather, founds his family and Nehru fathers the nation and both
social units have their center in Saleem who is fathered-founded by fate, the grandest patriarch of
all. More than mere alliteration but less than rational––certainly below the threshold of legal
prosecution––Saleem’s self-centered muddling of nation and family evinces another literary
logic of his defense; he allegorizes the nation and therefore is guilty of all that befalls it.
National Allegory
!

27
If the novel’s allegory is a “literalization of metaphor,” Saleem gives literal life to the
dead metaphor of a nation’s ‘birth,’ and channels his hyperbolic memory and guilt by narrating
himself as an allegory of India (Kortenaar 43). By making dead metaphors literal the novel’s
allegory also makes events hyperbolic. Although the OED dictates that one should not
understand hyperbole “literally,” Saleem creates hyperbole precisely by making metaphors literal.
For instance, India’s rapid and uneven industrialization registers literally on Saleem’s bandied
toddler legs, a base allegorically bent under the weight of his responsibility for the nation. As
Kortenaar remarks, “if India were a person, it would be a grotesque such as Saleem, its paternity
would be in dispute, and its ability to tell its story would be in question” (46). Nationalizing
himself through allegory, Saleem disburses the blame of his war crimes by literalizing the
“imagined communion” Benedict Anderson argues helps establish the nation as an imagined
community.
Saleem’s strongest communion with India comes through his telepathic communications
with the other magical children born in the first hour of India’s independence. He becomes a
radio and acts “as a sort of national network.” By transforming his mind he could “turn it into a
kind of forum in which they could talk to one another, through me” (259). Beyond the sudden
shock of discovering this power and the onrush of voices, Saleem hears the subcontinent’s
multilingualism as “the voices babbled in everything from Malayalam to Naga dialects, from the
purity of Lucknow Urdu to the southern slurrings of Tamil” (192). Deeper probing, “below the
surface transmissions” reveals “universally intelligible thought-forms which far transcended
words” (192).
In Rushdie’s novelistic vocabulary, universal “thought-forms” become the magical-realist
equivalent to Anderson’s print-language, a shared field of intelligibility that transcends local
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particularities and grounds national consciousness. Such universal comprehensibility allegorizes
the imposition of Hindi as India’s national language by making literal its elision of intra-national
linguistic battles. It is no mistake that Saleem juxtaposes his discovery of “universal thoughtforms” with “the partition of [his home] state of Bombay along linguistic boundaries––the dream
of Maharashtra was at the head of some processions, the mirage of Gujarat led the others forward”
(191). These language marches succeed and Bombay is divided into two states. In this context,
the desire for unity is an understandable, if not endorsable, response to the state’s fragmentation.
Moreover, Saleem’s ruminations on linguistic sectarianism allude to the first confrontations
between East Pakistan and its rulers in Rawalpindi.
Without the sutures of universal thought forms, the question of official language remains
an open wound. In 1948, Pakistan’s Prime Minister Liquat Ali Khan rejected the Bengali
speaking East Wing’s demand for dual official languages, Bengali and Urdu. He claimed that
Urdu was both a lingua franca and the “language of the Muslim nation” (cited in Ayoob and
Subrahmanyam, 31). M.A. Jinnah, the ‘father’ of Pakistan, argued the same line at Dacca
University in the East Wing, and the students—Mujibur Rahman among them—jeered him off
the stage (Ayoob and Subrahmanyam, 31).11 When Saleem and his fellow Pakistani soldiers
arrive in the Eastern wing to set the stage for military repression they tap their feet to the tune of
“Amar Sonar Bangla” (Our Golden Bengal), although “none of [them] could understand Bengali”
(408). Unable to comprehend the verses of Rabindranath Tagore’s song turned into a hymn for
independence, the Pakistani soldiers are “protected from the insidious subversion of the lyric”
(408). Saleem’s sardonic comment and translations of select verses—“they madden my heart
with delight”—foreground the linguistic discordance between Pakistan’s two wings (408, my
emphasis). In this context, language divides and cannot make compatriots legible. Saleem’s unit
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shuffles past “fluttering newspapers in curious curlicued script, through [the] empty fields and
abandoned settlements” left in the wake of genocide (425). Universal thought forms ultimately
allow Saleem to elide, if not entirely ignore, the dire consequences of the subcontinent’s
numerous languages; but even telepathic communion with magical children cannot create the
imagined ground for Saleem to practice a democratic union with his fellow citizens, a solidarity
worth fighting for.
The Midnight’s Children’s Conference communes daily from midnight to one a.m. “in [a
telepathic] lok sabha or parliament” (259). Differences between their (magical) powers and
material lives rive the MCC just as they do the nation’s governing institutions. Unable to decide
whose power is greatest, the children defer to Saleem, their medium of communication. He
rejects the title “chief” and insists that they form a “family, of a kind,” of which he is “just the
oldest,” a “big brother” (260-1). Available here are all the ingredients for a national imagined
community but rather than solidarity a “many-headed monster, speak[s] in the myriad tongue of
Babel” (262). Nationalism fails at the point of emergence. The MCC literalizes the voices of
democratic constituencies clamoring to be heard and lead the way forward. Shiva offers that he
and Saleem should be “joint bosses of this gang” because, the future army major argues
tautologically, “gangs need gang bosses” (252).
Shiva
If Saleem is India born disfigured, then his midnight twin Shiva is the nation’s militant,
impoverished other half. When “the memory of his actuality” grows dull, Saleem’s rival comes
to represent “all the vengefulness and violence and simultaneous-love-and-hate-of-Things in the
world” (342). The ambiguity of simultaneous love and hate tempers Shiva’s brutality. It is Shiva,
after all, who fights in the Indian army and becomes a war hero in the military intervention
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against West Pakistan’s genocide. He represents a complicated indictment of militarism and its
“world of startling uniformity” (250). Shiva murders easily but also kills killers. After that saving
moment, however, Shiva aids tyranny, helping sterilize the poor, crack down on Communists
and round up other Midnight’s Children under Indira Gandhi’s Emergency rule. The military
forms a powerful conjunction of interests, a bulbous joint literalized in Shiva’s enormous knees
(rather than bandy legs), an ongoing articulation of nationalism, capital and the international
flow of weapons.
Far from disinterested solidarity, Shiva’s nationalism emphasizes material relations over
imagined communion:
money-and-poverty, and have-and-lack, and right-and-left, there is only
me-against-the-world! The world is not ideas, rich boy; the world is no
place for dreamers and their dreams; the world, little Snotnose, is things.
Things and their makers rule the world…For things, the country is run.
Not for people. For things, America and Russia send aid; but five
hundred million stay hungry…Today, what people are is just another
kind of thing. (293)
Shiva highlights India’s entrenchment in the Cold War geo-politics between America, China and
the Soviet Union. Moreover, his attention to class differences and nationalism’s material base is
both necessary and accurate. “For what reason you’re rich and I’m poor? Where’s the reason in
starving, man?” (252). Shiva offers a crude materialist analysis but does not take the Marxist
reprieve of class solidarity as a solution or even a starting point to counter Saleem. Instead,
atomistic individualism, “me-against-the-world,” is the first principle in a world that offers no
larger narrative, no larger structure of meaning. This vision of the world reduces people to “just
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another kind of thing” to be made, exchanged or destroyed as the strongest power dictates. For
Saleem, humans reduced to mere materiality are dust particles, “anonymous, and necessarily
oblivious”; they cannot make a nation (34). For Shiva, however, nationalism is unnecessary for
military service.
To serve in West Pakistan’s army, Saleem required amnesia and the attendant inability to
feel responsible for his actions granted him innocence and numb service; Shiva, on the other
hand, already rejects larger narratives that may make him responsible to others; he fights for
himself, to make himself a more powerful thing than the lesser things around him. Insofar as
Shiva does not care to remember those strangers, his fellow citizens and East Bengalis, who
benefit from his military service, he too is an amnesiac. That is, Shiva’s narrative begins and
ends with himself as the atomistic individual whose material circumstances improve regardless
of the cost to others. Shiva willingly takes credit for his murderous actions but unlike Saleem, he
is on the right side of history in the 1971 war. The novel avoids easy solutions here because both
Saleem’s amnesia and Shiva’s ruthless individualism disconnect soldiering from the fraternity of
imagined communities; both forget the nation they serve, or worse, persecute their compatriots.
Despite their antagonisms, the two actors overlap in their critiques of Cold War geopolitics.
Warring Systems
Saleem contextualizes his amnesia and the atrocities that follow in the struggles of Cold
War machinations and the subsequent trade in weapons. Such arms trafficking, Saleem hints,
exonerates the individual soldier’s role in war crimes; after all, it is an air raid’s fire and bombs
that “purifies” Saleem and begins his amnesiac stint in the army. He only survived the 1965 war
“because nobody sold our would-be assassins the bombs bullets aircraft necessary for the
completion of our destruction” (393). In Bangladesh, Saleem’s unit fights with “American guns,
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American tanks and aircraft,” shielded by President Nixon who infamously tilted toward West
Pakistan in a bid to bridge the diplomatic gap with China (431). Like Shiva, Saleem too is a thing,
bought, sold and used as the greatest power sees fit.
The battle of superpowers creates for Shiva a world of basic binaries, “have-and-lack,
left-and-right,” in which people as things are subordinate to thing makers. Shiva inadvertently
voices the important critique that focusing on explosions of genocidal violence may obscure our
attention to the systemic violence endemic to capitalism and statecraft. Saleem counters by
attending to the dialectical entwinement of capitalism’s systemic injustices and eruptions of
sweeping murder. While Shiva rejects “dreamers and their dreams,” Saleem argues that dreams
too circulate like things, materializing as Mirages and Mystéres, the French fighter jets and
bombers deployed against India’s Soviet MiG jets.
After Independence, the Soviet Union, China, France and United States all sold weapons
to the partitioned neighbors, who in turn vied for superpower support. Indocentric perspectives
on the 1971 war lambast America as an imperial hegemon, China as a militant hypocrite for their
support of West Pakistan during the conflict, and praise the Soviet Union as India’s lone ally in
the Security Council.12 This simplified version gets the basic coordinates right but neglects the
nuances of geopolitical maneuvers. While the Soviet Union publicly sided with India during the
war, it sold $30 million in military equipment to Pakistan in 1968, “including medium tanks,
rocket launchers, artillery, and helicopters,” some of which West Pakistan used in Dacca so as to
avoid using U.S equipment, thus frustrating its relationship with Washington (Sisson and Rose
237, 258). Meanwhile, both the U.S. and China cut off new arms supplies to West Pakistan when
the repression began in March, but continued to ship replacement parts and materials sold under
contracts approved before their embargoes; the Soviets did the same. Sadly, India’s pioneering
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non-alignment policy only meant keeping out of the “quarrel between the two power blocs. It
was not neutrality or equidistance from the two super powers.” Most importantly, the policy
never excluded “accepting defense equipment from one of the major powers” (Ayoob and
Subrahmanyam, 194).
The novel both mocks such militarism and acknowledges its necessity in an
independence struggle. When the West Pakistan General Tiger Niazi surrenders to the Indian
General Sam Manekshaw, Saleem imagines the two friends converse in Britishisms—“I say,
bloody fine to see you Tiger, you old devil!”—and sing “Auld Lang Syne” together; like Ayub
Kahn, general cum premier, they are “not MADE AS ENGLAND” but “certainly Sandhurst trained”
(437, 330). However, these students of the Royal Military Academy also train the Mukti
Bahini—East Pakistani soldiers, police and other volunteers. These independence fighters sought
temporary refuge in West Bengal, where the Indian military helps organize and supply them
(Ayoob and Subrahmanyam, 156). The novel empathizes with the Bangladeshi independence
fighters by pushing them offstage as they successfully escape capture by the invading army;
“Soldiers came looking for Bahini and killed many many, also my son” (428). These sympathies
stand in tension with the novel’s indictment of military service but align with a larger critique of
individual guilt amidst global bellicosity.
Saleem’s evasion of personal guilt through a hyperbolic national allegory seems
understandable given his entrenchment in the flow of weapons and geostrategic concerns; he
combines Fredric Jameson’s infamous claim that “third-world literature” should be read as
“national allegories” with the dictum “always historicize!” 13 Any proper historical account
deconstructs the always already international situation of national allegories, especially of the
post-colonial South. However, the novel builds on Saleem’s failed account by pointing to the

!

34
limits of Jameson’s dictum and taking it too literally. Rather than enabling the prosecution of war
crimes, Saleem’s allegory defends his soldiering by historicizing it as one episode in a larger
narrative of belligerent nationalisms. Moreover, Saleem caricatures history through a selfcentered, strangely causal narrative to lampoon individual indictments in the international state
system. Prosecutions of those who hold and use weapons never question the weapons
suppliers—all permanent members of the UN Security Council in this case—or the global
political dynamics that arm perpetrators. Saleem’s allegory troubles the dictum ‘always
historicize’—how far back?—by making difficult what might be a sloganized version of David
Harvey’s work, ‘always spatialize!’—how far abroad?
The war crimes Saleem commits require thinking space and time not merely as absolute
(fixed) or relative (redefinable), but as relational. Harvey theorizes that a “relational view of
space holds that there is no such thing as space or time outside of the processes that define
them”; “Processes do not occur in space,” Harvey goes on, “but define their own spatial frame”
(123). Saleem’s narrative defense of his war crimes takes the process of genocide seriously and
acknowledges its ability to bend space-time, pulling global matter into its orbit: his amnesia, the
Sundarbans episode, American guns and diplomatic support for Pakistan, its use of French
fighter jets and close alliances with China, Soviet military equipment on both sides and
diplomatic support for India. Entrenched in the global flow of weapons, capital and political
pressure, the novel uses Saleem’s allegory to critique the atomized indictments of ICC tribunals
as allegories of justice, hyperbolic prosecutions that make absurdly literal the metaphor of
soldiering; to give one’s life for the nation. But this argument goes too far if it absolves ground
level actors like Saleem and reduces regional players to puppets or client states without
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acknowledging their own goals. Since Independence and Partition, India and West Pakistan have
fought bitterly over Kashmir and sought weapons for the conflict.
Kashmir
Even amidst superpower intrigues, the Kashmir conflict focuses regional anxieties
between the partitioned neighbors whose concerns, paranoid or real, lead to the 1965 war in
which Saleem achieves amnesia. This war affirmed East Pakistan’s suspicion that their
“economic and political (and now defense) interests” mattered less to Rawalpindi than the
struggle for Kashmir (Ayoob and Subrahmanyam, 65). Saleem’s uncle General Zulfikar orders
mines placed along the border between West Pakistan and India leaving “those damn blackies”
in East Pakistan to “look after themselves” (327). Indeed, Rahman’s popular six-point program
asked explicitly for a regional military force, an ordinance factory and military academy. Given
these ongoing tensions, Saleem makes the case for the historical overdetermination of his actions
by beginning his narrative in Kashmir with Tai the boatman, who fights to exile the foreign
influence of Aadam Aziz’s German medical training.
Aadam’s childhood mentor Tai rejects him and his “foreign” training, materialized in a
“big bag full of foreign machines,” “that thing made of a pig’s skin that makes one unclean just
by looking at it” (15). For Tai, “the bag represents Abroad; it is the alien thing, the invader,
progress,” which, like Aadam, he wants exiled from the Kashmiri valley. Tai reads “Abroad” as
those elsewheres with Great Wars and pigskin bags that invade Srinagar, provoking his
combative language. Many things happen Abroad during the Kashmir chapters, but these events
are peripheral no matter their significance elsewhere. As Doctor Aadam Aziz meets his future
wife Naseem, “far away the Great War moved from crisis to crisis” (22). “On the day the World

!

36
War end[s],” Aadam finally sees Naseem’s face and finishes falling in love (23). In Saleem’s
narration, World War I happens Abroad.
Such distancing glosses what Dipesh Chakrabarty terms “provincializing Europe” so that
Europe is the Abroad, the periphery from which Aadam returns to the Kashmiri center. This
spatial reorientation meshes with Chakrabarty’s, and the narrative’s, critique of enlightenment
historiography and undoes what Johannes Fabian calls “the denial of coevalness”; the love story
unfolding in Kashmir exists at the same temporal moment as those world-historical events; they
belong to the same modernity. 14 Tai, however, understands the globe’s simultaneity and
campaigns to exile Abroad’s influence on Kashmir.
He wants Aadam, “our foreign-returned doctor…that nakkoo, that German Aziz,” to
leave lest a world war erupt in his home valley (24). Despite Aadam’s departure, however,
Kashmir soon becomes a battleground for warring nations.15 When Tai demands “Kashmir for
the Kashmiris,” he is shot by either Indian or Pakistani troops (35). Tai misunderstands the
problem insofar as he locates Abroad only in Europe, forgetting the proximity of British
colonialism and the partitions left in its wake. He succeeds in banishing the German trained
Aadam Aziz but fails to survive Kashmir’s occupation by Indian and Pakistani armies. “In those
days,” Saleem reminisces of his grandfather’s home, “there was no [Indian] army camp at the
lakeside, no endless snakes of camouflaged trucks and jeeps” and “no soldiers” (5). These first
mentions of military power in the Kashmir chapters foreshadow Saleem’s own soldiering. He
begins his autobiography in this prelapsarian space because Kashmir hosts the subcontinent’s
perpetual war between rival nations, for which Saleem claims responsibility.
Inheriting his grandfather’s hope of returning to Kashmir, Saleem circulates it to
belligerent politicians by “dream[ing] Kashmir into the fantasies of our rulers,” and instigating
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the 1965 Indo-Pakistan war (387). His dreams merge with the fantasies of Pakistan’s leadership
in a perverse imagined communion, which—like print capitalism and telepathy—produces both
national solidarity and military excursions abroad. Beyond amnesia and military conscription,
Saleem claims that the “hidden purpose” of the 1965 war was “nothing more or less than the
elimination of my benighted family from the face of the earth” (386). Saleem’s absurd claim to
catalyze a war aimed at the systematic destruction of his family eerily displaces his role in the
systematic destruction of dissenting Bangladeshis.
This parallel again evinces the hyperbolic logic of his appeal; Saleem is guilty of war
crimes, for instigating the war (amnesiac secession from history), the previous war that
successfully destroyed his family and the Kashmir conflict that burns steady in the post-colonial
subcontinent. That is, Saleem’s entwinement with the subcontinent’s belligerent twentiethcentury history makes his guilt both inevitable and excusable. To prosecute him is to indict the
whole historical situation because he allegorizes—literally embodies—his nation. Such allegory
writes national history hyperbolically to make legible the global determinations warring in the
subcontinent and, conversely, to explicate the international stakes of regional conflicts. 16 Where
Saleem’s defense by allegory fails, the novel succeeds in indicting both local war criminals and
the Cold War weapons distributors who comprise the UN Security Council. The manufacture and
export of weapons to regions of “strategic concern” subverts the ostensible antiimperialism
claimed in nation state sovereignty and their professional armies. Midnight’s Children critiques
the need for national standing armies even while empathizing with the militant struggle
independence often requires.
Postcolonial studies, which focuses on imperial brutality and subaltern resistance, must
frame these within a critical material account that rejects the necessity of professional armies

!

38
under the false name of antiimperialism. An ongoing decolonization project must question the
belligerence of armed sovereign borders. This difficult conclusion sympathizes with the
necessity of armed antiimperial struggle but begs for a conversation about military service
without upholding it as the apex of citizenship, national or otherwise, by attending to systemic
injustices, eruptions of violence and the revolutionary struggle against both.
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Chapter 2: Against Indifference: International Weapons and Narratives in
Rwanda

[At the] root of it all, however, is the fundamental indifference of the
world community to the plight of seven to eight million black Africans in
a tiny country that had no strategic or resource value to any world power.
(Dallaire 6)
When discussing the 1994 Rwandan genocide, writers frequently blame international
“indifference” without elaborating on what that might mean. At first glance, indifference seems
to indicate that the international community did not care about the execution of approximately
900,000 Rwandan Tutsis and moderate Hutus, and therefore provided no material aid to the
country during the crisis.17 This banal version of indifference—nobody cared about Rwanda—
implies humanitarianism as its opposite. Indeed, the international community responded to the
massive refugee exodus following the genocide with a massive humanitarian aid mission that
attempted to appease both global conscience and Rwandan suffering. Unfortunately, the resulting
refugee and aid camps helped genocidaires hide, reorganize, and refuel before launching more
attacks.18 While most accounts of the Rwandan genocide critique the poor political analysis
supporting the humanitarian response and its dire consequences, the story of global
“indifference” and its relation to humanitarianism remains unexplored. I argue that the common
accusation of global “indifference” helped animate the humanitarian response while also
obscuring the deep investments in Rwanda of major global powers. That is, the problem was not
that no one cared about Rwanda but that some Security Council powers, especially France, were
overinvested—politically and militarily—in Rwanda and Central Africa. At stake here is a
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reevaluation of a dominant narrative trope surrounding the Rwandan genocide as well as an
immunization against the ruse of “indifference” for future “humanitarian” emergencies.
In this chapter I advance a material critique of the narrative of indifference in Rwanda by
demonstrating that the international community supplied weapons and peacekeeping missions
both, simultaneously affecting a disinterested solidarity and promoting militant profiteering.
These tensions complicate the story of indifference, which appears in texts from a variety of
genres, including journalism, military memoir, and literary fiction.
American reporter and New Yorker correspondent Philip Gourevitch’s We Wish to Inform
You That Tomorrow We Will Be Killed with Our Families lists “the indifference of the outside
world” as one ingredient in “an excellent recipe for a culture of genocide” (180).19 In Shake
Hands With the Devil: The Failure of Humanity in Rwanda, Canadian Lt. Gen. Roméo Dallaire,
the Force Commander of the UN Assistance Mission For Rwanda (UNAMIR) argues that the
country’s story is one of “betrayal, failure, naïveté, indifference, hatred, genocide, war,
inhumanity and evil,” in which “the developed world, impassive and apparently unperturbed, sat
back and watched the unfolding apocalypse or simply changed channels” (xxiv). I read these
texts against my primary text Murambi, The Book of Bones, a rare fictional account by
Senegalese author Boubicar Boris Diop. The novel opens the day the murders begin when Tutsi
shopkeeper Michel Serumundo laments that the Football World Cup would occupy the planet
uninterested in “the same old story of blacks beating up on each other” (9). In her forward to the
novel, Eileen Julien hopes that Diop’s work will help readers overcome “the numbed
indifference or silent acquiescence of which we are all a part” (x). While these texts belong to
different genres, they overlap as travel accounts responding to a relatively brief stay in Rwanda.
This broad categorization does not intend to skate over their formal differences but construct an
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archive of texts to explore “indifference” as a trope. Reading these varied texts as kinds of travel
literature, moreover, helps explain their concern with and use of “indifference”; these authors
and texts initially know nothing about Rwanda and come to care deeply about the country. In
other words, they journey on the narrative arc from ignorance—the ostensible root of
indifference—to humanitarianism and want their readers to do the same. Diop and Gourevitch
visit Rwanda in the aftermath of the genocide, while Dallaire participates intimately in the failed
peacekeeping mission and its attached political processes before returning to Canada stricken
with PTSD. Even so, Dallaire remains hopeful; “After all I have witnessed, I too believe we can
prevail” (548). Diop’s novel seems to endorse this progressive narrative from distance to
intimacy and activism.
In this chapter's first section I takes up one major narrative in Murambi—the novel
deploys no less than nine focalizers—that appears to offer this affirmative lesson in the story of
Cornelius Uvimana’s return to Rwanda after the genocide. Uvimana progresses from an exiled
acquaintance with the genocide to a deep immersion in its machinations and concludes by
affirming literature’s power to awaken readers. The novel’s disjunctive form interrupts this
banal, if powerful, conclusion by framing it with alternate narratives and other more nefarious
focalizers. An analysis of these formal ruptures provokes my turn to Dallaire’s memoir and an
analysis of global overinvestments in Rwanda.
Lt. Gen. Roméo Dallaire’s presence in the middle section of my analysis reflects his
unfortunate placement as the fulcrum between the international communities of the global North
and South. As the Force Commander for UNAMIR, Dallaire enacted the Security Council’s
orders while negotiating—and quite literally translating—between the anglophone RPF
(Rwandese Patriot Front) and the francophone RGF (Rwandese Government Forces).
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Consequently, his formulation—“betrayal, failure, naïveté, indifference, hatred, genocide, war,
inhumanity and evil”—places “indifference” between naïveté and hatred, failure and genocide,
betrayal and war. This syntactic location suggests that "indifference" is not merely a non-space
between naïve caring and brutal hatred, but the battleground between these contradictory and
seemingly disconnected phenomena. Torn between failure and genocide, betrayal and war, the
trope of “international indifference” only makes sense if we take it to mean the clash of such
contradictory vectors. In other words, Dallaire's formulation suggests that indifference is
produced.
In the second section I attempt to displace the commonplace understanding of
indifference as a synonym for apathy and argue for the production of indifference in
bureaucracies (the UN) and, more largely, in situations of contradictory investments. In the last
section I trace these material investments, specifically weapons shipments, which prompt a
return to Murambi and attention to the text's indictment of France's neocolonial African policy
while also gesturing towards the antiimperial potential of indifference.
Writing Development
Two major sections of Diop’s novel chronicle Cornelius Uvimana’s return to Rwanda
after a twenty-five year exile in Djibouti. He fled Rwanda as a boy after a period of violence
against Tutsis, in which he and his mother were targeted. Uvimana returns to Rwanda believing
that his whole family perished in the genocide, only to learn something worse. Uvimana’s father,
Dr. Joseph Karekezi, orchestrated the mass murder of fifty thousand people at Murambi
Polytechnic Institute. Branded the “Butcher of Murambi,” Dr. Karekezi ordered the execution of
his Tutsi wife and young children as well. When Uvimana learns that “he was the son of a
monster,” his life and return from exile “could no longer have the same meaning” (78). “He had
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suddenly discovered that he had become the perfect Rwandan: Both guilty and a victim” (78).
This realization concludes the first section of Uvimana’s development as he enters the polity by
coming to know what everyone else already knows (Slaughter 3). The second stage passes
through open grave memorials.
Uvimana must visit the Murambi memorial to confront the slaughter organized by his
own father, who destroyed his mother and siblings. His response to the genocide uses words,
even words as weapons of war. While the form these words will take changes over the course of
Uvimana’s development, the basic affirmation of literature’s power remains intact. He abandons
the idea of a play but does not give up on writing.
He would tirelessly recount the horror. With machete words, club words,
words studded with nails, naked words and…words covered with blood
and shit. That he could do, because he saw in the genocide of Rwandan
Tutsis a great lesson in simplicity. Every chronicler could at least learn—
something essential to his art—to call a monster by its name. (179)
Uvimana sees in the genocide and its aftermath “a great lesson in simplicity,” which
prods him into the “modest role” of “tirelessly recount[ing] the horror.” If the “essential” lesson
seems clear—“to call a monster by its name”—the proper name of that monster remains unclear.
At first glance, this Rumplestiltskin theory of writing names the monster of genocide and
critiques the international community, especially Western nations, for obfuscating the situation
lest they fulfill their obligations under the UN Genocide Convention. But recounting the horror,
as Dallaire did in his daily reports, failed to move the international community. Even worse,
these dispatches convinced the Security Council that an intervention force could do “little good”
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(Barnett 560). Dallaire and Uvimana assume that such accounts fight against the monster of
indifference whose defeat will allow their readers to confront tragedies.
Learning to write the proper name of genocide and its executioners certainly seems an
important lesson. Uvimana believes in a “duty to get as close as he could to all suffering” (181).
By recording and sharing the horror and suffering of survivors, he will become a medium for
Murambi’s dead whose “most ardent desire was for the resurrection of the living” (181).20 If
Uvimana's narrative affirms literature's power to breathe life into half-dead affects, the novel’s
formal disjunctures bespeak a more cautious lesson: the living need no resurrection because they
are not dead, nor indifferent. Worse, some are too alive and invested in the horror of genocide.
Uvimana should realize this when his survivor-guide takes him away to larger room and asks
him to “touch a flagpole put up on top of a little pile of brown pebbles: This is where [the
French] hoisted their flag” (149). The guide tells Uvimana that the French military built the
garrisons for their humanitarian invasion, Operation Turquoise, atop the Murambi massacre
grounds. To excavate the memorial and preserve the violation required digging beneath a
military playground; the novel preserves these layers in its sedimented form.21
Those cruel days were like nothing that had ever been seen. Woven from
flashes, there were threaded with all manner of frenzy…he would never
be able to tame this whirlwind, its bright colors, its howls and its furious
twisting.
Diop’s novel weaves together flashes of experience from nine different focalizers—
victims, perpetrators and a French Colonel—whose frenzy both precedes and breaks up
Uvimana’s narrative. This formal strategy subverts an easy focus on Uvimana or an affirmative
narrative of development. Although the novel does not employ the Bildungsroman’s formal
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tautology—beginning at the end and narrating how one got there—Uvimana does develop into
an ideal human rights subject affirming the basic right to life of both the victims and his own
future vocation as a chronicler employing human rights literacy.22 But he is not the novel’s hero.
The story of Uvimana’s return to Rwanda does not even begin until we have met a
victim, a perpetrator, and a RPF-allied informant. These narratives precede and exceed
Uvimana’s story, setting a stage that formally demonstrates the need for a polyvocality the novel
bravely attempts. After Uvimana’s first section, the novel breaks again into many other voices
that speak while living through the horror of genocide. This section’s focalizers include
perpetrators, victims, and most importantly a French Colonel tasked with evacuating Dr.
Karekezi. While it is true that this formal strategy "encourage[s] the reader to view the genocide
from a variety of different angles and to resist a reductive interpretation of the events," the novel
does not simply advocate the recognition of genocide as such—rather than tribal or ethnic
warfare—by those who paid "little attention" during the 1994 massacres (Hitchcott 53, 55).23
Rather, these formal disruptions encode David Keen’s lesson that conflicts do not simply disrupt
economies and interrupt benevolent progress but continue economics by other means and create
“an alternative system of profit, power and even protection” (10-11). These alternate systems
link local extortions with “international trading networks,” allowing Rwandan genocidaires
access to South African arms and French military protection. That is, the human rights NGO’s
desire for “a speedy transition from wartime relief to development” ignores the ways
development processes both promote conflict and continue during these perilous times (10).
The survivor-guide at Murambi Polytechnic Institute tells Uvimana, “the World Bank had
given a grant” for the school’s construction, “but work had been interrupted by the events” (145).
The genocide ostensibly interrupts a “Banking bildungsroman” meant to evince the “[World]
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Bank’s extensive commitment to education” (Benjamin 162).24 Such funding inundated Rwanda
and increased by “nearly 100 percent from 1989 to 1993”; this last year’s total foreign assistance
of $334 million received an additional $130 million in “emergency aid” (Des Forges 94). Despite
the spending regulations on aid money, “Rwandan officials diverted resources intended for
civilian purposes to use by military or militia,” including purchasing arms (ibid. 94). This
militarization depends on the Banking bildungsroman and siphons monies into the arms trade
shot through with a parallel tautology of development—citizens begin as what they must
become, armed soldiers. The UN peacekeeping mission led by Dallaire tried to interrupt the flow
of arms in Rwanda.
UNAMIR and the Bureaucratic Infrastructure of Indifference
In early January 1994, a high-ranking member of the Hutu Power extremists turns
informer and warns UNAMIR of arms caches in Kigali and militias training to systematically kill
Tutsis. The informer, codenamed Jean-Pierre, discloses a mission to target Belgian soldiers—
UNAMIR’s military backbone—hoping that a few casualties will lead to the contingent’s
withdrawal. Dallaire reads this buildup as a direct threat to UNAMIR and a violation of the
Kigali Weapons Secure Area (KWSA) agreement; he sends a fax to UN’s Department of Peace
Keeping Operations announcing his plans to raid the arms caches believing that his mandate
allows this action. The reply from the head of Peacekeeping Operations, Kofi Annan, and his
deputy, Iqbal Riza, scolds Dallaire for even thinking of such action and reminds him of the
severe limitations of UNAMIR’s mandate. When Gourevitch later interviews Riza, the latter
devalues the fax as one among many correspondences with Dallaire and the UN mission. Riza
tells Gourevitch, “We get hyperbole in many reports” (106).
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Riza invokes the literary figure of hyperbole to imply that Dallaire’s fax exaggerated
reality and effectively canceled its own persuasive power. Riza’s comment on UN member state
unwillingness to contribute troops in the wake of Somalia suggests that the hyperbole was not in
the details of Dallaire’s fax but his assumption that the world community cared enough to enable
action. Riza deploys the Realpolitik commonsense that no one would have offered “our boys for
an offensive action in Rwanda” (Gourevitch 106). But Dallaire already had his “boys”—
Ghanaian and Tunisian troops lauded for their courage during the mission—and thought he was
merely informing his superiors, not asking for permission of what he read as entirely within his
mission’s mandate. Gourevitch cites a television interview Dallaire gives in which the latter
mourns the “absolute detachment of the international community and particularly of the Western
world.” “To be very candid and soldierly,” Dallaire continues, “who the hell cared about
Rwanda?” (cited in Gourevitch, 168). Dallaire’s hyperbolic fax received a hyperbolic reply, a
rejection sanctioned by an “absolute detachment” both from the situation in the Rwanda and
UN’s genocide convention. The rhetorical question, “who the hell cared about Rwanda?” repeats
across writing on the genocide because the answer—no one—is damningly commonsensical.
However, Michael Barnett’s essay “The UN Security Council, Indifference, and Genocide in
Rwanda” offers a more troubling reply to Dallaire’s question.25 Barnett served as an expert on
Rwanda for US State Department staff at the UN. To answer Dallaire, he turns to the production
of indifference in bureaucratized peacekeeping; everyone cared about Rwanda but they cared
more about the bureaucracy that regulated and authorized that caring.
Barnett works as a political science professor at the University of Wisconsin and uses
Midwestern self-deprecation to mock his status as “a seasoned veteran of Rwanda for nearly four
months,” when the genocide begins. Barnett argues that his standing as an expert derived not
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from extensive knowledge of Rwanda “but rather the culture of the policy-making process in the
U.S government and the UN” (554). Barnett expertise derives from bureaucratic tautology: “As a
political officer I was, by definition, an expert. Rwanda was my account; I was its owner and
hence a Rwanda expert” (554). The language of commerce subsidizes this bureaucratic position,
underwriting Barnett’s claim to Rwanda as “my account,” “its owner,” which confers formal, if
not entirely empty, expertise. And language is a currency indeed. Barnett’s earns expertise and
fluency with a strong purchase on UN departments, acronyms and, most importantly, “the
precise language of past mandates” (554-55). This bureaucratic insularity inhibits any substantial
knowledge of Rwanda, while doubling one’s investments in sustaining and reproducing the
bureaucracy. Following Jean Herzfeld, Barnett locates the production of indifference in this
bureaucratic self-interest that undercuts investments in populations these organization ostensibly
serve.
This suggests that one function of the UN was to distribute
accountability to the point that it becomes irretrievable. Who was to
blame for the lack of response to Rwanda? Everyone. The mere presence
of the UN allowed states (and the Secretariat) to shield themselves from
responsibility, to point fingers in all directions, and to avoid
responsibility or culpability. (575)
Barnett seems to perform the argument of bureaucratic indifference by spreading the
blame across principal actors such as the UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali as well as
the culture of bureaucracies. The former suffers “indecision to the point of paralysis, if not
complacency” and fails to provide guidance to the Security Council or transmit Dallaire’s
recommendations (559). After President Habyarimana’s plane was shot down on April 6, 1994
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Barnett argued for withdrawing UNAMIR’s “5,000 lightly-armed peacekeepers scattered
throughout Rwanda” (558). That number is greatly exaggerated, and is corrected in his book. But
it evinces the distance, or delusions, separating Security Council debates from the reality Dallaire
describes; there were “2,538 UNAMIR personnel on the ground on April 7” (231). This distance
and lack of recommendations combines with bureaucratic self-preservation—coded as a moral
obligation to preserve the UN’s reputation—so that daily reports of genocide convinced the
Security Council that a “modest-sized” intervention would do “little good and much harm both to
[the peacekeepers] and the UN’s reputation and future” (560).26 Indifference to Rwanda is
produced passively out of an over-identification with both the UN bureaucracy and national selfinterest. In a “brutal” formulation, Barnett argues, “the UN had more to lose by taking action and
being associated with another failure than it did by not taking action and allowing the genocide
in Rwanda” (561). Identifying with the bureaucracy produces “an emotional and cognitive
mechanism for producing exclusion and apathy": indifference (561).
Similarly, active anti-intervention arguments appealed to the safety of UN peacekeepers
as well as the organization’s reputation and ability to secure future resources if soldiers died.27
As Barnett summarizes, “Moral oratory draped self-interested actions. Indifference was
presentable through the appeal to the transcendental” (572). But there are problems with
Barnett’s account.
As already noted above, Barnett writes initially of over 5,000 peacekeeping troops
already deployed in Rwanda when the genocide began; as we have seen, this is simply not true.
Second, and more problematically, Barnett claims that “few, if any, member states had
independent sources of information, and they therefore relied heavily on the Secretariat for
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intelligence and policy recommendations regarding UNAMIR’s future” (559). 28 Dallaire
disagrees.
Disallowed from raiding the arms caches, Dallaire must instead brief ambassadors from
France, Belgium, and the United States in Rwanda. “None them appeared to be surprised, which
led me to conclude that our informant was merely confirming what they already knew” (148).
The lack of surprise registers powerfully on Dallaire, who fears that everyone around him knows
more about the situation than he does. Before Dallaire departs for Rwanda, the DPKO tells him
repeatedly that no one has any “interest” in Rwanda besides its former colonial rulers, Belgium
and France. However, Dallaire notes that the five permanent members of the Security Council—
France, England, China, Russia and the United States—“all had fully equipped and manned
embassies in Rwanda, including both military and intelligence attachés” (90).29 None of these
great powers, however, provide Dallaire and his staff with any intelligence. The grotesqueness of
this situation worsens when Dallaire reveals that “the French, the Belgians and the Germans had
military advisers numbering in the dozens at all levels of the military and gendarme command
and training structures in Rwanda” (90).
The French and Belgians permeate the military wings of the Rwandan government,
advising both the RGF and the Gendarmerie “from their headquarters to their training institutions
to their units in the field” (70). This network of advisers extends further and reaches deeper than
“their ambassadors or military attachés let on” (70). Dallaire prods the embassies for more
information, but they reveal nothing and leave him to wonder, “What was their actual mission in
Rwanda?” France, meanwhile, stations an elite paratrooper battalion, which remains “closemouthed about its strength and true mission in Rwanda” (71). French military aid to Rwanda
peaked twice, in October 1990 and February 1993, in the form of outright interventions to stop

!

51
the RPF. These military investments and extensive embassy networks challenge the common
accusation of Western indifference. The situation was better and worse than that. The Security
Council powers were already in Rwanda, especially France, Germany and Belgium; but they
advised the wrong side of history and trained those government forces behind whose lines the
genocidaires worked.
French military investments in Francophone Rwanda extended to “military advisers, both
in and out of uniform, to major units of the RGF.” “France was the only member on the UN
Security Council,” Dallaire continues, “that had demonstrated a clear interest in Rwanda” (62).
While France’s “clear interest” seems an advance on supposed Western indifference, Dallaire
means to indict the ostensible neutrality of peacekeeping mandates as well as French backing and
military training of a repressive regime. However, he notes a rift within French foreign policy
and its multiple authors. When Dallaire visits the French embassy to debrief them on his
preliminary recommendations for 2,500 UNAMIR troops, the military attaché leaps “into the
fray.” Arguing against the need for so many troops, the attaché claims, “France had a battalion of
only 325 personnel stationed in the country and the situation seemed to be well in hand.”
Dallaire reads the “deliberately obstructive” attaché as evidence of an “outright split” that
fractures the French foreign affairs department and ministry of defense (76). Rather than correct
these failures, the French help rescue members of the Habyarimana regime, even those complicit
in organizing and executing the genocide. Unfortunately, the French were anything but
indifferent to Rwanda and they were not alone.
Less than a week after the DPKO rejects Dallaire’s raid on arms caches, an unscheduled
military cargo plane lands in Kigali airport. UNAMIR’s military observers
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found the aircraft to be loaded with tons of artillery and mortar
ammunition. The paperwork on the plane—registrations, ownership,
insurance, manifest—mentioned companies in France, the United
Kingdom, Belgium, Egypt and Ghana. Most of the nations on the list had
troops in UNAMIR. [Major] Brent [Beardsley] asked a Belgian officer
what it felt like to be risking his life in Rwanda while his nation dealt
arms that could be used to kill him. The officer replied that peacekeeping
was peacekeeping, and business was business, and the business of
Belgium was arms. I cursed the double standard of the supposedly excolonial powers. (156)
Dallaire indicts the simultaneous arms trafficking of those nations that also contributed to
a peacekeeping mission. Such militarism is not the remnant of colonialism but an active
profiteering that jeopardizes his men and mission. The unnamed Belgian officer’s blasé response
matches Dallaire’s incredulity, as if the General naïvely forgets that both peacekeeping and arms
trafficking are just “business.” These multiple, contradictory businesses produce international
indifference, tearing apart Dallaire and UNAMIR, reducing them to witnesses of a slaughter that
the "international community" was overinvested in. Amidst these secret plots Dallaire suspects
“that these powerful nations did not want to get involved because they had a firmer grasp on the
threats to the success of the Arusha accords than the rest of us” (90). These threats undercut the
peacekeeping mission but bolster economic investments as capital flowed into Rwanda in the
shape of weapons.
French Militarism
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These formal, thematic and military concerns coalesce in Diop’s novel when a French
Colonel arrives to help Dr. Karekezi escape. Colonel Étienne Perrin’s narrative of evacuating Dr.
Karekezi precedes Uvimana’s final section and undercuts his affirmation of literature. Perrin’s
chapter demonstrates that foreign powers were not indifferent, but all too invested by
acknowledging the presence of French troops and their complicity with perpetrators. Secondly,
Dr. Karekezi showcases the profits available to weapons smugglers.
The heavy-handed dialogue between Colonel Étienne Perrin and Dr. Karekezi (“the
Butcher of Murambi”) rehearses French complicity in genocide as the consequence of
entrenched racism. Colonel Perrin laments those “crazy” men in charge of foreign affairs who
operate with “one-track minds: ‘Africa is ours, we’re not going to let it go’.” These Parisian
strategists “create African heads of state there in their offices” (121). Dr. Karekezi was merely a
pawn amidst these strategy games, serving as a useful backup to President Habyarimana, whose
concessions to the RPF during the Arusha peace accords loomed darkly over his fate. These
African strategists knew of Dr. Karekezi’s “dubious trafficking” flowing through his “tea
factory” (120). If Perrin’s indictment of French complicity and racist geo-strategies
overdetermine Dr. Karekezi, this brief allusion to weapons trafficking through a tea plantation
both bolsters and undercuts his claims.
The French foreign affairs officers know of Dr. Karekezi’s weapons smuggling because
the French national bank, Credit Lyonnais, provided a $6 million bank guarantee for Rwandan
arms purchases from Egypt in 1992. The Rwandan government paid $1 million in cash and
another $1 million in the form of 615 tons of tea; future tea harvests were pledged as collateral to
Credit Lyonnais for the balance.30 Diop’s novel condenses this history into a brief allusion of Dr.
Karekezi’s “dubious trafficking,” which his French patrons endorse because it allowed “the man
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[to] advance concealed for a long time” (120). Dr. Karekezi’s “sensational return to politics” at
Murambi exceeds French strategists who find his “planned liquidation” “rather embarrassing”
(120-21). Still, they wonder if Dr. Karekezi can be forced into a leadership position to broker
power with the victorious RPF.
In Perrin’s account, the French foreign affairs officers still believe in Dr. Karekezi
despite his brutality because “in Africa political questions get resolved everywhere with extreme
cruelty”; and besides, “the survivors of this alleged genocide were soon going to forget the entire
episode” (121). Perrin attributes the French nonplussed response to racist ideologies that see in
Africa a continent devoid of political process save those of “extreme cruelty”; even the victims
will surely soon forget these predictable practices. Dr. Karekezi argues that this braggadocios
racism hated the anglophone RPF, the first “Blacks who don’t kowtow to you” (126).31
Dr. Karekezi retorts that the French hated the RPF as much as his fellow Hutu Power
comrades. The anglophone RPF register as “shady characters from other places,” who “look
down on” the French and militantly refuse to play their docile parts.32 Dr. Karekezi summarizes,
“Hatred, you can handle that, but this indifference, no. That’s worth killing several hundred
thousand Tutsis” (126). French military investments, interventions and evacuations fight against
Black anglophone usurpers indifferent to the colonial power. This indifference is worse than
hatred because it rejects the other as worthy of hate; the RPF simply cease to “kowtow” before
French military power. The RPF’s indifference to France’s “Great Power act” allows them to
successfully immobilize a French convoy on the contested road to Butare (128-29). This military
victory doubles as a racial performance that defeats French colonial expectations. Perrin
concedes the incident was a “kind of humiliation” that would “weigh heavily on our politicians’
decisions” (119).
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Two RPF companies ambushed a French convoy exceeding the bounds of the French
controlled Zone Turquoise and making their way to Butare. They order the French forces to
submit to an inspection. As RPF military leader Paul Kagame recounts to Gourevitch,
Our interest was to make sure none of these people they were taking
were FAR [RGF] or militias. The French refused. Their jeeps were
mounted with machine guns, so they turned them on our troops as a sign
of hostility. When the soldiers in the ambush realized there was going to
be a confrontation, they came out, and a few fellows who had rocketpropelled grenade launchers targeted the jeeps. When the French soldiers
saw that, they were all instructed to point their guns upward. And they
did (159).
The RPF find two Rwandan government soldiers in this convoy and execute them. After this
incident “the French softened their tone” and began speaking of the RPF with “grudging respect”
(158). This militant arrogance forgets the RPF’s previous successes, in which, to Dallaire’s mind,
they “proved capable of engaging and defeating the French-backed Rwandese Government
forces” (47). Dallaire senses colonial angst in the Butare ambush and another defeat. No French
troops are killed, “but French pride suffered a blow,” because both “patrols had been outwitted
by the RPF and shamed in the process” (444-45). Unfortunately, Dallaire notes that these
victories “did nothing to dissuade the French from wanting to support their former colleagues
and put the RPF in their place” (445). Dr. Karekezi argues that the RPF’s victory marks “the
beginning of the end” because France will “leave Africa by the back door” (129).33
This fictional dialogue labors to balance French colonial racism and the agency of
Rwandan genocidaires. Diop’s account of racism entrenched in French foreign policy rhymes
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with those offered by philosophers Alain Badiou and Georgio Agamben, both vociferous critics
of European right-wing jingoism that hates North African immigration, francophone or
otherwise. However, Colonel Perrin reflects that French complicity does not absolve the
“enormous bloodstain” on Rwandan hands; “To say otherwise would be to think of them as
irresponsible children.” The rejection of paternal responsibility conflicts with Perrin’s
acknowledgement that “we did nothing to prevent the massacres. We were the only ones in the
world who could have done it” (124). This self-indictment rings hyperbolic given the
international scope of weapons shipments, the presence of Security Council power embassies
and intelligence capabilities, as well as the neutered UNAMIR mission. Only decrying French
indifference would sound more absurd.
Although the novel's disjunctive form "challenges any reading to be the final version of
events," Perrin's chapter eagerly indicts the French and helps that nation's reading public, as well
as those of England and the US, to recognize their governments’ part in “aiding and abetting
genocide” (Hitchcott 54, 57). But this analysis stops short insofar as it assigns Diop's novel, or
aesthetic responses to the genocide, a merely revelatory function, awakening readers out of their
ignorance. I believe Diop's novel begs readers to investigate the genocide and their place in a
gruesome world. This requires, first, rejecting the narrative indifference and attending carefully
to the pervasive linkages already in place. As I have tried to demonstrate, finally, one crucial
linkage that requires special attention is the international arms trade enabling both neocolonial
suppression and humanitarian relief of the global South as well as its humanitarian armature.
Let us return to the mass graves and the rage they produce.
Angry Lessons
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Uvimana prepares himself for the worst but when he sees the first skeletons, he
“immediately want[s] to turn around and go back” (144). He has already visited several mass
graves but encountered a different type of remains. In the cities of Nyamata and Ntarama, “the
skulls, arms, and legs had become detached from their torsos”; in Murambi, however, the bodies
are almost all intact (144). Uvimana “took fright…started pacing up and down the hallway,
glancing indecisively in every direction, as if looking for a place to flee. Saliva was collecting in
his throat and he swallowed it to conceal his disgust. Even from the outside the stench of the
cadavers was intolerable” (144). Seeing whole bodies affects his whole body. Taste, smell, sight
and movement explode into each other, proving to him that “genocide had taken place only four
years ago and not in ancient times” (147). Despite the “nauseating stench of decomposing
bodies,” Uvimana tells his companion that he wants to “see everything.” His companion replies
that there are sixty-four more rooms like the one they are in and that Uvimana will “see the same
bodies everywhere” (146-47). “No,” Uvimana snaps, amazed at the “sudden bout of rage” he
experiences.
The cacophony of sensations harmonizes into rage. Uvimana’s grows “furious” with the
guide who apologizes for the crass remark, which ignores the particularity of victims and lumps
them into “the same bodies everywhere” (146-7). Violating this particularity produces rage and
reveals to Uvimana “his own suffering, much more profound than he had thought” (147). This
fury born of suffering is the real lesson of the Murambi memorial. And the education justifies the
open graves because they challenge “every Rwandan” to “look reality in the eye” (147). In this
reality, “the victims had shouted out” but “no one wanted to hear them.” The memorial preserves
the “echo of those cries,” whose continued reverberations scold global indifference to Rwandan
screams (147). Uvimana’s rage and endorsement of the open grave memorials constitute the final
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stages of his development. He becomes “the perfect Rwandan: Both guilty and a victim” (78).
Uvimana is also the perfect visitor by learning from the memorials, which drive him to write
about the genocide. The horror of the memorials meshes with an outrage at the world’s
indifference—“No one wanted to hear them”— and makes the affirmative power of literature an
inevitable and powerful, if banal, conclusion. Philip Gourevitch also visits a mass grave turned
memorial and, like Uvimana, experiences an educative rage.
In his opening chapter, Gourevitch visits a mass open grave at a church in Kibungo
province and reflects on the desire to look more closely, to know by walking among the dead. He
arrives on the scene aboard a UN helicopter accompanied by two Canadian military officers with
the proper paperwork. A Kalashnikov-wielding guard accepts the paperwork and grants them
entrance to the memorial.
“The dead looked like pictures of the dead” (15). Open, decomposing and strewn about in
agonizing chaos, the bodies “did not smell” nor did they “buzz with flies” (15). The remaining
tissues, clothes and bones clearly evince violence—“Macheted skulls had rolled here and
there”—but do not provoke a visceral reaction from Gourevitch. He finds the genocide “still
strangely unimaginable,” meaning “one still had to imagine it” (16). Looking does not provoke a
meaningful response despite the range of affects he experiences: “revulsion, alarm, sorrow, grief,
shame, incomprehension, sure but nothing truly meaningful” (19). After touring more rooms,
Gourevitch walks outside and hears “a crunch.”
The old Canadian colonel stumbled in front of me, and I saw, though he
did not notice, that his foot had rolled on a skull and broken it. For the
first time at Nyarubuye my feelings focused, and what I felt was a small
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but keen anger at this man. Then I hear another crunch, and felt a
vibration underfoot. I had stepped on one too. (19-20)
Gourevitch’s range of meaningless emotions narrow to a “small keen anger” focused on
the Canadian colonel. This anger is the real moment of insight. Gourevitch describes his anger as
“keen” not merely to emphasize the sharpness of his emotional focus, but because the adjective
suggests a clarity otherwise absent during his visit to the memorial. The moment’s visceral
lucidity instantly clouds when Gourevitch also missteps on a skull; he does not elaborate on his
anger or follow its insight when discussing the lessons of such memorials specifically, and the
Rwandan genocide more generally. The scene contrasts sharply with Uvimana’s experience, in
which the stench of decomposing flesh overwhelms the narrator.34 Gourevitch smells nothing
and the graphic sights incite an apparently meaningless confusion of emotions. The dead remain
pictures that represent nothing but their own death, their powerlessness rendered mere visual
datum. Only when the colonel missteps does Gourevitch glimpse the affective foundations of
mass violence.
His “small but keen anger” fixates on the colonel and a trespass that, in the larger context,
seems to matter little. Regardless, for the first time Gourevitch feels clearly in a momentary burst
of emotion and its ready target. He glimpses the keen anger necessary for mass violence, and
understands how a murderous drive for a “new order” feels both “compelling” and “absolute”
(17). In this light, Gourevitch’s accidental trespass—stepping on a skull—reads as a selfindictment that acknowledges his and our own potential as an agent of violence. This is not to
conflate small angers with the systematic murder but to caution against the misuse of such
righteous anger to energize the will to intervene.
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Chapter 3: Accumulating Safety: Asian Shylocks and The In-Between World of
Vikram Lall
Total corruption, I’ve been told, occurs in inches and proceeds through
veils of ambiguity. (Vassanji 271)
Critics such as Nalini Iyer have read M.G. Vassnaji's The In-Between World of Vikram
Lall as demonstrating that "the diasporic Indian community in East Africa manages to stay
influential through corruption and by pandering to the needs of the ruling elite” (Iyer 211). At its
best, studying the Asians of East Africa complicates a simpler story of empire—colonizers and
colonized—by attending to the "sites of colonial contest" themselves "marked many times over
by various forms of “subjects” and power brokers (Desai 159). The value of these arguments lies
in their attention to empire's unevenness, its creation of and reliance on local racial tensions to
advance the larger project of subjugation. Vassanji's novel, however, further complicates this
story by teasing out a strange logic of capital accumulation. The title character of The In-Between
World of Vikram Lall weaponizes capital accumulation as a form of self-defense ostensibly
justified by the marginality of the Asians in East Africa who live in constant fear after Kenya's
political independence.
Idi Amin’s expulsion of Asians from Uganda in 1972 merely took the logic of
marginality to one conclusion. The foreign, imperial collaborators were asked to leave a country
to which they never belonged; the Asians are not merely a comprador class but a people under
threat from all sides; they are not hybrid but stranded. These charges are not entirely untrue,
which mutes polemics against racism and marginality, and begs for a more sophisticated
strategy. The complicated history of the South Asian diaspora in East Africa requires nothing
less than an acknowledgement of its historical role and a simultaneous refutation of racist
!

61
caricatures that forget their place in Kenya's radical political history.
Vassanji’s novel builds precisely this nuanced critique, I argue, by caricaturing the
caricature of the "Asian Shylock," offering as the principal focalizer a Kenyan Asian man who
embezzles a huge fortune for himself and his partners among the new political elite. Vassanji's
critique of capital accumulation and the Asian Shylock inheres in Lall's strategic self-defense,
especially when it veers hyperbolic at crucial moments. Despite the hyperbole, however, the
novel's argument is not an obvious one. Vassanji's literary strategy pushes readers to
"counterfocalize" against Lall and produce a parallel alternative narrative to the one he offers.
This strategy both avoids the polemical while also strengthening our critical reading muscles.
For Gayatri Spivak to counterfocalize is to “shuttle between focalization and the making
of an alternate narrative as the reader’s running commentary” (22). This “effortful and active”
practice grounds the “‘political’ in political fiction” because it activates the “readerly
imagination”; “Literature advocates in this special way” and such literary reading “has to be
learned” (22). Counterfocalization may offer a one-word summary of postcolonial literary
criticism; one generates the parallel alternative text precisely by reading a given text closely (22).
The reward of this labor is ultimately an understanding of both the structures of domination and
possibilities of resistance. Vikram Lall offers a bit of both by critiquing a particular logic of
postcolonial capital accumulation. Vassanji's text, I argue, produces structural critiques through
tiny fissures in a single focalizer's narration. Lall's financial schemes, for instance, demonstrate
the fusion of the formal and informal economies whose transnational circuit siphons wealth to
the corrupt elite. His claim to be an overdetermined participant of such schemes—the Asian
Shylock has no other position—seems to reveal another intersection of race and capital. A
counterfocalized reading, however, reveals as well the radical political opposition always
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countering such overdeterminations; Asians actively aligned with the Mau Mau rebels, launched
trade unions, and engaged in other decolonizing efforts. Vassanji's literary strategy cannot list
these possibilities out in great detail but prods readers to explore alternatives that found historical
realization or remain energetically speculative. Lall avoids the struggles for independence and
the delicate postcolonial period by claiming to be apolitical, but his search for moneyed safety at
the intersection of finance and transport puts the lie to his ostensible apoliticism.
Gilded Communalism
Lall first discovers the link between wealth and safety purely by chance. He and his sister
Deepa are rescued by a wealthy businessman in Dar es Salaam from communal attackers who
want to punish them for deviating from their sexual communities. At that time, the Hindu Lall
has a platonic affair with a Shamsi Muslim girl; they share an emotional intimacy but nothing
more, which Lall blames on his cowardice to invest fully in a woman. Meanwhile, Deepa visits
Lall in Dar to escape her mother’s watchful eye and spend time with Njoroge, their childhood
friend and her current African lover; they dance together at nightclubs and openly demonstrate
their love. They broach "the most sensitive topic in East African sexual politics: relationships
between Asian women and African men" (Jones 172).35 In this way, Deepa and Lall earn the
wrath of self-appointed communal warriors who attack them in a dark street.
“Out leapt before us six youths, howling like wild dogs, gesturing like demons, mouthing
all manner of obscenities; they surrounded us” (208). They block all escape routes and ready for
an attack when a white Mercedes appears and turns towards them. The attackers disperse “like
cockroaches” (208). Out of the car steps a local millionaire, Mr. Bapu, whose nondescript name
(Mr. Father) only adds to his benevolent ghostliness. He saves their lives, insists they spend the
night at his mansion, shows them his beautiful garden, plucks a rose for Deepa and drops them
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off the next morning at the university where Lall studies; he never appears or is mentioned again.
Lall remembers this episode in Manichean terms as the fortunate rescue from provincialism by a
wealthy benefactor. He remembers not the contingency of the rescue but the gleaming white
Mercedes and its saving headlights. A closer look at this scene yields worthwhile results.
First, the attack takes place in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, rather than Kenya, the novel’s
principal setting. This parallel location, where Lall studies and Deepa comes to visit and openly
be with Njoroge, suggests that such communal policing is a regional issue in East Africa and not
simply isolated to Kenya. Vassanji’s oeuvre negotiates these issues across East Africa and offers
novelistic depth to the abstracted historical record. Secondly, Lall admits that he remembers
these attackers with a great deal of contempt and has “called them names” (209). One of those
names, however, is particularly telling. Lall describes one of their attackers as a “half-caste
chotara,” deployed here as a pejorative name for the child of mixed parentage. Vassanji places
this insult in the context of breaking communal (sexual) borders to undercut the attacker’s
authority to purity, contemptuously belittling these communal policemen. Taken together, the
scene suggests that the communalism plaguing East Africa inherits a miscegenated history rather
than the ills of postcolonial independence.36
This all seems fairly positive until we address again the saving “white Mercedes” and its
anonymous millionaire owner. The car’s color and manufacturer reads as a kitschy metaphor that
repeats twice on the page in a short span; a white luxury chariot arrives just in time to extricate
them from militant provincialism. Lall barely acknowledges the contingency of its arrival at that
moment, on that street, but instead focuses on the attackers’ lowness and the white Benz. Wealth
saves. That it is the German Mercedes, rather than a British Rolls Royce, for example,
foreshadows something of the transnationalism required by capital accumulation, and the supra-
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communal position one may occupy given enough capital to buy the protection of an estate
behind security gates. Such wealth ensures safety even in hostile East Africa's self-policing
sexual communities. Although he does not explicitly say so, Lall remembers this episode as the
first instance when wealth saved him and his family. The lesson sticks. He describes the efforts
of his career merely as an extension of this lesson; wealth in the form of accumulated capital—
reified in a commodity or not—protects people in precarious circumstances. As an Asian in East
Africa, Lall contends, he is born into a vilified community, stranded in-between colonizer and
colonized. This position began, in Lall's narration, when his ancestors worked as laborers on
constructing the Ugandan Railway.
Iron Lines: Family, Railroads, and Colonial Infrastructure
The Lall family feels connected to Kenya through the railroad their grandfather worked
on. The rail just before the station box, Anand Lal tells his son and grandson, bears his name
inscribed on the metal line with acid and a steel wire. Lal’s fellow laborers had done the same on
previous lines. These signatures in Punjabi letters are “our claim to the land” (16). The “our” of
this claim refers to “our people,” Asian laborers who “had sweated on it, had died on it: they had
been carried away in their weary sleep or even wide awake by man-eating lions." Lall’s claim to
belong by dint of historical labors mirrors that made by prominent East African Asian
businessman Nanji Kalidas Mehta in his memoir Dream Half-Expressed. Asian labor on the
Ugandan Railway, Mehta argues, was an “enormous human sacrifice at the alter of civilization
[that] bears testimony to the fact that no nation can stay alone and flourish in isolation…It also
teaches us that the debts of the past must be recognized and should bear a just relation to the
future” (cited in Desai, 154 with emphasis). Mehta attempts to universalize Asian labor on the
railway as a contribution to all, or at least to East Africa, by restraining its political contexts:
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indenture and settlement strategy. Simultaneously, Mehta deposits Asian "sacrifice" in a
historical bank—"debts of the past"—so that its value appreciates over time. Vassanji's Lall
furthers this argument by using these historical "debts" to stake a "claim to the land."
Vassanji drives Lall's claim too far because it aligns railroad laborers with the desires of
their colonial masters who pushed the Asian laborers to settle the land. This reading does not
require an untenable equivalence between the British and their subjects, but acknowledges the
strong sense of Imperial subjectivity developed by the South Asian diaspora who sought to take
advantage of the Empire’s offerings. The Asian presence in East Africa predates the arrival of
Europeans and comprised primarily of merchants and traders. At the height of empire, however,
these merchants, as well as the laborers and bureaucrats who arrived with the British, sought to
bring East Africa under Indian control as a province of its imperial hub (Metcalf, 182). Mehta
figures Asian commercial history as a romance and savors its intimate exchange of “mutual
gain” (as practiced by the Asian traders) rather than the “unequal power” used by the British
(cited in Desai, 153). Lall, meanwhile, advances the settler strategy by using Asian work on the
railway as a payment for their share of East Africa. Vassanji critiques Lall's settler claims by
aligning his focalizer's family history with the British Empire and its epistemologies.
Narrating the story of his grandfather’s decision to stay “in the new colony after his
indenture-ship,” Vikram Lall imagines his Dadaji (Grandfather), Anand Lal, and a few others at
an almost complete railroad station. During a peak period for the Empire, 1897, Anand Lal
completes his second contract with the British helping finish the Ugandan railways. Lall
imagines his grandfather
contemplating the vast flat grassy plains of the Rift Valley, the pointed
Mount Longonot, its sides grey with volcanic ash, rising up like the
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nipple on the breast of some reclining African god, two escarpments in
the distance, along whose steep slopes they had lain the railway in the
direst of wet muddy conditions….(17)
Filled with tropes from imperial travel writing, Lall connects his grandfather’s
contemplations too closely with British Imperial epistemology. Lall’s surveying eye sexualizes
the Rift Valley, transforming it into a bare-chested, reposing African deity. The deity’s breasts,
distant escarpments with a dormant nipple, are conquered by the railway lines, “lain” there in
“wet muddy conditions” (17). The trope of a sexualized landscape impregnated by European
modernity has a long, well-studied history. 37 Vassanji critiques such imperial visions by
embedding them within Lall's imagination of his grandfather's conquest. At first glance, there
does not seem to be anything critical in Lall's fantasies. Indeed, they might be read as Vassanji's
acknowledgement that British Indian subjects, indentured colonials or not, sought to bring East
Africa under British Indian control (Metcalf, 188). Vassanji goes beyond mere acknowledgement
and toward critique by ventriloquizing Lall's reading strategy.
Anand Lal does not speak for himself; rather, his grandson, Vikram, imagines these
contemplations and weaves them into a claim to belonging in Kenya. If Vikram Lall aims to
prove that he and his family belong in Kenya on the merit of their history with the land, he also
imagines his grandfather as an imperial warrior. Lall recognizes the tense position his
grandfather and fellow indentured laborers were caught in when he asserts that the Asian
workers were “speared and macheted as proxies of the whites by angry Kamba, Kikuyu, and
Nandi warriors” (17). These historical conflicts form a part of the historical background for
understanding why Asians are vilified in East Africa; they were and continue to be understood as
proxies for imperial powers, or as a self-interested and enclosed community that sails the
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prevailing wind. Vassanji resists such caricatures, however, through Lall's juxtaposition of his
grandfather's story with the completion of the railroad; Lall takes us from the indentured
laborer's too imperial thoughts to Lake Victoria where “the last key had been driven home” by an
“English lady” (17). The railway’s completion and Anand Lal’s survey appear sequentially in
one paragraph, highlighting the drastic power asymmetry between the two. By grading these two
perspectives against each other, Vassanji acknowledges that the Asian laborers worked as
"proxies of the whites" but underlines the fact that they were the proxy labor to an imperial
command that still retained the "last key" (17). This juxtaposition points to the asymmetry of
power between imperialists and their laboring subjects, who faced an indigenous resistance they
should have aided. In this way, Vassanji hints at the broad Afro-Asian solidarity required to
confront imperial power. Such hints leak through the cracks of Lall's focalization, prodding
readers to counterfocalize against Lall and investigate further.
We see immediately that Lall's version of the family history fails to produce the kind of
belonging that would defeat anti-Asian racism. While Anand Lal may not have participated in
the imperial pageantry at Lake Victoria, he helped build the empire's infrastructure. After
working on the railway, he sets up a small shop and joins the scores of merchants that help
penetrate and establish trade in the East African interior. Although Asian traders historically
precede the British, new crops arrive with the imperialists. Lall narrative frames the decision to
stay in Kenya and operate a business within a family story rather than the broad settler strategy
to which it belongs. By remaining in Kenya, however, Anand Lal takes part in the colonizing
mission Colonial Administrator Frederick Lugard advocated for Indians in East Africa and the
Indians advocated for themselves. Indeed, the Indian community's "self-perception [was]
founded on the notion that they had as much right to the lands as British colonists—rights based
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on community contributions that were tangible and appeared self evident in addition to less overt
yet profound notion of “civilizational worth”" (Nair, 90, her emphasis).38 Vassanji critiques such
notions—of land rights and civilizational superiority—within Lall's narrative.
If his grandfather and father worked on empire's material infrastructure, Lall practices the
epistemology sponsoring these colonial projects. Reading the African landscape as a naked
goddess poised for penetration exemplifies such imperial epistemology. This mode of seeing
strategically blinds itself to those already inhabiting the land or renders them impediments to be
overcome as modernity progresses rail by rail. 39 Such imperial epistemology forms the
infrastructure for Lall's own writing, moreover, as he omits the settler mission given to Indian
laborers and merchants. Lall's participation in and practice of such imperial infrastructures leaves
readers unsympathetic to his claim to belonging in Kenya. He sounds too much like a wellestablished settler defending bloodied inheritances. I am arguing, however, that Vassanji sets up
his narrator to fail, for Lall's narration to contradict its own intentions; in so doing, Vassanji
challenges readers to suspend Lall's narration, disbelieve its historical framing and
counterfocalize.
When Lall narrates the atomized story of his grandfather as a young man who merely
seizes an opportunity for himself in Kenya, Vassanji leaves clues that readers ought not to agree
with Lall's story. Continuing the trope of sexual conquest, Lall wonders if his grandfather had
not slept with a Masai woman during his youth and borne “cousins in some of the manyattas of
the plains” (59). If laying lines began as a literal description of building railways and doubled as
an imperial metaphor for subjugating space, it returns now as a fantasy of impregnation. Lall
admits that this “fantasy has partly to do with [the] desperate need to belong to the land I was
born in” (59). The fantasy is “not impossible,” moreover, because the railway workers were
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promiscuous according to “reports of their British overseers, quoted in histories of the railway”
(59). Lall’s fantasies of his grandfather are overseen by an imperial archive that takes
bureaucratic reports for histories. These reports represent their laborers without giving voice to
those licentious coolies who lay the foundations of Lall's Kenyan citizenship. In sum, Lall's
fantasies repeat three imperial tropes: first, the masterful survey of virgin landscapes awaiting
modernity's penetration; second, sexually conquering the natives; third, use the former two as
grounds on which to claim a home as a settler.
Dan Odhiambo Ojwang critiques these tropes of exoticism and sexual conquest in
Vassanji and other East African Asian writers as "window[s] into the historical context about
which the writers reflect" (Ojwang 44). Wherever Vassanji's writes about African independence,
his Asians experience only "menacing darkness mitigated by little islands of safety" (Ojwang
51). The In-Between World of Vikram Lall seems to repeat this trope and confirm Ojwang's
analysis, but the text ventures toward a different end. In Vikram Lall Vassanji does not only
reflect on the continuities, tensions and contradictions of the South Asian diaspora in East Africa
but actively critiques colonial alignments. This argument does not aim to recruit Vassanji's text
toward an antiimperial politics but to open up the critical reading strategy advanced by the novel.
Vassanji redeploys these imperialist tropes through the corrupt Lall precisely to make
readers suspicious both of the narrator and his claims. That is, Lall's early admissions render the
imperial tropes pieces of a worldview that supports embezzlement. Meanwhile, those who
recognize the colonial epistemology underwriting these tropes can map Lall's imperial
inheritances riding on colonial railways. Vassanji then links these tropes of imperial travel
writing with Lall's rise in newly independent Kenya's government bureaucracy. In so doing,
Vassanji pushes readers to critique Lall's careerist vision, which sees his arrival in the Ministry

!

70
of Transport as the continuation of an upward mobility begun by his grandfather. If his family
once labored under the burning sun, they have advanced to shady middle management now.
Vassanji uses this continuity to critique the liberation promised by political independence from
colonial powers.
Vassanji's critique inheres precisely in what Lall sees an enabling continuity between
empire and independence. Where Peter Simatei argues that Vassanji's fiction mourns the loss of
African nationalism's "reterritorialization of the British Empire," Lall aligns too closely with the
latter project (Simatei 59). Simatei argues that East African Asians see "African nationalism as
an assault on the Asian spaces of freedom guaranteed under colonialism," which is why they
might be lured by "a more hegemonic form of nationalism, I.e. British imperialism" rather than
the emergent African nationalism (Simatei, 59).40 Lall's too imperial allegiance to the railroad
does suggest a longing for the good old days of the formal Empire; however, he also aligns with
the new African nationalism and tries to carve out a protected space within its reterritorializing
project.
With help from his childhood friend Njoroge, Lall becomes an “assistant auditor and
inspector” for the railways in the Ministry of Transport. Lall’s family believes the job completes
his destiny—from manual laborer to middle management—as well as his childhood dream of
riding the lines “to appraise the world flying before me” (239). When Lall begins his career he
takes his grandfather along on the final voyage of a Manchester built engine. The retirement of
the "5607 'Sir George'" steam locomotive occasions Lall's invitation to Anand Lal. A new diesel
engine will replace the colonial machinery even while it travels on imperial infrastructure. Lall is
tasked with taking inventory of this infrastructure so that the new government can field
contractors for new engines. During this voyage, however, he also takes stock of his
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grandfather's labor and thought, folding them into the larger project of bringing colonial material
under the control of an ostensibly independent regime.
When the engine carrying the two generations of Lall reaches a crest and the Great Rift
Valley appears, "stretching vastly before us in the mist down below, virgin as God created it,
endless and endless until the Red Sea" (233). The masterful survey returns to look upon a (still)
"virgin" and "endless" land. This time, however, Lall attributes this description to his father, who
used it to entertain Vikram's "childhood wonderment" (233). Meanwhile, Lall's grandfather,
"Dadaji," stands "shaky on his feet, clutching my arm" and looks down at the valley, "his eyes
glazed with grim nostalgia" (233). This account differs greatly from the one Lall projected on his
grandfather or the mythical descriptions inherited from his father. Lall thinks that his Dadaji
remembers hard labor, losing the tip of his pinky finger, and witnessing his close friend's
marriage to a Masai woman. Although these elements do not disagree with earlier imaginings,
they are recollected "with grim nostalgia"; grim befits indentureship and loss (the tip of a pinky
finger) while nostalgia fondly remembers new and unexpected connections (marriage).
In sharp contrast, Lall feels a "true sense of pride and accomplishment" for treating his
grandfather to this trip using his new government position (234). The parallel sentences allow
Lall's pride to usurp his grandfather's grimness and his accomplishment to supplant nostalgia.
Through this juxtaposition Vassanji attempts to make clear that Lall’s narrative coopts his
grandfather’s experiences as the groundwork for his own career. Dadaji's "shaky" foundations as
an indentured laborer for the imperial project become the iron rails for Lall's upward mobility as
a bureaucrat in Kenya's newly independent government. By repeating the trope of a masterful
survey, moreover, Vassanji suggests the troubling continuity of colonial exploitation in
postcolonial governance, a continuity embodied in Lall’s position as an auditor asked to
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“appraise the world flying before me” (239). Such appraisal takes inventory of imperial
infrastructure without necessarily redistributing its fruits.
Independence had brought an abundance of opportunities, the British and
Europeans vacating lucrative farms and businesses and well-paying jobs,
foreign aid and loans promising contracts and kickbacks; this was a time
to make it, once and for all, as a family, as a clan, as a tribe—the stakes
were mountain-high. And this in the tinderbox Cold War climate of the
period, foreign governments peddling influence, bribes, arms. (235)
This cynical summary contextualizes Lall’s strategic cooptation of his grandfather's labor and the
railway itself. Neither are properly owned any longer, finally abandoned by their former colonial
overseers and therefore up for grabs. Both coexist as different orders of vacancies. Lall sees in
political independence the local ownership of exploitative structures and not necessarily social
justice and economic equality. This vision remains blind to other hopes of independence because
it myopically focuses on the narrow allegiance to “family, clan and tribe” (235). For Lall, this
sense of community seems to encompass, at most, the marginalized but economically powerful
Asians in East Africa. Such communalism both produces, and responds to, the very
marginalization it seeks to protect against, safe within a gilded fortress.
Nairobi’s Asian communities, Lall argues, suffered “devastation” after Kenyan
independence. When Britain passes its infamous immigration law in 1968 “to curb the flow of
British Asians from Kenya," an “Asian Exodus” follows as people flee to England before they no
longer can. Many friends and family depart and “property values in Asian Eastleigh” collapse
(236). This neighborhood and others like it were planned specifically to use the Asian
community as "a buffer zone between the very few whites and the densely populated indigenous
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Africans” (Siundu 263). Against the metonomy of the city as "the cosmopolitan ideal of the
nation," Nairobi's segregationist policies tried to minimize African migration into the city
(Siundu 265). This migration "constituted a risk to [the] wealth, health and power" of both
Whites and Asians who fought to retain their homogenous spaces (Siundu 264).41 Recounting
this troubled history seems to push against Vassanji's tendency "to portray Asians as victims of
malice and envy at their business astuteness" (Siundu 269).
Such a reading, however, conflates Vassanji's argument with that of his focalizers. One
does not need to swallow whole Lall's bathetic account of the Indian diaspora's uprooting in this
historical moment just as one should not endorse racist British immigration policy. Shaping
critiques from "the vantage point of global immigrancy and Asian diasporic communities the
world over" ignores the relative privilege of the Asians in Nairobi and removes "from sight [the]
particular pasts and futures that would impact on social interactions with Non-Asians” (Siundu
267). Such myopia inheres in Lall's perspective—not Vassanji's—precisely because Lall fixates
on the racism facing Asians in communal isolation.
Lall offers this communal context just after describing the trip with his grandfather and
the “abundance of opportunities” brought by political independence in order to demonstrate the
unevenness of such abundance and justify the communalism of his own response (235). In other
words, Lall’s hope that his family, clan and tribe will “make it, once and for all” announces the
desire to accumulate enough capital, and through it political power, to protect and sustain
themselves. This is accumulation under duress rather than for its own sake.
If we do not dismiss Lall’s claim as merely a Machiavellian ruse for a total alignment
with global capital, then we might see evidence of a particular order of postcolonial capital
accumulation driven by the need for personal and communal security. This strategy seems
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relatively unthinkable given Marxist analyses of race and capitalism that understand the former
as a tool with which to divide laborers, suppress wages and drive capitalist accumulation
forward. This framework allows us to see how racial constructions enabled the British Empire to
use Indian merchants as settlers to buffer their rule in East Africa and facilitate unencumbered
exploitation and extraction of wealth. If we dismiss Lall’s drive as merely parroting imperial
capitalist ideology, little remains to be said. To consider Lall’s context in the relatively marginal
Asian diaspora might inspire capital accumulation as a defensive measure, however, remains
more difficult and interesting. Taking Lall's claim seriously does not require endorsing Lall's
drive to accumulation for self-defense as a strategy or a twisted mode of resistance. Rather, the
point is to understand the political contexts that reinforce the centrality of capital accumulation.
Perhaps most riskily, I also suggest that we see a parallel between Lall's strategy and the
economic policy of former Non-Aligned Movement nations, which seek to shore up their
independence on the strength of economic power. This policy too is a self-defense strategy
against global capital and holds together a contradictory symmetry: one only defeats capital by
becoming a better capitalist, which is of course how capital conquers you. Obviously, such a
strategy deliberately omits (Kenya), or grandly defers (China), alternative economic and social
possibilities that might do more than accumulate better or faster than the imperialists.
When Lall imagines trains “traveling west from Nairobi to Lagos and Accra, south to
Cape Town, north to Khartoum and Cairo, uniting all Africa,” he hints at the lost opportunity
during decolonization (240, emphasis mine). For a moment, Lall breaks through communalism
or the relatively narrow claims to Kenyan belonging and advocates a pan-African solidarity. This
lost project would reclaim colonial infrastructure (railroads) to advance postcolonial
independence and transnational allegiances (“uniting all Africa”). Such a utopic horizon appears
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in a paragraph where Lall’s family declares his new career to be “pure destiny” and the “just
reward” of his grandfather’s work. At its best, Lall’s juxtaposition of an unrealized African unity
and his own upward mobility posits the Asians in Africa as fellow Africans who would both
belong to and participate in a larger antiimperial solidarity. Such a gesture would reject the
political and racial antagonisms that culminated in the post-Independence “Asian exodus” he
described earlier (237).
Vassanji forecloses these alternate possibilities, however, by reintroducing the
possessive, commodifying mode of Lall’s focalization. “The country was mine to explore, on
this mysterious metal highway stretching from the coast into the interior, its iron rails reaching to
diverse, far-flung and strange places” (240). Exoticism spices Lall’s enthusiasm—“mysterious,”
“far-flung,” “strange”—even while he attends to the railroad’s primary function as an instrument
of trade that penetrated from “the coast into the interior” (240). These tropes of exoticism and
trade collude in a kind of orientalist hermeneutics through which Lall reads the railroad as the
“Thousand and More Miles of Fantastic Lives and Ghost Stories” (240). The possibility of
advancing the Non-Alignment project or even an abstract postcolonial solidarity no longer holds.
Rather, Lall reads the railway as a storybook filled with adventure and treasure, benevolently
haunted by his grandfather’s indentured labor.42 This fantastic reading, in part, allows him to
later found the “Aladdin Financial Company” and invent schemes to create money out of thin air.
Vassanji discloses the possibility of a postcolonial transnational solidarity, at least a pan-African
unity, within Lall’s careerism and exoticizing tropes in order to disclose the political projects
Lall must remain blind to. In this way, Vassanji pushes readers to suspend Lall’s version of
postcolonial independence and investigate other modes of political life attempted in that period.
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As other scholars have noted, Njoroge, Deepa and Uncle Mahesh give voice to such
alternate modes of party, sexual, and radical politics respectively. I am arguing, however, that
Vassanji advances his main argument by weavings suspicion and critique into the fabric of Lall’s
narration. Rather than merely choosing one among the possibilities each of these characters
represent, Vassanji’s formal strategy pushes readers to more critical responses to every given
narrative. Such counterfocalization develops the critical capacities necessary for political
practice.
One historical realization of such radical political practice is Mankhan Singh, whose
absence haunts Lall's narration. The openly communist Singh formed the first trade union, the
Labour Trade Union of Kenya, and demanded immediate independence for the East African
territories. Other examples include lawyers who defended the Mau Mau in court, doctors who
treated the fighters, pro-African journalists and printers, as well as a lumberman who provided
the Mau Mau with food (Gregory 267). Vassanji takes special note of the lumberman, Yacood
Deen, and incorporates him into the novel; Lall's uncle Mahesh lives shortly as a lumberman
who supplies the forest fighters.
Lall, however, associates such practice with the murder of his childhood friends, the
wealthy European Bruce family. They are killed by the gun Mahesh supplies the Mau Mau. The
Bruce children's murder traumatizes Lall and ostensibly turns him away from politics. In truth,
Lall shuns only radical left politics in favor of rampant capital accumulation.
Asian Shylock: Corruption and/or Banking
Lall's entry into the new government’s bureaucracy comes on the strength of his friend
Njoroge’s recommendation letter. Without that, Lall argues, he would have floundered.
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with neither the prestige of whiteness or Europeanness behind me, nor
the influence and numbers of a local tribe to back me, but carrying
instead the stigma from a generalized recent memory of an exclusive
race of brown “Shylocks” who had collaborated with the
colonizers…Black chauvinism and reverse racism were the order of the
day against Asians. (238-39)
While Mankahn Singh and other radicals put the lie to the "generalized recent memory,"
exclusivity and collaboration remain dominant accusations. Historian Robert Gregory's work
pushes against such a reductive view by detailing the political activity of "Asians," an awkward
term for a fractured constituency. Hindus, Muslims, Parsees, Sikhs—such as Singh and Lall—
and Goans broke their united front in the years after World War II and the subcontinent's
partition (Gregory 262). Agitation for separate electorates in government by the many new
communal organizations led to different degrees of "collaboration" with the colonizers (Gregory
259, 1981). Divide and rule succeeded in some moments and anticolonial antagonism in others.
This complicated history has no place in Lall's narration because it subverts his principal
argument; as an Asian, he had little choice to become something other than an shadow banking
financier; he merely took advantage of these racist assumptions and the opportunities they
brought.
Lall's rise actually begins with a moment of naive honesty. Charged with evaluating
offers for new rail coaches, Lall fails to recognize an Italian woman named Sofia for the bribe
she is and rejects the Italian firm's offering of luxury rail coaches; he judges them to be
financially unsound and not designed with East Africa’s uneven landscape in mind. When the
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Ministry of Transport rejects the firm’s bid, Sofia disappears. Despite Lall's heartbreak his
integrity in the matter earns him praise and a promotion to be Paul Nderi’s personal assistant.
Njoroge warns Lall not to take the position among the “top brass” because “it’s
dangerous and murky up there.” Lall replies that he is “the least political person” Njoroge
knows. They laugh and Njoroge tells him to “stick to railways. And finance. Stay away from
politics” (251). Lall notes the irony of that advice because his future career as a shadow financier
places him in contact with the highest echelons of political power. Despite Njoroge’s admirable
politics—he backs the Mau Mau struggle and their abandoned veterans, turns away from
Kenyatta after the failed promises of independence and joins the "people's hero" J.M Kariuki —
he remains stunningly blind to political economy, not recognizing railroads and finance as the
battlegrounds they are. Indeed, Lall only comes to understand the connection between railroads
and finance when he is introduced to informal economy.
Lall’s shadow banking career begins with a briefcase full of American dollars. His new
boss, Paul Nderi assures him that the briefcase consists merely of donations from well-wishers
who want to help safeguard Kenya against the communists lurking in Tanzania. Nderi tells Lall
that “arms have been discovered now and then in the hands of” the communist opposition and
“money flows constantly into their coffers, from Moscow and Peking” (256). He uses Tanzania’s
socialist government to scare Lall, arguing, “they have nationalised the banks and the private
properties of your Asian brothers” (256). Nderi privatizes geopolitical battles by tugging on
Lall's transnational ethnic solidarity—"your Asian brothers" of East Africa—to capture his
attention and motivate him to become a bank, or at least facilitate informal banking services. Lall
initially responds to these regional battles and Cold War alignments by claiming ignorance,
doubling down on his ostensible apoliticism. Lall argues, “This was totally beyond me. Like any
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ordinary citizen I had read the news reports he mentioned and assumed that, if correct, they
would be acted upon by the government” (256). That a government bureaucrat with hopes of
becoming a “PS” (permanent secretary) would regard ‘the government’ with such studied
distance seems suspicious (251). More understandable is his inability to understand how these
geopolitical issues “concerned him, specifically” (256). Nderi demonstrates to Lall the precise
links between these different scales of political action, ranging from the Cold War to regional
communalism. Specifically, Nderi narrates a fantastic link between the fight to stave off
communism and Asian capitalist prowess.
As Lall sits awestruck before “the open briefcase of stacked US dollars,” which appears
as “a foreign and very potent object with their dull green colour,” Paul Nderi offers a two-part
map to help situate Lall (257). Nderi acknowledges that his party's political opposition would
read the cash stuffed briefcases as “bribes,” “foreign interference,” and “American imperialism”
(257). He assures Lall, however, that no larger forces are at play; this money is simply the sum
donations of “private individuals” who want to see Kenya remain capitalist and the ruling party
to stay in power. (257). In this way, Nderi acknowledges the geopolitical forces shaping capital;
however, he atomizes them as the voluntary relation between private individuals and electoral
parties. This is the first part of Nderi’s mapping. The second part zooms into Kenya’s particular
racial politics and the assumptions behind them.
Nderi asks Lall to “find your Indian contacts and have them change this money [into
local currency] and stash it; like in a bank” (257). Then some flattery: “You with your brilliant
mind will keep track of the account,” so that when “our different constituencies need money for
their operations, they will be paid by those Indians” (257). “Those Indians” become moneylaundering banks. Nderi assumes the Asian Shylock will handle the large sum of money and
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Lall, despite his initial shock, delivers. Nderi’s strategy bets on the Indian community at large
rather than Lall particularly, as evinced in Nderi’s initial request that Lall seek out his “Indian
contacts” to make the magic possible. Lall turns to his father who in turn calls another
acquaintance who “immediately understood what was required,” and guides them to Narandas
Hansraj, a local “dealer in curious” (257). Through his shop, Hansraj “came into frequent contact
with tourists” and becomes the laundering banker. Lall characterizes him as a caricature—“a
typical banyani of modest habits, shrewd mind, and accumulating wealth” for whom laundering
dollars is “only a shade out of the ordinary” (258). Hansraj specifically, and Asians generally,
bridge the formal and informal economies, which here need the racial Other as an intermediary
to grease their coupling. For Lall, Kenya can only imagine the racially marginal Asians in an
absolute relation to capital, no matter its legal status.
Although Lall enables this transaction he denigrates Hansraj as a “typical banyani” (258).
This is not internalized racism or self-hatred but Lall’s twisted attempt to ground Nderi’s racist
assumptions by summoning a figure who embodies the caricatures of Asians. This gesture
absolves Lall of having to push back against such racism, prove its caricatures wrong or draw on
the radical political history of Asians in East Africa; instead, he rides instead the tide of racism's
enablements. That is, rather than rejecting this introduction to the informal economy, Lall comes
to embrace these profitable enterprises even if they require him to be an "Asian Shylock." Here,
the difference between Lall’s narrative strategy and Vassanji’s becomes even more apparent.
Lall consistently foregrounds the racist stereotypes he faces as an Asian in independent
Kenya. However, Lall’s career and narrative capitalizes on the enablements of racism. For
example, Lall wants to distance himself from the “typical” Hansraj but nevertheless works with
him. Even more, he springboards from this success to a deeper immersion in the grey zone
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between informal and formal capital transfers; he becomes an expert money launderer. He
capitalizes on the racism facing the Asian community by justifying his accumulation as a mode
of self-defense. Meanwhile, Vassanji undercuts Lall’s narrative by making explicit the larger
consequences of its worldview. These consequences include a reiteration of colonial narratives
and blindness to the other possibilities of postcolonial life.
Following that thread of suspicion, readers can see Lall’s acceptance of Asian
stereotypes for the strategic excuses they are. For instance, Lall clearly admires Hansraj’s
“shrewd mind,” and admits to being slightly amazed that the “dealer in tourist gewgaws could so
easily muster the equivalent sum [of two hundred thousand US dollars] in shillings” (261). He
remains critical, however, of Hansraj’s typically “modest habits,” which contrast sharply with
the tailored suits, vacation homes and imported English teas Lall comes to enjoy. In other words,
Lall merely rejects Hansraj's style of accumulation but endorses its necessity and informal
methods. In this way, Vassanji produces a hyperbole of the Asian Shylock bent on rampant
accumulation.
If Lall builds on a career by following the enablements of racist caricatures, then Vassanji
constructs him as the caricature of caricatures, a parody on steroids, “the King of Shylocks”
(346). Vassanji’s critical strategy, however, does not allow readers to simply reject Lall’s
narrative and ignore the very real problems Asians face. Indeed, Lall continually juxtaposes his
hyperbolic accumulation with its strategic value as a tool of self-defense.
Lall ascends the ladder of government bureaucracy and befriends the politically powerful
principally on the strength of his ability to launder American dollars. He is even summoned to a
direct meeting with President Jomo Kenyatta, who remarks that Lall’s work serves the nation.
The meeting ordains Lall as a “higher initiate,” conditionally “admitted into the abode of power”
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(274). The “power latent in my new status,” Lall writes, “was brought home to me in the most
amazing fashion”; he defends his father’s business from being taken over by a petty local
politician (280). In contrast to later episodes of triumph, which he announces with the swagger of
one opening his palatial gates, Lall here tries to capture something of the genuine surprise and
newness of political power. It is worth reiterating that these political connections are attached to
his usefulness in the informal banking sector. For these temporary connections legality is beside
the point.
An unnamed local politician threatens to take over Lall’s father’s business. Lall
telephones the politician to say that his father’s business is legal, that they are “citizens of this
country,” and their businesses cannot simply be taken over (281). “By what authority?” Lall
asks. The politician screams, "You cannot talk to me like this, you Indian! I will have you
deported tomorrow!” (281). Lall’s interlocutor deploys “Indian” as a pejorative reminder of
abject powerlessness, underlined in the threat of deportation; even crossing a petty politician is
an offense worthy of expulsion. Lall reads this threat as “simple blackmail” and, seemingly
unfazed, replies that he has “recourse to the courts of law and the constitution, to defend my
father’s business and his rights” (281). These apparatuses rely on Lall’s claim to be lawful
citizens of a country that, in this scene, seems to acknowledge neither the rule of law nor their
citizenship in any meaningful way. The man replies “brashly” that Lall and his family will not
come within “a hundred feet” of the court (281). Once the unnamed politician acknowledges the
takeover is extralegal, and unapologetically so, Lall takes recourse to the highest authority in
Kenya. “In that case I will speak to Mzee himself” (281). Lall’s claim to a personal connection
with President Kenyatta defeats his interlocutor and shocks his own father. Neither know the
circumstances of this powerful connection, which, precisely because it is built on informal
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economic dealings, is strong enough to protect his father’s work in the formal economy. A
stunned silence follows, then the man hangs up. This successful self-defense leaves Lall
“profoundly affected” and pushes him to ask, rhetorically, if such connections were “the only
way to get justice for a minority?” (282).
The answer precedes Lall’s rhetorical question. No, there is no other avenue of justice for
the Asian minority, Lall argues, by carefully demonstrating that they have no recourse to the
legal system. Lall and his father could theoretically take the hostile politician to court but would
either be killed or deported beforehand. Either way, they will remain “a hundred feet” from the
courts, merely glimpsing the edifices (281). Instead, Lall must invoke his connection to President
Kenyatta. “Can such power reside in one man?” Lall asks, again rhetorically, after the invocation
defeats his interlocutor (282). The question, however, allows Lall to underline the oligarchic
structure of political power in newly independent Kenya. In so doing, his second question—
“Was this the only way to get justice for a minority?”—answers itself because it forecloses all
other possibilities of justice (282).
A preview of Lall’s final conclusion that minorities had no chance in Kenya’s turbulent
post-independence political climate comes when he encounters Njoroge’s failing idealism.
Between meeting with Kenyatta and defending his father’s business, Lall joins Njoroge in a cafe.
A short distance away from them, university student protestors face “tear-gas” and “a zing or two
of rifle bullets” from the General Service Unit (GSU), the police’s paramilitary wing (278).
Watching the violent repression outside, Njoroge mourns that he does not “know what to believe
any longer” (279). “The world’s too much beyond our control; we thought we could make a
difference to it, we could make Kenya great, make Africa great—and it’s all slipped away, the
ideals and the hope” (279). Violent state repression destroys Njoroge’s pan-African ambitions.
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Njoroge flounders because he has turned away from Kenyatta and the failed promises of
independence. He cautions Lall on building a relationship with the President, “you need a long
spoon if you sup with the devil” (279). Although surprised that Kenyatta has transformed from
Moses to the devil for Njoroge, Lall says nothing further. While Njoroge flounders because of
his political hopes, Lall seems to thrive on an ostensibly apolitical acceptance of the given order.
This scene combines Njoroge’s despondency with the violent repression of student protests to
offer a bleak glimpse of the political climate. Rather than acknowledging the various modes of
resistance on display, Lall focuses on their bloody defeats. In sum, the scene contextualizes his
money-laundering career within a violent oligarchic state that suppresses its most hopeful and
dynamic citizens. The same paragraph announces the jailing of Ngugi wa Thiong'o. When Lall
asks his questions about the possibility of justice in the next scene, they serve as rhetorical
exercises meant to solidify the answers bluntly suggested here. Vassanji, however, pushes
against such an overdetermined logic by foregrounding its blind spots and hyperbolic structure.
Such hyperbole need not be obvious. It does not necessarily rely on the absurd but can simply
strips some nuance away. The line between satire and hyperbole seems thin here because satire
often requires taking existing logic to hyperbolic ends. In Vassanji's strategic use of
counterfocalization, however, hyperbole is a literary strategy.
Despite having provided ample answers in his narrative, Lall cannot help but reply to his
own rhetorical questions. Through these answers, Vassanji critiques Lall’s worldview. Minorities
could only get justice, Lall argues, if they were among the “well-positioned”; his own access to
the politically powerful demonstrates this to be true (282). However, Lall continues “even
penniless” Africans were “protected and favoured” by their access to “family or communal
allegiances” (282). Lall seems to have forgotten about the tear-gassed students he witnessed only
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a few pages earlier. He also forgets the collection of former Mau Mau fighters Njoroge had
introduced him to. These rebels were abandoned by the newly independent regime despite, or
precisely because of, their “communal allegiances.”43 Lall admits, “suspicion and intimidation
could make a victim of anyone,” like a “costal man” in Nakuru or a Luo seeking a job in Nyeri.
(282). These communal antagonisms, however, paled in comparison to the “few and frightened
and caricatured” Asians who “could be threatened with deportation as aliens even if we had been
in the country since the time of Vasco de Gama and before some of the African people had
arrived in the land” (282). Just as Lall overlooks the class hierarchies in African communities, he
omits the multiple migrations that brought Asians to East Africa and their troubling political and
economic history. Instead, they are made passive victims, “frightened and caricatured” (282).
That his own economic rise depends on these caricatures slips to the background because Lall
wants to follow the logic of marginalization to its ultimate conclusion.
This abhorring of a people, holding them in utter contempt, blaming
them for your misfortunes—trying to get rid of them en masse—could
and did have other manifestations on our continent. Idi Amin cleansed
Uganda of its entire Asian population by deporting them, and many
African leaders applauded him. Little did they know what a slippery
slope it was from that move toward genocide in Rwanda, and then
elsewhere. (282)
Lall invokes the Rwandan genocide as the ultimate end of all such communal
antagonisms, using Idi Amin’s expulsion of Asians to ground his argument in regional political
history. This argument is hyperbolic, the East African equivalent of breaking Godwin’s law by
raising the specter of genocide to win an argument. Parsing this critique requires some care. Lall
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is not wrong to note the continuum between discriminatory policies, marginalization, and the
search for genocidal solutions to communal problems. Mahmood Mamdani also articulates a link
between the Rwandan genocide and East African Asians, framing them both as part of his larger
analysis of how the construction of “natives” and “settlers” helps produce such (genocidal)
antagonisms (Mamdani 28). However, Lall builds a “slippery slope” across Uganda, Kenya, and
Rwanda that slides over too many historical and political differences. Simply, Kenyan Asians
were never in the position the Tutsi of Rwanda commanded. The former never ruled, massacred
their enemies, were in turn periodically massacred, or engaged in a protracted rebellion from
exile. Although both the Asians and Tutsi were used to advance English and French imperial
ambitions respectively, the comparisons must remain very broad and generally ignore historical
specificities.44
But such generalizing comparisons are precisely what Lall relies on and Vassanji
critiques. When Lall ignores the inequalities among African communities and the economic
power of Asians, he pushes those blind spots to their hyperbolic end, sliding too smoothly from
social marginalization to genocides. In these strategic omissions and hyperboles, Vassanji
imbeds his critique in the very form and logic of his focalizer’s narration. In doing so, Vassanji
pushes his readers to suspend Lall's logic even while attending closely to the text. This writing
strategy has two consequences. First, it asks readers to do more than choose among the various
characters' world-views and challenges them to produce another one entirely. Secondly, it
disallows readers the comfort of reading the text as the voice of a native informant speaking from
the margins. If readers had not caught on to these clues, the remainder of Lall's narrative builds
on these hyperboles in order to become a premier money launderer and earn his name as the
"King of Shylocks" (346).
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In a simpler version of this novel, Lall might have experienced a moral and political
transformation after defending his father’s business. After all, he drew a connection between the
“abhorring” of Asians in Africa and the Rwandan genocide (282). In that more banal, didactic
novel Lall would begin engaging progressive politics and perhaps join his friend Njoroge in the
fight with “the radical politician J.M. Kariuki, champion of the poor and a critic of the
government” (284). Instead, Vassanji's Lall learns the opposite lesson; “To me the world was
what it was, a far from perfect and tangled manifold” (285). Attempting to “change this world”
yields only unintended harm, as he learned from Uncle Mahesh’s solidarity with the Mau Mau
and the radical Oginga Odinga (named Okello Okello in the novel). As an Asian, Lall prefers
rather to stay in his “natural place,” the middle, and “watch events run their course” (285). "The
secret to my success," he argues, was the lack of "moral judgments" (285). This superficially
apolitical position barely conceals Lall's allegiance to the dominant political powers and their
ravenous economic exploitation. In other words, Lall's stake in "the middle" veils his extreme
turn toward the informal economy in order to become a "neutral facilitator" for transnational
capital flows (318).
The Neutral Facilitator
The Kenyan government severs formal ties with Lall when news of his meeting with
Rhodesian representatives gets out. Although Nderi set up the meeting in London, Lall serves as
the scapegoat because he remains "the disposable outsider" (301). Jomo Kenyatta confirms the
dismissal but offers Lall continued protection. Once these formal ties are severed, the informal
connections multiply.
Lall partners with his in-laws to become their "facilitator" in business by using his
political connections (309). When the National Bank calls Lall for help to transfer foreign aid
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money into local shillings, Lall and his in-laws found the Aladdin Financial Company. They
accomplish this sudden request by "scouring the shops of Nairobi, Mombasa, Nakuru, and
Kisumu"; they turn, in other words, to the Asian business community (313). Later, the bank
needs to buy some of the dollars back and the company facilitates this transaction as well,
charging exorbitant prices for both transactions. Despite the fact that they deal with aid money
for drought victims, Lall argues that their fees simply represent "the morality of the marketplace"
(313). He previously argued that his lack of moral judgments catalyzed his success; that ruse
falls away here and Lall's alignment with the exploitative logic of the "marketplace" lays bare.
The company name, Aladdin, also signals such an alignment, even while playing with the trope
of Oriental wealth. Fittingly, Lall does not see himself as Aladdin but rather as the "genie of the
fabled lamp" (318). He enables wishes, but slavishly, without judgment. He may be able to grant
any wish but is enslaved by every new wisher. These strained allusions attempt to represent the
larger constraints of his position and allow Lall to arrive, tangentially, at a structural critique of
capitalism.
[W]ould it have made a difference if I had declined the fortuitous role
that happened my way? Surely there would have been another to fill my
place. The game of money requires the presence of someone such as me,
the neutral facilitator. (318)
Lall argues that although he lucked into his position, there is nothing contingent about the
position itself or about the "game of money" (318). Capitalism, especially transnational capital
flows, requires "the neutral facilitator," the one who knows how to rig the game (318). The
"neutral facilitator" serves a structural function in capital circulation, one that disguises its
absolute allegiance as neutrality. “Does a bank need to be moral? Or a croupier?" (318). Lall
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uses these rhetorical questions to absolve his corrupt dealings because he facilitated these
transactions in the same way a bank does. These analogies are useful in so far as Lall avoids
ethics for the sake of discussing capital’s systems and structures. Lall’s language, however, bears
cracks through which Vassanji reveals just how deeply Lall aligns with capitalism and its
(informal) institutions.
Banks and croupiers, after all, never merely facilitate the game of money; they play it, rig
it and always want to keep the game going. There is nothing “neutral” about these roles or their
interests. Lall admits that he made hundreds of millions—the currency changes of course—
amidst war, famine, and drought. Readers cannot accept that Lall's serves merely a structural role
as the “genie” of embezzling aid money. Rejecting Lall’s version of a structural explanation,
however, does not mean a return to individualism and discourses of morality. Rather, Vassanji
pushes reader to examine carefully the connection between Lall's two arguments.
On the one hand, Lall claims that he merely fumbled into this role as the "neutral
facilitator" for capital flows. On the other, he also claims that he was particularly suited to this
position as an Asian in East Africa. Lall defends himself, in other words, by claiming that he
merely capitalized on the racist assumptions of his boss and others who reintroduced the Asian
Lall to the world of money laundering. This argument traces an awkward circle to conclude that
the Asian Shylocks of East Africa are uniquely placed to play the “neutral” role in financial
circuits because they are outcasts banned from finally belonging to Africa nor willing to return to
India; they are a tribe set apart, the “Wahindi,” the Asian Shylocks, whose allegiance is to capital
itself (267).
The derogative "Asian Shylock" obviously picks up on the anti-Semitic notions of a
people uniquely fixated on law and money but not attached to a nation state. Shakespeare's
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Shylock, however, offers a more sophisticated lesson. As Ken Jackson suggests, Shylock aligns
imperfectly as a Kierkegaardian Knight of Faith, who must heed the call of an absolute Other
without believing that he will receive anything in return. Like Abraham, Shylock is called to kill
whether he wants to or not, to offer "the gift of death." This reading of Shylock's predicament
aligns, again imperfectly, with Lall's argument; as an Asian Shylock, Lall claims that he
participates in the informal economy whether he wants to or not. For Kierkegaard, the Knight of
Faith acts on faith, the "strength of the absurd," to form an uneconomic relation and transgress
his obligation to the universal—Hegel's nation state—for an "absolute relation with the
Absolute" (Kierkegaard 71). In a strange way, the Asian Shylock is accused of performing this
movement away form the nation state toward an absolute relation with something
incomprehensible, something outside and above the nation.
Lall argues the he too must seek an absolute relation to an absolute, global capital, and he
must do so despite his own interests. Ostensibly, his chief aim is to belong in Kenya and
acknowledged as a fellow citizen. Lall must act against this desire by becoming the very
caricature that pushes Asians to the margins of Kenyan society. Being the Asian Shylock means
being exiled from the national community; Lall seeks instead an absolute relation to global
capital, which demands him to act against both his best interests and Kenya's.
There is nothing uneconomic in Lall's actions, however, because unlike the Knight of
Faith Lall believes that this absolute relation will grant him security within the nation. Where the
Knight of Faith's act gains nothing for his position within the nation—it rather aligns him with
the Absolute—and therefore requires "the strength of the absurd," Lall acquires wealth, influence
and a measure of security. Lall gains quite a bit within Kenya despite embezzling public money.
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I have taken this detour to Kierkegaard through Shylock in order to better conceptualize
the slander of the "Asian Shylock" and its relation to global capital, the circuits of which
entangle but exceed any given nation state. More than a low-minded insult, the Asian Shylock is
both called to and accused of seeking an anchor outside of the nation state, a relation. Lall claims
that such racism precedes and exceeds his career, determines it despite his own desires to the
contrary. In other words, Lall, like the Knight of Faith and Shylock, acts against his obligations
to Kenya and his best interests. Instead he goes in "fear and trembling" toward an absolute
relation to an absolute beyond the nation. Lall departs from those Kierkegaardian heroes,
however, by engaging in an economic relationship with that absolute, capital. He receives a great
deal in return. Moreover, he acquires an imperfect safety within the structure of the nation state.
Lall aligns with Shylock, insofar as both the universal—Venice and Kenya respectively—and the
absolute Other—the Law and capital—demands that he trespass his obligation. Denied full
citizenship, he must seek his salvation elsewhere.
While classic Marxist critique understands deformed creatures such as Lall as a product
of capitalism’s regime of subjectivization, one also needs to understand the particular
postcolonial conditions that produce such subjects. Although it is broadly true that capital’s
financial flows rely on middlemen such as the Asians merchants of East Africa, it leaves open
the question why particular populations, especially minority peoples, come to embrace this role.
Lall argues that the Asians take on this function as a self-defense strategy. This argument tries to
coopt Spivak’s notion of strategic essentialism—retooling the very epistemic categories used to
oppress you—in the service of capital accumulation. Lall does not care to work against such
essentialism but merely launder it, turn white markets brown.

!

92
He reframes the racist trope of the Asian Shylock as an “enabling violation,” but not in
the way Spivak intends (Spivak 524, 2004). Lall argues that the prejudices enforcing the social
marginalization of Asians also enable their capital accumulation for self-defense. Such
accumulation both guarantees their marginality—‘proving’ that Asians are interested only in
money and without allegiance—and allows them some protection from the consequences of such
economic power relative to their small population. The argument reads less like strategic
essentialism than a convenient tautology. To bolster these arguments, however, Lall juxtaposes
them with episodes in which his ill-gotten access to political power helps defend his family’s
businesses.
Another informal economic giant, Mother Dottie, threatens his sister's husband, Dillip.
Mother Dottie deals primarily in the illegal ivory trade, among other things, while Dillip owns a
burgeoning chemical business. Her henchmen lay before him a contract to sell his enterprise for
ten percent of its value. They threaten Dillip with "information regarding his family, who had
bribed officials on several occasions, and one of whom (Mahesh Uncle) had collaborated with
communist enemies of the state” (310). These weak and common premises barely conceal the
extortionists’ threat. Dillip immediately refuses but grows “extremely frightened by the chill that
[meets] his answer,” and offers to consider the offer (310). The “chill” he feels is the threat of
death. Dillip and Dottie’s lawyers sit a large library with “two ceiling-high elephant tusks on
either side of the antique desk, and bookends and numerous other knick-knacks of carved ivory”
(310). There is nothing subtle about this setting, which discloses an artful ability to bring
immense violence to bear outside of the law. As “the principal dealer in the country’s illegal
ivory trade,” Mother Dottie and her henchmen are well practiced in these arts. These threats
advance on the previous episode of hostile takeover insofar as Mother Dottie formally recognizes
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Dillip’s legal powers. Such recognition remains merely formal, however, because between their
equal rights within the legal structure (a sale contract), “force decides” (cited in Miéville 120).
Dillip calls Lall who turns once again to Kenyatta.
The President likely benefits from some of Dottie's businesses but offers to help Lall.
Kenyatta calls Dottie's lawyer and tells him, "You have no shame" (311). “They," Asians, "are an
asset to our country; they export to Uganda, to Tanzania, to Ethiopia" (311). “They” refers here
to Dillip’s company Mermaid Chemicals, which is a synecdoche for all Asians. Like the
representative company, the Asians too export to other East African nations and consolidate
economic power for Kenyatta and his regime. For the help, Dillip offers Kenyatta a ten percent
share in the company; “Just like the British manufacturers say, By appointment of Her Majesty
the Queen, et cetera” (312). This pageantry amuses Kenyatta and slyly reminds readers of the
failed promise of independence, which exchanged ruling oligarchies rather than abolished them.
Only those ensconced within this exploitative elite may enjoy safety from extortion, deportation
and death. Lall remains in this elite precisely because of his ability to shore up their position.
Kenyatta tells Lall that his informal financial work is "an important service to the nation" (276).
His national service consists in abstracting value and making it available for global financial
flows.
Lall is ‘in-between’ in this sense too, not merely of identity but in-between labor and
finance. Both modes of in-betweenness coalesce in the slander of the Asian Shylock, which
signifies placelessness (neither Africa nor India) and "wily" financiers whose absolute
relationship to capital denies their allegiance to any given country (267). To reiterate, Lall argues
that such racist tropes enabled his entry into the informal economy and, more broadly, that the
Asian community's self-preservation lay in excellent capital accumulation. Meanwhile, Lall also
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claims that his position—and that of fellow Asian Shylocks—is a structural one within the game
of money; it just happens to be brown in Kenya’s racial political history. In sum, economic
structure and racial political history overdetermine Kenya’s elite Asians. These arguments
present a self-enclosed logic by which Lall and his colleagues cannot escape their fate as money
launderers.
While his uncle Mahesh and sister Deepa represent obvious counterpoints to these claims
of overdetermination, I am arguing that Vassanji encloses his critique within Lall’s narrative
logic and its tendency toward hyperbole. Rather than merely choosing one among the few
perspectives on offer, Vassanji's critical strategy develops our ability to counterfocalize against
any given narrative and produce an alternate narrative. For instance, when Lall attempts to
retrieve a little elbowroom from his own arguments by demonstrating his power to accumulate
capital, the demonstration also contains Vassanji’s critique.
My prestige round about town was large though somewhat shadowy. I
was the famous facilitator, with access to the powerful and the
immeasurably wealthy. I was not in any business for myself, yet I gained
a stake in many enterprises that I had helped to make a success. (312)
While Lall’s swaggering self-description attempts to stake out his ostensible power,
Vassanji uses it to return to a structural critique of financial capitalism. Lall claims prestige from
his “access” to political and economic power. That is, he does not actually have such power but
merely enjoys a shadowy contact with it. This claim meshes well with his supplemental
argument that he was not “in any business” but gains “stakes” in those enterprises he helps (312,
emphasis added). Lall’s arguments try to elide the very political and economic power he
demonstrated a paragraph earlier by defending his brother-in-law’s business. In other words, Lall
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does not need to be in a business because he is a business: the neutral facilitator. And on the page
following, Lall provides the proper name for his business, the Aladdin Finance Company. The
separation between Lall’s self-description and the proper name marks the critical distance
readers must cross. This space barely spans a page but allows Vassanji to categorize Lall’s
financial work in the broader economy. That is, Lall’s self-description cannot take on its proper
name because it doubles as Vassanji’s critique of informal banking, or even banking in
capitalism more generally.
Like Lall, banks too enjoy a shadowy prestige and immense power as facilitators with
stakes in many enterprises without ownership or productive expertise in any, save capital itself.
Vassanji's critique requires taking Lall's braggadocio seriously but unpacking it as the
personification of a structural position. Lall’s arguments on the shadowy prestige of neutral
facilitators in the game of money provide the framework and vocabulary for this reading.
Vassanji, however, does not engage in polemic but rather challenges readers to produce a
critique with the given tools. Vassanji’s critique, it should be noted, centers on capitalist banking
specifically, which supplants the state as the primary sponsor and coordinator of productive
activities. He makes this clear by mapping the privatization of financial networks and
dramatizing their excesses.
Lall founds the Aladdin Finance Company when Kenya’s National Bank needs help
transferring aid dollars into local schillings. Once the national financial infrastructure leans on
private companies such as Aladdin hyperbolic exploitation follows. Lall extends his
identification with the fable’s genie and fancies himself a powerful agent who “could make
monies vanish and produce gold out of thin air” (335). He remains the “banker of choice,” for
the country’s “perpetually upwardly mobile businessmen and politicians” (335). Lall extends the
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fairly pedestrian function of bankers into the realm of fable (the genie) and megalomaniacal
fantasy, describing himself as the “alchemist who could transmute currencies” (335). These
strained metaphors, however, capture something of the singular interest in capital Lall and his
business partners’ share, an interest that certainly exceeds the self-defense arguments he makes
throughout. Like alchemists, they want to create capital out of rocks. As bankers they invest in
generating capital out of capital, no matter how fantastic the process. The "Gemstone Scandal,"
which earns Lall the title "King of Shylocks," perfectly dramatizes the financial sorcery
necessary to generate capital merely by circulating capital, without investing in any productive
ventures (346).
Lall and his partners buy a Tanzanite mine they know to be fake and start a company
called Solomon Mines (345). The name refers less to the Biblical King than to H.R Haggard’s
famous imperial adventure novel King Solomon's Mines; this intertextual reference echoes
backward to demonstrate the genealogy of Lall's imperial fantasies on the railroad; the reference
also echoes forward to sound out Lall's financial schemes as treasure raids. Lall and his partners
engage in self-referential financial deconstruction, with the added proviso that the remainders are
deposited in “British and Swiss banks” (345). Said less cryptically, Lall and his partners take
advantage of the government's offer of “handsome commissions to exporters or exporters selling
local commodities abroad and brining into the country precious foreign exchange” (345). They
ship out “nonexistent or worthless gems” at inflated values to their own subsidiary in London
and deposit the Kenyan government's commissions in British and Swiss banks “on behalf of
some of our elites, into their secret accounts” (345). These deposits are financial transactions on
which Aladdin Finance earns commissions in local currency, which is sold back to the National
Bank at premium prices during “cash-flow crises” (345). To complete the financial tautology,
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their own Aladdin Finance handles all of these transactions as well; money circulates from and to
the National Bank, flowing through various subsidiaries of the same financial institution,
Aladdin Finance Company.
This closed circuit requires false (or non-existent) gems merely to catalyze the process.
The purpose of this circulation lies in “earning immense sums in commissions in foreign
currency,” whose transfer also earns commissions and, after circulating as local Kenyan
currency, siphons more wealth from the National Bank, the institution from which the initial
commissions first flowed out. This is capital generated from the circulation of capital, yielding
enormous wealth for well-placed elites. Since this circulation is not connected to material
production, schools or electrical grids say, it leaves the great majority of people untouched and
their country poorer. Lall argues that these financial circuits and their hyper-accumulation were
driven by self-defense.
When Patrick Iba Madola (I.e. Daniel arap Moi) comes to office after Kenyatta’s death,
Lall fears for his life. “Without my almighty protector,” Lall realizes, “I was naked” (332,
emphasis mine). The religious language captures something of the existential terror Lall feels
when returning to the world of absolute capital, which offers a “price” of his life and regards him
as “an easily disposable commodity” (332). Devoid of Kenyatta’s protection, Lall must again
face the threat of death by any number of enemies he made along the way. He collects important
documents and stores them in an abandoned railway station; in his absence, his house is broken
into and some jewelry and cash stolen. Lall is not surprised by the bullet holes in the walls and
actually left the valuables open on purpose. “This was as I expected” (333). Lall responds to this
threat by leveraging his relationship to capital circuits and letting his clients know that his death
would mean the release of incriminating documents. That is, he reasserts his place in the
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informal economy as an important node, connected enough to bring down other nodes in the
network. The threat on Lall's life and his response bolsters his argument that he merely occupies
a structural position in the game of money and is all too replaceable. For the moment, however,
he uses his position to remind the hunters that killing him would not be very profitable to
anyone.
His network assures him that Lall was merely “imagining [his] terrors,” because he is a
“fearful Asian” (333). The response confirms the circuitous racial logic that enabled his
accumulation in the first place. They dismiss his fear as imaginary and a consequence of his
being Asian. That such fear has a basis in bullet holes and expulsion policies matters less than
Lall’s place as an “important and valued member of the business community” (333). Lall’s
ability to enable accumulation buys his safety, because the “the wheels grind on as before” and
“business is business is still paramount” (333). In order to alleviate some of the tension, Lall is
invited to join a delegation to meet with the new President.
“So many prominent yet nervous Asian businessmen desired to contribute to my
briefcase…that to accommodate all it had to be filled with notes of twenty-pounds sterling
instead of the local currency” (334). By this point, Lall deems it unnecessary to explain how he
acquired such a vast amount of money in British currency; no one is surprised. The president’s
representative accepts the large “donation” briskly and puts it in “a golf trolley that collected all
the briefcases” received that day; rather than Kenyatta’s patronage, Lall realizes that the new
president “would simply tolerate me” (335). The briefcase full of pounds sterling is not much
different from the cash and jewelry Lall leaves for the would-be assassins to steal; both
donations are simply the price of avoiding bullets. The transition to Moi’s presidency does not
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signal the shift to a new precarity for Lall but rather the return to open violence from which
Kenyatta's patronage shielded him.
Despite the new president's lack of patronage, Lall remains safe because of his structural
placement in the informal economy. For the "perpetually upwardly mobile businessmen" aligned
with the new regime Lall remains the "banker of choice," reveling in his status as the "alchemist
who could transmute currencies, the genie who could make monies vanish and produce gold out
of thin air" (335). Lall mutes his braggadocio when discussing his crimes with Seema—his lover
during his exile in Canada—and instead thinks of himself as a "simpleton" whose "crimes of
circumstance" were the results of "simply going along with the way of the world" (344). Seema
replies, "That's what many of the killers in Rwanda would also say." Lall cannot identify himself
as a potential murderer but receives an appropriate reply. "There are different ways of killing,
Mr. Lall" (344).
Lall's earlier comparison between the marginalization of Asians in Kenya and the
massacred Tutsi of Rwanda returns to haunt him. This time, however, Lall plays the perpetrator,
killing at a distance through financial systems. Confirming Seema's response, he discloses the
machinations of the Gemstone Scandal, which siphoned the country's wealth to an elite class.
Lall goes on, moreover, to describe his involvement in more direct modes of killing. He never
picks up a gun but makes sure they too circulate to the appropriate places. These "varied"
financial projects "offered me comfort, prestige, and the friendship of the powerful," while also
making his name "legend outside of the country" (346). For instance, Lall accepts cheap gold
and diamonds from a "company in Uganda that is obviously a front." In exchange he arranges
to facilitate the arrival of certain metal goods in Mombasa port and their
transportation in covered trucks back to Uganda, from where presumably
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they will go on farther north and west, where the civil wars are fought.
Nothing could be easier to arrange. (344)
North of Uganda lies Sudan and West is the Democratic Republic of Congo, formerly Zaire at
the time of the civil war. Lall provides weapons—"certain metal goods"—to these conflict zones
knowing full well the murderous political import of his services.45 Nevertheless, he frames these
transactions as "financial involvements," abstracting their deathly powers into a question of
logistics and capital flows. A scarier link between Lall's gun running and claim to apolitical
"going along" lurks in Rwanda, which abuts Uganda's southern border.
The word "presumably" sneaks into Lall's story of transmuting cheap diamonds into
weapons shipments; "presumably they will go on farther north and west." He uses the qualifier
to rupture the link between his facilitation of weapons and their use; he can only assume where
and how they move on from Uganda. Although Lall's familiarity with Central African political
wars gives the lie to his ostensible apoliticism, he maintains a strategic distance to any particular
position within these wars. However, "presumably" also forwards Vassanji's critique of Lall's
worldview by indicting the icy indifference that reduces bloody conflicts to logistics without
context. That is, Vassanji's critique inheres in Lall use of "presumably" to distance himself from
the consequences of arms transfers. If Lall remains uncertain about the final locations of those
weapons, then the possibility of their use in Rwanda remains. Since these weapons flowed out of
Uganda, however, they would have aided the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) whose invasion
into Rwanda finally stopped the genocide. Lall's gun running takes place a few years before the
Rwandan genocide during a time when the RPF launched unsuccessful invasions.
Despite the possibility that Lall unintentionally aided the RPF, Vassanji critiques the
broader structural overlaps between weapons and capital—indeed, weapons as capital. That Lall
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might have found himself on the right side of history is an ambiguous, perhaps dubious,
prospect, which retrieves gun-running from the brink. Vassanji acknowledges such a
possibility—that arms can help 'good' rebellions—but only within a frame that equates arms,
capital and "unwanted flotsam" such as "generals, prime minsters, politicians, widow, orphans"
awash with illegal monies (346). Such residue includes diamonds, guns and people as a part of
the "financial involvements" Lall sets out to describe. Gems are exchanged for guns, which are
used to dispose of or exile people who may also have gems to exchange for the "assistance of a
finance company such as Aladdin to see them safely to their new homes" (346). Vassanji sets his
critique within this chain of equivalences made possible by Lall's worldview. The paragraph
opens and closes with the all encompassing "financial involvements" conducted by a "finance
company," which frames those equivalences as the exchange of capital. Through this framing,
Vassanji critiques Lall and provides his readers with a strong clue with which to produce their
own critical narrative. That is, readers ought not only to disagree with Lall's finance based
worldview but in doing so must produce a different relation between guns, gems and people.
Although Vassanji does not offer any direct guidance on a new relationship, he does explore two
popular options.
The "chummy bazaar of discreet telephone class and the party circuit" ends with the Cold
War when the West begins calling into account loans ostensibly supplied to fight off
international communism. This broad historical context does not allow for simple indictments
because it calls attention to entrenched circuits of power and capital. When the reinvigorated
press learns about Lall's gemstone charade, they make him a "symbol of corruption" and christen
him the "King of Shylocks" (346). Such individual indictments evince a strategic myopia that
disables a broader focus on the geopolitical forces entwined with capital flows. Isolating Lall
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does little to halt corruption and, as a symbol, misrepresents the scale of the problem. Rather
than thinking historically and systemically about a wide range of actors ranging from nation
states to mine laborers, Lall becomes the racial surrogate whose essential corruption reveals the
dark underbelly of human greed. Such banalities obscure far more than they reveal.
I am arguing that Vassanji advocates for the systemic, historical view rather than the
banal individualism that seeks out "a bad guy" even while allowing Lall to hide in the shadows
of those systems. That is, Vassanji's attention to the impact of Cold War geopolitical economy
seems to mitigate Lall's guilt in gun running and shadow capital accumulation.
Indeed, Lall's individual life becomes "cheap" and its value only recovers when he
reestablishes himself as one actor in a network that will be disrupted if anything happens to him.
A few days after the press names Lall the "King of Shylocks" assassins arrive at his home and,
unable to find him, angrily fire their machine guns. A few bullets hit the undiscovered safe in
which Lall hides with his wife, deep in their bedroom closet. He invites the press to “look at the
unlawful attack and destruction of [his] property,” then baldly states that his lawyer will publish
his business documents if he dies. That is, he threatens to disclose the identity of his business
partners, many of whom rank among the post-Independence Kenyan elite (348). “I possessed
information that could help indict a platoon of politicians and a hive of senior bureaucrats” (349).
Soon afterwards, Kenya's new president Daniel Arap Moi delivers a speech reminding everyone
that "attacks on private individuals would not be tolerated" (348). Given the briefcase full of
pounds sterling donated to the president by Lall and his fellow Asian businessmen, Arap Moi's
speech seems intended not to defend Lall's safety but rather his own, or even warn against the
futility of attacking "private individuals" given the entanglements of business and state in the
embezzling racket. The president uses the futility of individual indictments in an attempt to
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placate both the public as well as Western donors; the government sets up an independent "AntiCorruption Commission," which in turn publishes the "List of Shame"; "Vikram Lall's name was
first" and he is "invited to testify about my questionable business dealings" (349). "But if Vikram
Lall spoke, as everybody knew, a lot of prominent people would get skewered" (349). His place
in the network protected him briefly but sufficient pressure turns those connections hostile and
he, a lone node, comes under threat. Lall flees to Canada and writes the confessional
autobiography we read.
The "List of Shame" and its sponsor, the Anti-Corruption Commission represent
Vassanji's most generous articulation of the disinfecting power of sunshine. Challenging both
world-weary cynicism as well as the overly optimistic hopes of "transparency," Vassanji
demonstrates that public pressure on a few nodes within a network puts that network on the
defensive without necessarily disrupting it. Lall is publically ostracized for his corruption even
while "everybody knew" that those shadowy dealings involved other major players. To prevent
him from disclosing other players, hired hitmen prowl. When he returns to Nairobi intending to
testify to the Anti-Corruption Commission, Lall fears for his life and hides but is ultimately
found and killed; Lall tosses his autobiography to a friend before flames engulf him.
While Vassanji acknowledges the efficacy of public pressure he does not allow it more
worth than the self-preservation tools of informal capital networks. Lall's shadowy allegiances,
in other words, will not tolerate any threat and readily sacrifice a person they dare disrupt the
great "game" of accumulation. Sunshine, "transparency," does not disinfect but rather reveals
people like Lall, the racial other who serves as a "perfect scapegoat" because he is "an Indian
without a constituency," "the crafty alien corruptor of our country" (365). Removing him by trial

!

104
or execution will not hinder the continuing function of those shadowy networks. This is the dark
reality of capital's claimed self-regulatory powers.
Lall tells his lawyer to feel out the Commission and gauge their interest in his plea
bargain. Lall admits only to engaging in "unethical but not illegal" activities "done with the
approval of public servants" (364). He offers "as a goodwill gesture" to liquidate most of his
wealth and answer questions about the Gemstone Scandal. The Commission will "declare
publicly that it has no case against" Lall, who can live on with a clean slate (364, emphasis
added). Even offering these limited admissions endangers Lall's life. Consequently, he asks his
lawyer to also reach out to Nairobi's businessmen such as Paul Nderi, Lall's first boss, who are
afraid of becoming scapegoats "for a condition that's rampant"; the lawyer assures these
businessmen that Lall will only focus on the Gemstone Scandal. In a disquieting if unsurprising
move, the Commission accepts Lall's offer; he must admit to the Gemstone Scandal but "need
not name names," nor speak about other dealings. "The Donors and the World Bank will be
pleased," his lawyer summarizes, "all they want is some admission, after all, some
accountability" (367). The Commission hopes others will follow Lall's example and perhaps
usher in a genuine truth and reconciliation movement.
Vassanji's cynicism shapes Lall's hopes. The stunted form of "accountability" Lall offers
and the Commission accepts reduces complex long running systems to a banal individual
moralism, pardoning sinners if they properly repent. Lall's book length defense, which doubles
as Vassanji's indictment, culminates in the Commission's myopia. What better deal could Lall
hope for than limited personal guilt for one scheme of many, some monetary compensation and a
blind eye to the informal economic structures that dictate the country's present and future. To
Lall's surprise, however, even this meager admittance threatens too much.
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After accepting Lall's offer the Commission is declared illegal and promptly disbanded.
Open and vulnerable, Lall admits that he was "naïve in my expectations" (368). Vassanji's
cynicism runs beyond his focalizer. Lall's lawyer is arrested, possibly tortured, leaving behind a
"dangling" client. "It's clear that powerful people close to the government prefer to keep my
mouth shut" (368). Neither Lall nor Vassanji remain quiet.
I have been arguing that Vassanji speaks through and against Lall. When Vassanji's
focalizer first attempts to articulate the infrastructure upholding his claim to belong to Kenya—
the Lal family's labor on the East African railroad—Vassanji critiques this history through Lall's
imperial tropes—the conquest of empty and sexualized landscapes—to acknowledge the imperial
projects emanating from India into East Africa. Asians were not merely coolies but settlers. Lall
also claims to be overdetermined by the racism against Asians in East Africa, who are a
frightened minority are prevented from any other positions in society than Shylockian
middlemen. Lall argues that his career could not have been otherwise due to these factors and
that he, like other Asian Shylocks with their superlative power to accumulate capital, find safety
in these moneyed shadows. Vassanji's most obvious critiques to these claims are Lall's sister
Deepa and radical Uncle Mahesh. Less obvious, and perhaps more important, is the critique
embedded in Lall's narrative and its use of hyperbole.
I have been arguing that Vassanji builds Lall as the caricature of a caricature, an
overblown Asian Shylock. To understand this hyperbole, however, readers must also take
seriously the marginality of Asians in East Africa, acknowledge both their role in settler
colonialism as well as the racism of expulsion policies. Lall focuses on the latter in order to
justify what he claims to be capital accumulation for safety's sake. Lall's strategic myopia
misuses Spivak's strategic essentialism. Vassanji, however, urges readers to take a more global
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view and read against Lall, to counterfocalize and produce alternate narratives. Doing so does
not merely yield a more complex understanding of East African history but also a structural
critique of capitalism and its use of racial others to facilitate capital circuits. Like Lall, these
racial others are condemned to seek an absolute relation to global capital against some their own
interests and the interests of the universal they marginally belong to. Despite Lall's hyperbolic
accumulation, however, Vassanji proffers a subtle argument about the racial and political
circumstances that might energize capital accumulation.
My most speculative argument links Lall's claims to the quest for economic power among
postcolonial nations. I have in mind India and China particularly. While the latter may be
developing a "proto-post-capitalist" society, the former now happily embraces neoliberal
economic policy. Both have prioritized economic development over human rights because it is
only economic power that can protect against neocolonial advances. Neither, however, offer a
narrative one can entirely agree with.
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Chapter 4: 'The door was always open': Caste and Neoliberalism in The White
Tiger
When Aravind Adiga's novel The White Tiger won the Booker Prize in 2008, some were
embarrassed and frustrated that they again had to discuss poverty in India. Expressed in a
Telegraph article, these critics argued that the "book took us back three decades" to a time when
"the BBC showed nothing but cows on the roads”; Adiga focuses on "everything that is bad and
disgusting" (Dhillon). For them, the novel's critiques of uneven and combined development and
the 'India Shinning' slogan promoted by the government returns the discussion to an
impoverished India denied coevalness with Britain or other Western powers. Literary critics on
the other hand largely celebrated the novel's focus on injustice, with the simultaneity of booming
technology centers and the rural poverty seemingly unaffected by this new wealth. Neither the
embarrassed nor the ebullient, however, discuss the novel's representation of caste and its
complex relationship to the growing wealth divide. I redress this gap by foregrounding caste, its
relation to occupation and wealth as well as its potential annihilation within neoliberalism. This
last point will be the most contentious and joins an ongoing debate between anticapitalist and
anticaste Dalit activists.
I build my reading of the novel primarily in conversation with two critics: Betty Joseph,
whose article "Neoliberalism and Allegory" offers the most astute reading of the novel available
to date, and Gopal Guru's article "Rise of the Dalit Millionaire," which attempts to critique
subaltern accumulation and, I argue, subsume anticaste work within anticapitalism. Along the
way, I also turn to Bhimrao Ramji Ambedkar (Babasaheb), the primary theorist of and for the
lower castes, author of The Annihilation of Caste and the Indian Constitution, as well a fierce
critic of Mohandas Gandhi and his fight to retain and reform the caste system.
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Betty Joseph's "Neoliberalism and Allegory" reads The White Tiger as a satire of
neoliberal rhetoric and an allegory of India as an "individual emerging finally from long-term
postcolonial economic woes and ready to take its rightful place on the international stage" (69).
Adiga's novel satirizes this figure by focalizing through an "an illegitimate spokesman" of
neoliberalism, Balram Halwai, an "uneducated rural migrant and murderer who self-identifies as
a successful “entrepreneur"" (72). However, it is unclear why Joseph considers Halwai an
illegitimate spokesperson for neoliberalism; his rise from poverty to wealth ostensibly proves the
power of individual initiative—personal and political entrepreneurship—to transform the rural
and uneducated subject in to an urban businessman in the global information technology sector.
Indeed, India's new Prime Minster Narendra Modi, a neoliberal to the core, touts his rise from
being a tea server. Joseph rightly critiques neoliberalism's mythology that erases social and
historical contexts, an erasure that helps drive the evisceration of the social welfare state.
However, the strong social ties binding the welfare state in India also manifest as strict caste
hierarchies that imprison people in degradation. And the escape from the latter constitutes an
important part of Halwai's narrative, if not Adiga's critique.
Halwai is born into a poor family of the sweetmaker's caste. His father does not work in
this prescribed occupation but rather slaves as a rickshaw driver to support his family. When he
dies amid the bloody spasms of tuberculosis, Halwai must help his brother earn money for the
family. He eventually becomes the driver for a wealthy, upper-caste family that bribes politicians
to secure an export deal to China for their coal business. The local extraction of coal is, of
course, built on labor held subservient in part by caste, which disallows social mobility of any
sort. Halwai kills his employer and takes a bag of bribe money—which he considers back pay for
years of exploitative wages—as the starting capital for a new business.
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His opens a taxi business in Bangalore, India's Silicon Valley, operating a fleet of cars
that drive technology workers to and from their offices in the middle of the night. This work
allows global companies to operate 24/7 and live up to the "customer care" slogans promised by
otherwise anonymous corporations. These workers make up the "off-shore resources" that
continue the working day so that the global North may ostensibly go home for an evening of
leisure after eight hours. In this way, Halwai's labor continues to support international capital,
but as an owner sunning himself beneath his prized chandelier rather than the blotted trenches of
a coal mine. That is, Halwai's escape does not necessarily position him differently relative to
global capital but does transform his relation to caste and its hegemonic space, the village.
This transformation, however, requires violence. First, and most obviously, Balram
Halwai must murder his employer to reappropriate the wealth extracted from his labor. Second,
Halwai's entire family will be murdered for this transgression. Both murders speak to the
violence—physical, not discursive—structuring the caste system.46 This violence answers two
questions Joseph believes Adiga is asking: "What if this last bastion of imagined collectivity
also falls to neoliberalism? What if even the poor villager is now in the pores of global
capitalism?" (87). The answer may be "let it fall" because it—neoliberalism—may aid the
annihilation of caste. If this imagined collectivity also includes the nation state then its
exploitative presence in rural areas can be done away with too; such evisceration of the state,
however, also means the destruction of the welfare state or, at best, recasting it as the
infrastructure-building agent it is meant to be. If the neoliberalisation of the rural should be
resisted, it cannot be on the grounds of preserving the current order and its violent relations. I
agree that one should not look nostalgically "onto the rural as a site of essential values" but as a
hostile space, the essential caste values of which must be fought.
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I agree with Joseph's contention that Adiga encodes these questions within a literary
strategy that privileges satire. This strategy undoes the usual allegorical method of establishing
metonymic relations so that Balram Halwai stands in for a collectivity. Instead, he is
ventriloquized by Adiga to voice the "appropriation of the neoliberal virtue of entrepreneurship
as primitive accumulation, extortion, bribery, and criminality" (Joseph 91). Halwai does not
speak for or represent a collective; he boasts his own exceptionality too often for that. For
Joseph, moreover, ventriloquization only aides Adiga's satire, the thrust of which comes from the
principal focalizer, who is an "illegitimate interceptor" of the neoliberal dream (Joseph 89).
Interception and appropriation accurately describe Halwai's strategies. He absconds with
a mythology never intended to include him despite its claims otherwise. Moreover, such
interception seeks not to end a clash but to open a new battlefront, expose new wounds to the
astonishment of the established combatants, village caste violence and international
neoliberalism. Interceptors must always be illegitimate. This is different from saying that Halwai
is an "illegitimate spokesman" for neoliberalism because he does not parody its ethos, as Joseph
argues, but rather embodies its grandest myth—advancement through individual initiative.
Balram's initiative may indeed be a part of Adiga's "fiction of agency" but it comes at a
price, "namely that the poor, once they stand out as individuals, may be quite different from what
most audiences know or imagine about them" (Korte 298, emphasis mine). Such individualism
goes to the heart of neoliberalism and its socially bankrupt ethos that sees in collective struggle a
hindrance to the kind of "indigent agency" necessary to create a "tiger economy" (Korte 296).
Indeed, Balram idly dreams of establishing a school that would produce classes "full of White
Tigers unleashed" on the world (Adiga 319). Tigers are, of course, solitary animals that do not
form collectives. If such individualized agency "disturb[s] preconceptions which their [cultural
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elite] readers might have about poor people," it does so by proselytizing an atomic relation to the
world and reaffirming the possibility of upward mobility for "determined individuals" (Korte
297, 296).
Such platitudes ignore the collective efforts raging simultaneously as the novel is being
read. Benedict Anderson long ago identified "meanwhile" as the novelistic vocabulary for
articulating the simultaneity of plots, of pressing readers to imagine the multiple lives lived in
parallel without necessarily intersecting; such an awareness constitutes "imagined communities"
(8). Formal or informal collectives that push against the limitations within such communities
constitute an important part of thinking simultaneity. Such collectives are, however, absent from
Adiga's novel; they do not show as absent presences, hinted at through hyperbole and satire. If
the novel "endows the indigent with conspicuous agency and powers of enunciation," it does so
by ignoring all the enunciations already in flight, choirs of resistance that do not seek permission
or endowment from others. Adiga' s indigent agency must remain trapped between the lines,
ignorant of the struggles it does not even care to parrot.
Even in this otherwise bankrupt reading that fixates on individual agency, however, a
utopic potential lingers. The height of Balram's agency is not his becoming a business owner but
rather in his "audacity to address" the Chinese premier directly (Korte 303). Such individual
audacity is less interesting than the form it takes.
Built on his claim that "the future of the world lies with the yellow man and the brown
man," Balram addresses the Chinese premier, Wen Jiabao, though letters. As Elizabeth Hewitt
has argued, the epistolary form both assumes and engages complex systems and networks of
exchange.47 Although Balram knows about email, owns a computer and works in an information
technology hub—the web is no longer a metaphor or description but an emerging sentience—he
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continues to write paper letters. Balram's attempt to engage the premier recalls the all but
forgotten project of Non-Alignment, a postcolonial solidarity built on transnational
communication networks and their postal transmissions. This is not to say that Balram, or Adiga,
want to harken back to a pre-electronic age; rather this epistolary mode points to the long history
of such engagements between China and India even while pausing to note the wars that have
punctuated that history.
Halwai wants to tell Premier Wen the true story of India through his life story, but
fixating on individualism or even critiquing its atomized logics misses a key feature of his
narrative, namely caste. Not discussing caste, indeed not foregrounding it as a driving force in
the novel and Indian society at large, succumbs to the ideology of "castelessness" whose
American counterpart may be "postracial." That is, Balram's caste—Halwai, sweetmakers—is
marked in the novel, while the caste of others, especially his masters, is not. Critics have paid
insufficient attention to this point and Balram's caste gets mentioned often only in passing or
conflated with his class position. In doing so, we may fail to understand how the novel represents
the relationship between caste and class as well as the limitations of this representational
strategy.
In contemporary Indian society, caste is a marked term imperfectly analogous to woman
or black. Castelessness, like male and white, assumes the natural, universal reference point,
invisibly commanding subalterns to identify themselves as deviant relations. Caste now means
lower caste (Deshpande 37). The upper castes generally, and Brahmins specifically, are the
"unmarked universal citizen" for whom no articulation of caste is necessary; indeed, they may
claim castelessness, which paradoxically proves their high caste (37). The higher castes could
disrobe in this way because their caste remained invisible and unrecognized as a "source of
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privilege or advantage" (37). In contrast, lower castes acquire a "hypervisibilty," marked legally
and socially as the subject of reservations—quotas ostensibly aimed to alleviate social injustices
(37). The newest legal category—after "Scheduled Castes" (SC) and "Scheduled Tribes" (ST)—
"Other Backward Classes" (OBC) recalls a colonial insult and strategy of subjugation; subalterns
as backward people always need to be brought forward into modernity, willingly or not. More
importantly, through the addition of OBCs to the reservation system, "the general category had
now become a euphemism for the upper castes" (38).
Within this social matrix, Balram's caste matters a great deal. That he alone announces
his caste in the novel is as significant as the fact that he does not need to enunciate the (high)
castes of all those whom he serves. However, Balram need not announce precisely to which legal
category he belongs because "everyone in the Darkness who hears that name knows all about me
at once" (Adiga 63, emphasis mine). In the Darkness, Halwai's counter-figure to the ubiquitous
cliché "India Shining"—the Indian government's marketing campaign—one's surname indicates
their caste and through it their destinies. Halwai actually complicates this version of caste by
offering this reduction: "These days, there are just two castes: Men with Big Bellies, and Men
with Small Bellies. And only two destinies: eat - or get eaten up" (64).
Caste and class thus intersect without subsuming each other: high-caste wealth (Big
Bellies) and low-caste poverty (Small Bellies) align all too well. Balram contends, however, that
the lower castes too can have wealth as long as they are willing to eat and not get eaten up any
longer: "anyone with a belly could rise up" (64). His own murderous rise attests to that.
Moreover, Balram's binary demystifies the relation between caste and "destiny" by disjoining the
latter from occupation or vocation. As a Halwai, Balram belongs to the caste of sweetmakers, but
his father became a rickshaw puller because, he speculates, "a member of some other caste must
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have stolen [the sweets shop] from him with the help of the police" (64). Balram disarticulates
the relationship between caste and occupation because another illegally appropriated that
relationship. He does not seek to return to this 'true' caste vocation but rather uses this "enabling
violation" to break away from caste limits (Spivak 524, 2004).
An important debate between Ambedkar and Gandhi concerned precisely this split
between caste and vocation. In 1937, Ambedkar published the second edition of The
Annihilation of Caste and rebutted Gandhi's conservative critique of his work in an article
entitled "A Vindication of Caste" (1944).48 Ambedkar cares little for the sacrosanct Mahatma
who is "so great that when he opens his lips it is expected that the argument must close and no
dog must bark" (1944). Specifically, Ambedkar refutes Gandhi's claim that
the law of Varna teaches us that we have each one of us to earn our bread
by following the ancestral calling. It defines not our rights but our duties.
It necessarily has reference to callings that are conducive to the welfare
of humanity and to no other. It also follows that there is no calling too
low and none too high. All are good, lawful and absolutely equal in
status. (1944).
Ambedkar's rejects Gandhi's arguments as reducible to the "the dogma of predestination."49 Such
a societal principal would forbid one from changing occupations even if it "would be impossible
for him to gain his livelihood through the ancestral calling" (1944). Moreover, Ambedkar notes,
the Mahatma and his family have long ignored their calling as traders—they are Banias by
caste—and have chosen instead to becomes ministers (the lot of Brahmins), lawyers, politicians,
and newspaper magnates (1944). The second critique listed here speaks to a central injustice
within Gandhi's claims. Specifically, the higher castes may ignore their "ancestral calling" and
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move freely into another occupation and its place in society even while they prohibit lower
castes from doing the same.
For Balram, Gandhi's prescription would mean a life as a sweetmaker even if the family
shop were stolen a generation ago. This ancestral calling has little to do with his family's lived
reality or the clear hierarchies within which it takes place. Before Balram learns how to drive he
works at the local teashop, "the one with the big photo of Gandhi in it" (Adiga 61). Even if the
novel does not mention Gandhi's fiercest critic, pieces of Ambedkar's arguments certainly creep
in as the former's visage overlooks a scene he helped create. The shop's workers are
crushed humans in crushed uniforms, sluggish, unshaven, in their thirties
or forties of fifties but still 'boys'. But that is your fate if you do your job
well — with honesty, dedication, and sincerity, the way Gandhi would
have done it, no doubt. (51)
Predestined to be "human spiders," these workers, and Balram with them, are consigned to lifelong servitude no matter their aptitude. While neoliberalism proffers false hopes of social
mobility based on industriousness, the caste system vanquishes such hopes. If this rigidity seems
perversely more honest, it does not allow for the possibility that capital will profane this sacred
system.
When Balram first tries to learn how to drive a car and change his vocation, his future
teacher dismisses him because he is a sweetmaker and driving is "like taming a wild stallion only a boy from the warrior castes can manage that" (56). Like Gandhi, Balram's teacher
conflates Varna and caste, which Ambedkar differentiates: "Varna is based on the principle of
each according to his worth, while Caste is based on the principle of each according to his birth"
(1944). Balram's birth, however, determines his worth, his abilities to tame cars or advance his
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occupation. The old driver capitulates because "three hundred rupees, plus a bonus, will do that,"
as will working as a free mechanic for the local taxis (Adiga 56).
The interruption of caste by capital here does not hail a new development in their
relations or the overturning of the former by the latter. Rather, this moment presents an already
ongoing and dynamic relationship between these overdetermining forces. The landlords of
Laxmangarh, Balram's village, own large coalmines they hope to contract to Chinese firms. The
wealth produced from these mines, moreover, allows their son Ashok to live and study abroad
before returning to India. Joseph contends that these landlords "use the rural as a sort of
interdiction of the global and the local" so that the movement of their son and his tuition partly
tell "the story of multinational capital" (79).50 She uses interdiction here in Spivak's Derridian
sense: "a practice that does not take sides, but uses what is strategically important" (77). These
"old residual power structures" depend on the local caste hierarchies, which may be residual but
are no less powerful for that (79). If the novel does indeed ask, "What if this last bastion of
imagined collectivity also falls to neoliberalism?" it is less concerned about villages than caste
communities (87). The question, then, is not "What if even the poor villager is now in the pores
of global capitalism?," but rather, how does this casted indigent live in these spaces? The novel's
representation of rural life in India cannot be "an authentic description of the hardships endured
by the rural populations of many India villages" because the aesthetic strategy centers on satire
and caricature (Suneetha 168).
The buffalo Balram's family owns, for instance, serves as "a parodic allusion to
microcredit: a fattened animal remains the hope of all members of the family, yet the entire
family seems to be working for it rather than the other way around" (Joseph 87). This reading
shifts the time and place of neoliberalism; it is no longer arriving here soon (What if?) but
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already living with you and masticating your labor (how does?). Given this micro-penetration of
neoliberal capital it is unclear how Balram must be a "monstrous gangster-like" figure (87). Two
strands of argument join here. One, as I argued earlier, Balram does not represent an illegitimate
spokesman for neoliberalism but rather an instance of its greatest myth. This means that,
secondly, Balram cannot be anymore monstrous or gangsterish than his surroundings. This is not
to say that his behavior merely "mirrors" that of the landlord class, nor do we hear in his speech
only "entrepreneurial shibboleths as criminality" (Joseph 87, 72, emphasis in original). I am
arguing instead that Balram appropriates and intercepts the logics around him—discursive,
entrepreneurial, and violent.
The shift away from mirroring to appropriation matters a great deal. Returning to the
scene of microcredit, Balram's family must do everything to sustain the buffalo because "if she
gave enough milk, the women could sell some of it and there might be a little more money at the
end of the day" (Adiga 20). They pull Balram out of school to help produce more income and
remove their husbands' earnings when they return from their migrant city work. He only ensnares
himself more deeply into these bonds when he tries to break free. For instance, Balram's
grandmother sponsors his driving lessons with the caveat that he must send his entire pay back to
the family; secondly, he becomes the driver for one the village landlords. Such desperation does
not evince a "cannibalistic urge" that "mirrors the landlord class's predatory brutality toward the
villagers" (88). Rather, Balram and his family live and die within the confines of the latter.
Caste relations frame these brutal confines more rigidly than critics have acknowledged.
While Balram may appropriate the language of entrepreneurship—as a driver he is already an
independent contractor of sorts—he cannot appropriate anything of caste. Even after Balram
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learns how to drive, the fortuitously lands an audition to be a driver and impresses the Stork (the
villagers' name for this landlord), he must answer a final, all determining question:
What's your last name again?
'Halwai'
'Halwai…' He turned to the small dark man. 'What caste is that, top or
bottom?'
And I knew that my future depended on the answer to this question. (63)
No matter his education or proficiency a final blockade remains. This scene occasions Balram's
digression into the dynamics of caste and his argument that only two castes remain: "Men with
Big Bellies, and Men with Small Bellies" (64). That analysis strangely ignores caste's
overdetermining power in the scene it interrupts and perhaps contributes to the critical silence on
this issue. The "small dark man," one of the landowner's sons, does not know the answer, so
Balram must answer himself. He replies "Bottom, sir," arguing that he could "have made a good
case either way" (65). In the landowner's reply, the novel parodies the affirmative action of the
reservation system and its patronizing benevolence: "All our employees are top caste. It won't
hurt to have one or two bottom castes working for us" (65). One is granted the permission to
serve and only earns that magnanimity after proving one's proficiency at the task. Balram cannot
appropriate such caste logic or power. He can, however, learn its violence.
They hire Balram only after ensuring that his family does not support the Naxalites
(Maoist revolutionaries) and remain in that village; "We know exactly where they are" (66,
emphasis in original). Balram explains that the Stork killed a previous servant who failed to
guard his infant son from a Naxalite kidnapping. Although the servant claimed innocence and
was executed, the Stork has the servant's entire family killed and their family house burned
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down. Balram assumes that the same has happened to his family after he kills the Stork's son,
Mr. Ashok, and absconds with the bribe money. One critic finds fault with Balram's actions,
arguing that "if the injustice of the master class was immoral, Halwai's methods of redressing the
injustice seems equally so" (Khor 44). Debating the morality of Balram's violence obfuscates its
context, a battlefield strewn with the victims of caste and poverty. His is a retaliatory violence
that, to my mind, cannot be unjustified.51
In a surprising argument, Ambedkar argues that the Buddha was "in favor of justice and
where justice required he permitted the use of force" (Buddha). More provocatively:
If a soldier can be killed in war because he belongs to a hostile nation
why cannot a property owner be killed if his ownership leads to misery
for the rest of humanity? There is no reason to make an exception in
favour of the property owner, why one should regard private property as
sacrosanct. (Buddha)
Theological accuracy matters less for my purposes than Ambedkar's tactical reading of
Buddhism, and the Buddha's teachings more specifically, to bolster an argument for the use of
retaliatory force. (Ambedkar argues that the Buddha and Marx agree on this point.) Although
force does not necessarily mean violence, Ambedkar’s phrasing suggests that they become
synonymous under the right conditions. The parallelism between a soldier at war and property
owners intimates that the latter too operate on a battlefield and should be treated as belonging to
a "hostile nation" bent on producing "misery for the rest of humanity" (Buddha). In this reading
nothing about property or the property owner remains "sacrosanct" (Buddha). Balram must be
understood in this context, guided by the invisible hand of these lessons even as he intercepts
neoliberal ideology.
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Ambedkar appears nowhere in the novel. Balram does not mention him, nor does he
come across the statues of him in Delhi even though he drives around the Gandhi statue a few
times. This omission is purposeful if not entirely desirable. The novel's literary strategies—
allegory, satire, counterfocalization—disallow a sincere treatment of Ambedkar. That is the
generous reading. A less generous reading may accuse the novel, and "the Brahmin Adiga"
specifically, of failing "to mention the term Dalit in the whole of the novel" (Dalit Nation). As
even that hostile reviewer notes, however, "there is [a] mention of Gandhi in a disparaging way"
(Dalit Nation). Given Balram's irreverence for such political gods, however, Dr. Ambedkar must
remain outside the novel lest he suffer the same fate. He can only appear in the guise of the
Buddha.
The Buddha first appears in the novel only to demonstrate how desolate Balram's home
village is. Laxmangarh is located in the Gaya district, home to Bodh Gaya where the Buddha
achieves (or re-achieves) enlightenment. Did the Buddha walk through Laxmangarh? "My own
feeling is that he ran through it — as fast as he could—and got to the other side —and never
looked back!" (18). The moment indicts Laxmangarh more than it does the Buddha, whose
enlightenment it seems would drown in the village's Darkness. The next paragraph destroys the
idols of Hinduism worshiped there: the Ganga river for its filth and Hanuman ("half man half
monkey") for being "a shinning example of how to serve your masters with absolute fidelity,
love, and devotion" (19). Such exemplary servitude only helps Balram underscore "how hard it is
for a man to win his freedom in India" (19). In this flow of indictments his earlier commentary
on the Buddha's foot speed then cannot be a critique but an admiring glance at an ideal of
freedom to which he aspires.
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At the novel's conclusion, Balram again returns to the Buddha to explain why he should
not be considered a "cold-blooded monster" (315). In reply to a "cunning Brahmin" who was
"trying to trick the Buddha" into claiming that he was a god, the Buddha says that he is neither
man nor god: "I am just one who has woken up while the rest of you are sleeping" (315). Balram
argues that he too is neither man nor "demon" but only one who has woken up, "and that is the
only difference between us" (315). This claim seems blasphemous on its own but it approximates
Ambedkar's reading of the Buddha discussed earlier. Balram has awoken to injustice and uses
force to rectify the situation; according to Ambedkar, with whom I concur, Balram has the
Buddha's blessing. Balram's second claim, that his awakening alone differentiates him from the
rest of us, suggests the possibility of an enlightened collective that fights back.
One night, will they all join together — will they destroy the Rooster
Coop?
Ha!
Maybe once in a hundred years there is a revolution that frees the poor.
(303)
Balram follows his mocking "Ha!" with a more concrete analysis.
People in this country are waiting for the war of their freedom to come
from somewhere else — from the jungles, from the mountains, from
China, from Pakistan. That will never happen. Every man must make his
own Benares. (304)
Balram's relative optimism of individual "revolution," however, matches his pessimism about
collective struggles that are either deferred or dislocated (304). Instead, he admonishes, "The
book of your revolution sits in the pit of your belly, young Indian. Crap it out, and read" (304).
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Although the scatological remark alludes to the work of "Untouchables" with feces, it also marks
the passage between internal and external as an effort, a verb ("crap") that must be followed by
another ("read"). If a driver only reads fantasy stories about servants killing their masters,
Balram argues, the master has nothing to worry about because these stories begin with a
deranged servant and end with a dead one; these penny novels reinforce the inescapability, even
sanity, of servitude. "It's when your driver starts to read about Gandhi and the Buddha that it's
time to wet your pants, Mr. Jiabao" (126). Reading these luminaries reverses the verb order for
the masters so that seeing produces liquefied fear; like the young Indian who must excrete his
wisdom to make it legible, the masters will see the terror inherent in their position soiling their
underwear.
The Buddha helps both actors—servant and master—understand what is inside them. I
am arguing that he must be the surrogate for Dr. Ambedkar. If that's true, then coupling Gandhi
alongside Ambedkar as enlightening thinkers seems incongruous. Given his earlier critiques of
Gandhi, however, Ambedkar (the Buddha) foils the former; the driver does not read Gandhi for
inspiration to revolt but as the paragon of a conservatism that must be fought. Reading Gandhi
alone does not suffice. Reading about him "and the Buddha" (Ambedkar), their debates against
each other, endangers the masters (126, emphasis mine). Indeed, his final escape consolidates a
few lines of Ambedkar's thought: the annihilation of caste (Balram works above and outside his,
then takes a high caste name), property owners are enemy combatants (Balram kills Ashok),
private property is not sacrosanct (he steals—expropriates—a huge sum of money).
Critiques of Balram's arguments note their individualism and therefore alignment with a
neoliberal ethos. Indeed, as I argued earlier, Balram's claims and life trajectory does not make
him an illegitimate spokesman for neoliberalism but offers the best kind of rags to riches story it
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promises will be available to all if only we unleash free market forces. I have also argued that
Balram does not merely mirror the landowner's logic but appropriates it and that such
appropriation should not be understood only as a caricature, a hyperbolic representation that
reveals the grotesqueness of its referent. Rather, Balram's interception of neoliberal
entrepreneurship exploits the utopic potential within this system. The criteria that ostensibly
make him illegitimate—"an uneducated rural migrant and murderer" —demonstrate their
irrelevance to neoliberalism's final analysis; does it generate profit? (Joseph 72).
I am not arguing that the novel demonstrates the efficacy of neoliberalism nor am I
personally endorsing the latter. Rather, I am following Fredric Jameson's method of locating the
utopian horizon within the otherwise repellent. He notes, for instance, that Walmart's production,
transportation, and distribution systems provide the "anticipatory prototype of some new form of
socialism for which the reproach of centralization now proves historically misplaced and
irrelevant" (Jameson 153). If Walmart provides an "anticipatory prototype" of a future to be won,
then the call centers and Balram's shuttle business glimpses an India where caste relations
succumb to capital's indifference.
Both Walmart and the technology companies in Bangalore (and the multinationals that
contract them) rely on global circuits of communication and trade that, while exploiting local
hierarchies to lower labor costs and prevent organization, otherwise care little of the local
prejudices and supremacies. Lower cost trumps concerns over the laborer's lower caste. Ignoring
this feature of capital blinds one to its enticements and makes the popularity of neoliberal
reforms, if not their success, incomprehensible. In such a failed analysis, one might mistakenly
charge the lower castes with the task of anticapitalist revolution without understanding why they
do not occupy that role.
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Gopal Guru, editor of Humiliation: Claims and Context, a volume that focuses in large
part on caste generally and untouchability specifically, falls into the traps I have just described.
Guru's punching bag is the "Dalit millionaire" who receives applause and a condescending
handshake from established (high-caste) industrialists. This scene "uniformly designate[s]" the
"triumphalism" of neoliberal ideology because it affirms, and answers in the affirmative, the
question: "Can the subaltern accumulate?" (Guru 41). The Dalit millionaire constitutes a
"spectacle," in Guy Debord's sense, "which, as false consciousness, necessarily forges a fake
association between a person or a social collectivity, and the spectacle" (41). He qualifies that the
Dalit millionaire is a "low intensity spectacle," a kind of sub-spectacle that promotes the
corporate class's ideology (42). This spectacle "induce[s] in common Dalits a feeling of
pacification, which in effect will neutralize their anti-corporate stance" (42). He goes on to argue
that corporations promote various cash transfers to the "toiling Dalit in rural India" in order to
neutralize any burgeoning radical consciousness and, to recall his earlier argument, promote
"false consciousness" (42).
Guru's analysis limits radical consciousness to anticapitalism. This is a strangely
provincial version of radical politics. While anticapitalism and anticaste politics would ideally
intersect and aid each other, Guru fails to mention the latter at all, let alone as a revolutionary
consciousness. He understands the Dalit millionaire's relation to caste in two ways: first, they
require the "ragpickers and scavengers in the withered down jhuggis [shanty slums]" to mark
them as a spectacle, economically and socially forward relative to their backward brethren.
These millionaires must "remain in touch with the wretched, howsoever "embarrassing" the latter
may be" (43). Guru seems to suggest that Dalits cannot escape their relation to the "wretched"
among them despite their desire to. However, he goes on to chide them because "they prefer to
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remain chained to their identity" (43). That caste identity is not a preference one can simply
disavow does not occur to Guru here. This means that Dalit millionaires, as Guru's nomenclature
indicates, must remain Dalit millionaires. More importantly, nowhere in these contradictory
relationships can one locate an anticaste politics that might use imposed caste markings—that
they "prefer" to retain—to upset its brutal hierarchies.
Balram both abandons his caste identity and describes its decisive role in his life. After
arriving in Bangalore, Balram renames himself Ashok Sharma, a high-caste name that does not
impose limits on upward mobility; we might call it caste-passing. As described earlier, the high
caste no longer carry a marker, acquiring the more universal category of citizen. However, in
recounting his story to the Chinese premier, Balram emphasizes how being a Halwai affects his
destiny by limiting the occupations he may take up. For Balram, a low caste identity is not a
voluntary choice but a shackle to be broken, never discarded. A high caste or unmarked identity
must be stolen, absconded with like a bag full of money, with which he must live in
apprehension, as a thief must.
Secondly, Guru understands the Dalit millionaire's relation to caste in terms of their use
of "state and political patronage" (43). Such patronage, rather than the "free and competitive"
market, combined with affirmative action measures, allowed the "political freedom that seems to
have helped Dalits gain economic freedom" (44). While it is true that the reservation and quota
systems are in place (ostensibly) to provide aid to the "Backward Classes," Balram's narrative
discloses a darker secret. Such state-sponsored balms are unnecessary if we move directly to the
guillotine. In cutting his master's throat, walking away with an attaché case of cash and even
taking his master's first name, Balram circumvents the kind of state and political patronage Guru
describes. That is, Balram provides an example, if an atomized one, of a revolutionary politics
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Guru cannot envision for Dalits or their millionaires: a direct attack that may not seek solidarity
with anticapitalists or the socialist parties that house them.
Indeed, the novel satirizes the socialist leaders in India. While it is generally true that the
novel represents "both the crisis of the nationalist-socialist state of the 1950s and the emergence
of the neoliberal globalizing state in the 1990s," the specific critiques of the former need
elaboration (Joseph 82). Specifically, the novel's allegorical structure marks the derangement of
Nehruvian socialism's ideals in the figure of the Great Socialist. This state leader displays all the
features of a corrupt autocrat conspiring with the landowners, whom he occasionally humiliates,
to siphon "one billion rupees form the Darkness and [transfer] that money into a bank account in
a small, beautiful country in Europe of white people and black money" (Adiga 98). Accused of
"murder, rape, grand larceny, gun-smuggling, pimping and many other such minor offences," the
Great Socialist nevertheless continues to remain in power through election rigging and false
promises to the poor. Balram reveals that the local unconstructed hospital ranks chief among
these broken pledges, leaving only "three different foundation stones for a hospital, laid there by
three different politicians before three different elections" (47). Balram's father dies in a hospital
too far away, without a doctor in attendance, and of a disease for which a vaccine is available,
tuberculosis. This triple tragedy underscores the Great Socialist's already capitalized name,
marking him as the abstract ideal of a gap between name and deed, a historic project deformed to
become unrecognizable.
The novel certainly critiques the narratives of
national progress and economic development, where infrastructure
development is now in the service of electronic capitalism and high-end
consumer goods, rather than the older socialist-welfare agendas of
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poverty alleviation, rural literacy, women’s welfare, and healthcare.
(Joseph 76)
In the figure of the Great Socialist, however, the novel argues that the difference between these
agendas has eroded. Joseph's "rather than" separates two projects that have now aligned so that
the "older socialist agendas" disguise servitude to "electronic capitalism" (Joseph 76, emphasis
mine). Laxmangarh's landlords push against the Great Socialist’s power by forming a party of
their own, the All India Social Progressive Front (Leninist Faction). If the name parodies the
divisions between the various Communist parties in India—CPI, CPI (Marxist), CPI (MarxistLeninist), CPI (Maoist) to name a few—its foundation by the masters as a challenge to power
offers a stronger critique. "Social Progressive" and "Leninist" no longer refer to leftist politics,
let alone left radical politics, but rather serve the landlords' interests under slogans that champion
the poor. To be clear, the novel does not seem to critique communism, socialism, or Marxism per
se, but parodies the Indian political parties that ostensibly fight under those flags. Even if these
critiques cannot be endorsed they cannot be ignored as they have been by otherwise astute
critics.
More troublingly, I want to suggest a link between the novel's critiques and Guru. I
suggested earlier that Guru seems unable to understand a radical emancipatory politics outside of
an anticapitalist frame. That is, Guru wants Dalits to either join the Marxist (party?) struggle or,
in the vein of Subaltern Studies, take up the mantle of revolutionary subjectivity. The term Dalit
itself, Guru argues, "symbolizes struggle as it is produced by the struggling masses in opposition
to both the state and state-driven capitalism, and the free market" (48). Taking something true—
that Dalit names and enables a collective struggle—Guru arrives at something false—the brown
washing of the term to represent abstract "masses" whose anticaste struggle is subsumed into
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Marxist terms. Worse, the term takes on an "autonomous ontological status" as an agential term
that rejects "the idea of victimhood" (48). Ontology is precisely the framework Dalit avoids
because its basic premise rejects the givenness of caste and the heirarchy of being it structures;
the term aims to marshal SCs, STs, and OBCs under one flag. Moreover, articulating an agential
term does not ignore victimhood—which is different than refusing to be victims only—nor the
explicitly caste-based violence under which it suffers.
Dalit as a struggle concept has been sociologically constituted,
historically arrived at and politically articulated. This, by definition,
would avoid any association with capitalism and the coercive state, and
other patronizing vocabulary produced by Gandhi or by the welfare state.
Dalit is not a caste term at all. (48, my emphasis)
If Guru only hinted at subsuming Dalit as a "struggle concept" earlier, the closing line of
this paragraph swallows it whole. Abstracting Dalit from its roots in anticaste struggle in order to
"avoid any association with capitalism" reads like a landowner claiming that the toil of his coal
miners benefits all equally without noting that he and his ilk are more equal than others. If this
comparison seems ungenerous or the muddling of entirely different agendas, then it captures
something of exasperation felt when reading Guru's perverse annihilation of caste. Again, this is
not to say that anticaste activism cannot and should not intersect with anticapitalism; rather, it is
to note that subsuming the former in the name of latter does little to cultivate such alliances.
The novel's Great Socialist inspires this ungenerous comparison because he operates
under the party symbol, "a pair of hands breaking through handcuffs — symbolizing the poor
shaking off the rich," which is "imprinted in black stencils on the walls of every government
office in the Darkness" (Adiga 97). Although these once powerful stencils on government offices
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mean to advertise the state as the saving force, they become caricatures in the novel, hyperbolic
parodies of a state that shackles the poor to the landlords and through them to capitalist
exploitation. After coming to a detente with the landowners, the Great Socialist visits them to
collect his extortion fee of one and a half million rupees. He knows they have the money,
"You've got a good scam going here — taking coal for free from the government mines. You're
got it going because I let it happen" (104). He did not merely enable the landowners but
produced them: "I brought you here — I made you what you are today" (105). This caricature of
a corrupt politician and the long scams they create nevertheless ruptures Joseph's critique of
current development narratives' fixation on electronic capitalism "rather than" the old socialist
agendas (Joseph 76, my emphasis). In the novel's logic those old socialist agendas now devour
the poor with the rhetoric of liberation and the exploitation of capitalism.
One more frightening symmetry: Guru writes that the emergence of the Dalit millionaire
forces the latter to "treat the ideology of neo-liberalism with liberatory potential" (49). Worse
still, they must "collaborate with the Indian corporate class with the purpose to create a unified
ideological impact on socially discreet groups" (49). Certainly, a crucial part of this ideological
assault directed at the poor holds that anyone can become a millionaire given, as the American
version might say, enough pluck and bootstraps. Indeed, I argued earlier that Balram embodies
this myth, making him the ideal representative for neoliberalism. However, the novel pushes
back, arguing that neoliberalism alone does not offer false promises to the poor; the Great
Socialist and his ilk do the same. For instance, a government agent visits Balram's school and
asks him to identify a photo:
Who is this man, who is the most important man in all our lives?
"He's the Great Socialist"
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What is his message for children?
"Any boy in any village can grow up to become the prime minister of
India. That is his message to little children all over this land." (35)
In the next moment, however, the agent names Balram the white tiger, "the creature that
comes along only once in a generation" (35). The equality promised earlier quickly proves an
abnormality, a rare genetic trait that has little to do with the vegetation around it. The agent
promises to send over a scholarship and transfer Balram to a new school. Those plans quickly
fall away, however, when he must go to work in order to pay off his family's debt to the landlord.
If Guru rightly critiques the structural limits of neoliberal capitalism—its promised upward
mobility depends on the indentured stasis of many—the novel critiques the Great Socialist's
version of a similar promise that cannot overcome generational poverty, or worse, perpetuates it
in collusion with the landlords.
Unpacking the novel's critique of the symmetry between neoliberalism’s promise of
wealth for all and the Great Socialist's promise of upward mobility does not require agreement or
endorsement. Most critics find Balram repulsive for various reasons and clearly the state minister
is not a likable character either. If the novel suggests a fearful symmetry between the two, it also
rejects both even while, as I argued earlier, noting the utopian potential within them.
The novel also gives both neoliberal capitalism and Great Socialism—I am retaining the
novel's caricature to avoid conflating it with existing or future instantiations—a figure of upward
mobility. While Balram represents an ideal of the neoliberal promise, Vijay represents the
obverse, Great Socialism's embodiment of a rise from poverty to party official. Balram
encounters Vijay throughout his life, including in Delhi when the latter slides into the car next to
another politician.
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The man on the right was my childhood hero - Vijay, the pigherd's son
turned bus conductor turned politician from Laxmangarh. He had
changed uniforms again: now he was wearing the polished suit and tie of
a modern Indian businessman. (270)
This trajectory corresponds to Balrams's own — the rickshaw puller's son turned driver turned
entrepreneur from Laxmangarh. If the novel's parallel between socialist politician and
entrepreneur becomes even more evident here, Vijay's new business suit melds the two
occupations together. He works with the other politician in the car to extort Ashok: "I told him if
he didn't pay, we'd screw him and his father and his brother and the whole coal-pilfering and taxevading racket they have" (271). Vijay and his Comrade—note the caricature—belong to the
national branch of the state-level Great Socialist. That is, they do not hope to end the corrupt
extraction of natural resources, labor, and wealth from Laxmangarh but exploit their awareness
and enablement of this "tax-evading racket" to benefit themselves. What was once a cold war
between two opposed world building methods—socialism and capitalism—collapses into the
banal collusion of corrupt politicians and landlords.
In another version of this novel, Balram might have killed a politician and landowners in
order to expropriate the money necessary to begin his new life. This would be a bloody justice
but not an entirely unwarranted one and one, as I argued above, that neither Ambedkar nor his
reading of the Buddha disallow. Instead, Balram kills the landowner. This plot trajectory may
keep the novel's world intact—Balram cannot become an anticorruption hero—but it also
advances the utopic horizon of neoliberal capital I discussed earlier, a horizon apparently
unavailable to the state. Specifically, Balram vanishes into the anonymity of global capital where
his past and caste matter less than the wealth he circulates; Vijay demonstrates that a similar
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upward mobility, but not anonymity, may be available within the party and state bureaucracy but
only if it is treated as a capitalist enterprise.
As with the novel itself there are crucial limits to these developmental trajectories.
Gender constitutes the most important of these outcast elements. The novel concerns a male's
rise from poverty, in servitude to predominantly male employers, and the transmission of this
story to the male Chinese premier. The other upwardly mobile figure identified above, Vijay, is
also male as are his Comrades, including the Great Socialist, whose agent once conveyed an
inspirational message to Balram at his school: "Any boy in any village can grow up to become
the prime minister of India. That is his message to little children all over this land" (Adiga 35,
emphasis mine). Even as this message presents a mirage, it genders access to that false oasis of
upward mobility for all. Indira Gandhi's time as prime minister never happened in this India, and
not because she imposed draconian measures against the poor, but because she does not exist as
a woman. After naming him the White Tiger, the government agent gives Balram a book,
"Lessons for Young Boys from the Life of Mahatma Gandhi" (25). The erasure of Ambedkar and
the gendering of education converge here in the form of the parting gift the government agent
has on hand. Gandhi had no lessons for young girls apparently and Ambedkar offers nothing for
children of either gender despite the centrality of education to his activism. Moreover, there seem
to be no girls in Balram's school, or at least none that he speaks of. The only correspondence
between women and education in Balram's narrative involves his sister's marriage, the
celebration and dowry of which required Balram to work to pay off the family debt rather than
attend school. No mention is made of his sisters' schooling.
Balram's decrepit school offered no books or other supplies but an indifferent teacher
who steals supplies and food to compensate a half a year's lack of pay. The novel mockingly
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describes the teacher as practicing a "Gandhian protest to retrieve his missing wages — he was
going to do nothing in class until his pay cheque arrived in the mail" (33). In this context,
emancipation through education rings as hollow as its attendant promise of upward mobility for
all. Even the educators suffer under the misallocation of resources, including the lack of training
or a training that emphasizes "rote learning" such that "the technique of emphasizing meaning is
not what s/he would understand by teaching" (Spivak 26). This constitutes the "real disgrace of
rural primary education," which defeats "even the good teacher with the best will in the world"
(26, emphasis in original). In the novel's terms, the subjects produced from this sort of education
are "half-baked" (Adiga 10). "He can read and write," laments Ashok, "but he doesn't get what
he's read. He's half-baked" (10). Balram concurs:
All these ideas, half formed and half digested and half correct, mix up
with the other half-cooked ideas in your head, and I guess these halfformed ideas bugger into one another, and make more half-formed ideas,
and this what you act on and live with. The story of my upbringing is the
story of how a half-baked fellow is produced. (11)
It is generally true that this passage tells the story of "Indian illiteracy and infrastructural
development" through Balram's "flawed and fragmentary perspective" (Joseph 89). And this is
not a bad thing. Indeed, Balram promises that any school that he starts would not "corrupt
anyone's head with prayers and stories about God or Gandhi," the fully formed but ossified
shibboleths of conservatism (Adiga 319). While being half-baked in this way does not lend itself
to achievements on standardized exams, it does encourage invention and deviation, processes far
more amenable to revolt. I would describe these processes as an aesthetic practice, the making of
something entirely new. In Balram's case such aesthetics breaks from given modes of
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instrumentality—his own servitude—for the sake of a neoliberal form—entrepreneurship.
Balram's education comes through poetry; he knows "by heart the works of the four greatest
poets of all time — Rumi, Iqbal, Mirza Ghalib, and a fourth fellow," Kabir perhaps, who remains
unnamed but whose ideas of equality have been memorized.
"'They remain slaves because they can't see what is beautiful in this world.' That is the
truest thing anyone ever said" (Adiga 40). Balram quotes Iqbal as the foundation of his
explanation of why masses remain impoverished even while they constitute the majority. In a
Marxian vein, Balram argues that the "history of the world is the history of a ten-thousand-year
war of brains between the rich and the poor," and "Poetry…when understood correctly spills out
secrets that allow the poorest man on earth to conclude the ten-thousand-year-old-war on terms
favourable to himself" (254). He goes to a street-side bookseller who reads a bit of poetry to him:
"You were looking for the key for years/ But the door was always open!" Balram repeats the
couplet feverishly, changing the poem's "You were" to "I was," as he comes to see the bag of
money and his master's death as the open door through which he must walk out. This fragment of
Iqbal's poetry, learned without its ecstatic context or historical explication, may be "half-formed"
but Balram makes it an affirmation of freedom. While some definitions of aesthetics claim it to
be in excess of instrumentality, Balram's understands aesthetics as that which ruptures the
existing instrumentality of caste and class hierarchies. For him, seeing what is beautiful in the
world means glimpsing freedom, the door to which is always open even if it leads to neoliberal
capitalism.
The equation of freedom and neoliberalism makes little sense without understanding the
local bondages from which one may seek escape. The allure of this trajectory into the anonymity
of capital—"[Bangalore] was full of outsiders. No one would notice me here"—comes in its
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liberty from caste (296). The novel, I have argued, both satirizes neoliberal entrepreneurship and
explores its utopian potential to profane sacred hierarchies. Attending to this tension allows us to
understand why anticaste and anticapital activism does not necessarily coincide despite our
desires; and subsuming the former within the latter does not help forge alliances. Through the
Great Socialist and his agents, the novel satirizes the liberation ostensibly promised by ruling
leftist parties, which either do not provide adequate infrastructures (hospitals) or use existing
systems (schools) to reproduce caste subservience (Gandhi). Only by intercepting bits of skill,
neoliberal ideology, and violence, the novel argues, does one break away from servitude, if not
achieve anything like freedom. For Balram "it was all worthwhile to know, just for a day, just for
an hour, just for a minute, what it means not to be a servant" (321).
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Conclusion
The twenty-first century's proliferation of South-South relations requires the critical
capacities, historical knowledge, and ability to read across disjunctive scales, offered by
Postcolonial studies. These South-South relations are both collaborative and domineering,
reflecting external the solidarities of national liberation movements as well as witnesses to the
eruption of internal antagonisms that destroy these hopes. This focus on the global South,
however, does not require denying the continued dominance of the North or fixing its place as
the fount of all power. In the course of this dissertation, I explore a range of issues that, taken
together, demonstrate the ways postcolonial literary studies enrich our understanding of
contemporary politics and aesthetics.
In chapters 1 and 2, I demonstrate that local violence—genocides in Bangladesh and
Rwanda—depends on Northern political support, weapons supplies as well as the humanitarian
aid that follows. Understanding such violence requires attention both to the historical colonial
relationships that ground these North-South relationships—the French in Rwanda for example—
as well as to the local actors who turn from victims to killers. In these chapters, I aim to
demonstrate that the supply of arms remains a key mode through which the North still shapes the
South. In chapter 1, for example, the protagonist of Salman Rushdie's Midnight's Children uses
these Northern weapons as one set of material evidence to absolve himself of war crimes
committed in Bangladesh. This hyperbolic strategy—look at all these overdetermining forces!—
caricatures one version of postcolonialism in which all crimes can be traced back to the global
North. The insufficiencies of this narrative challenge us to create the alternate narrative strategies
necessary for justice in the present.
I carry these concerns into chapter 2 by locating in the trope of “indifference” an obfuscation
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of the international community's many investments in Rwanda. The banal narrative that no one
cared about the genocide in Rwanda mystifies the involvement of old colonial powers France
and Belgium, as well as Uganda and South Africa, all of who supply weapons to the warring
parties. This arms supply is not equal, of course, as the Francophone powers equipped the
genocidaires while also providing peacekeepers to the UN and humanitarian aid in the
genocide’s aftermath. Boubicar Boris Diop's Murambi, The Book of Bones underlines these
grotesque connections that evince the continued influence of Northern powers without, however,
absolving the Rwandan genocidaires of their crimes. The critique of “indifference” aims to
inoculate us against its mystifying force and turn our attention instead to the existing networks of
political influence, arms, and capital that riddle South-South relations.
While I move in the first two chapters from India to East Africa, I zoom into the traffic
between these spaces across the Indian Ocean in chapter 3. These South-South relations, I argue,
represent emergent modes of collaboration and dominance even while drawing on historical
connections. In chapter 3 I focus on the Asian diaspora in East Africa, which may predate the
arrival of European powers but they remain “Asian Shylocks,” a community of imperial
collaborators who currently represent the vanguard of India’s expansion in that region. M.G.
Vassanji’s novel The In-Between World of Vikram Lall offers a literary analysis of these
complexities by taking seriously the racism facing the Asian diaspora as well as its historically
troubling class politics. Vassanji uses what Gayatri Spivak calls counterfocalization as an
aesthetic strategy to articulate a given text as well as mark ruptures that push readers to produce
an alternative narrative in parallel. By demonstrating that Vassanji’s focalizer represents the
caricature of a caricature, a hyper-Asian Shylock, I trace out the ignored histories of Black and
Asian solidarity and the alternate futures they can help energize. Such futures are urgently
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needed as India’s investments in, and exports from, Africa boom, rivaling only China in their
exponential growth. I examine this dialogue with China further in Aravind Adiga’s novel The
White Tiger, whose protagonist addresses the Chinese premier on entrepreneurship. The novel’s
epistolary form as well as its concerns with the Indian Ocean and transnational technology
showcase some of the concordant interests these two powers share.
Chapters 3 and 4 also figure protagonists who emphasize capital accumulation as a mode of
self-preservation. Vikram Lall, the namesake of Vassanji’s novel, argues that such accumulation
both protects against, and is enabled by, the racism that sees the East African Asian diaspora as
“Shylocks.”

Meanwhile,

Balram

Halwai,

Adiga’s

focalizer,

argues

that

capitalist

entrepreneurship helps him escape the shackles of the caste system. Balram represents a
caricature of neoliberalism’s success story—“development as bildungsroman”—while also
appropriating the utopic potential within capitalism’s ability to profane the caste system’s sacred
violence (Benjamin 147). Both Lall and Halwai, I argue, demonstrate the allure of capital
accumulation within disenfranchised or discriminated populations and help us understand why
their version of radical emancipation may not align with that advanced by anticapitalists. This
troubling insight raises the broader question of how to negotiate the turn to neoliberal economic
policy and the primacy of commercial development as well as the uneven spread of these forces.
The exponential industrialization of India and China, as well as their rivalry in Africa and the
Indian Ocean, amplifies other significant questions that must remain outside the scope of this
dissertation. The first among these questions concerns the fate of women and sexual minorities in
India and East Africa. While Uganda has recently repealed its draconian anti-LGBT legislation,
for instance, India reinstituted its archaic colonial policy of imprisoning queer people. Would
capital accumulation prove a similar defensive strategy for this half of the world's population or
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is that reserved for the heterosexual males that dominate this dissertation? Another set of
questions concerns the massive increase in resource consumption required by these economic
development policies and its meaning for global climate change. While neoliberal capitalism
promises a first world life for all, materializing even a fraction of such commercial and resource
development may turn the Anthropocene into the next mass extinction event. How then do we
address the 900 million living in extreme poverty across Africa and India at the moment when
these trading partners invest heavily in extraction industries? Responding to these questions and
others yet unknown to us requires thinking across disjunctive scales of human agency, emergent
South-South relations, and the narrative modes that must engage these registers. This is the task
of Postcolonial Literary Studies in the twenty-first century.
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Appendix A: Endnotes
Introduction
1

The notion of "scapes" of various sorts comes from Arjun Appadurai's Modernity at Large.

2

In chapter 1, I take up Jameson's argument on national allegory as articulated in his infamous

essay “Third-World Literature in the Era of Multinational Capitalism.”
Chapter 1
3

For an excellent discussion of the tribunal with special attention to gender violence, see the

special issue of Criminal Law Forum edited by Suzannah Linton.
4

Shalija Sharma’s “Salman Rushdie: The Ambivalence of Migrancy,” offers a subtle reading of

memory in relation to migrancy. Sharma maps Rushdie’s versions of cultural translation, which
range from “an excess of memory,” those characters who refuse to be tainted by anything
foreign, to a complete “refusal of memory,” such as those post-diaspora generations who would
call Bangladesh “Bungleditch.”
5

Fredric Jameson argues, in “Third-World Literature in the Era of Multinational Capitalism,”

that “third-world” texts should be read as “national allegories.” This holds true “particularly
when their forms develop out of predominantly western machineries of representation, such as
the novel” (69). Thinking through a Marxist framework, Jameson contends that a central feature
of capitalist culture “is a radical split between the private and the public, between the poetic and
the political” (69). This split is not yet present in the third-world and consequently, “the story of
the private individual destiny is always an allegory of the embattled situation of the third-world
public culture and society” (69). Aijaz Ahmad offers the most searing critique of Jameson’s
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argument in his In Theory: Classes, Nations, Literatures. Mark Mossman, on the other hand,
grants Jameson’s theory a range of validity but argues it is insufficient for accounting the
complex interiority presented in Midnight’s Children. Jameson originally articulates his claim as
“a sweeping hypothesis,” which is to say he is well aware of its limitations (69).
6

I had the great privilege of having a decorated veteran of the current US-led Iraq and

Afghanistan wars in my classroom. This 25-year-old Marine served four tours in Iraq’s most
hostile regions, including Baghdad and Fallujah. The war veteran told us that, during missions,
nothing matters beyond the safety of their small four-person unit. All the training up to
deployment, he said, places the highest importance on the cohesion and relationships of these
units; no one is left behind. He returned for subsequent tours because he felt responsible for the
new recruits who were going to be put on the front lines. As a sergeant at age 23, he wanted to
make sure that “these 18-year-old kids” would get home safely. The initial patriotism driving his
enlistment was forgotten, removed through training, in order to handle the circumstances. When
we discussed the Rwandan genocide in class, another student cried that he would have “gone in,”
and served in a US military mission to Rwanda had there been one to stop the genocide. The
Marine student commended the comment but confided to me after class, “That kid doesn’t know
what he’s talking about. You have to be trained to give your life.” Such training, however, would
begin by channeling one’s nationalist energy into an absolute caring for the small unit,
indivisible even by death.
7

For an excellent discussion of Rushdie’s religious tropes see Roger Clark’s Stranger Gods:

Salman Rushdie’s Other Worlds. “Saleem’s paradoic Buddhahood helps Rushdie to express his
view that Pakistani leaders crush the liberating, mystical aspects of religion.” While the
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Buddha’s sought transcendence through a “detached awareness,” Saleem achieves “forgetful
ignorance” (82).
8

A cyclone devastated East Pakistan in 1970, leaving a million dead. The central government in

Islamabad (West Pakistan) responded slowly and ineffectively to the crisis. Rahman commented,
“While we have a substantial army stationed in West Pakistan, it is left to British Marines to bury
our dead in Patuakhali. While we have army helicopters sitting in West Pakistan, we have to wait
for helicopters to come for relief operation from across the earth” (cited in Ayoob and
Subrahmanyam 90). Rahman’s Awami League won an absolute victory in the subsequent
elections and shifted political power to the East, to which the West Pakistani leadership
responded with violent repressions in 1971.
9

Rushdie may be drawing on John Locke’s work. For Locke, memory allows an individual to

retain self-identity without the need to repeat the same behaviors. Given this, one is able to
contradict or drastically alter behavior without necessarily identifying as a different person.
Secondly, memory functions as a theater in which one views previous actions, their attendant
consequences and compares them to the choices available in the immediate moment. Thus, an
internal mnemonic landscape is crucial to establish both identity and responsibility.
10

Sara Upstone offers a spatial critique of the novel’s domestic politics without damning

Rushdie as a misogynist or glorifying him as a feminist. Drawing on Anne McClintock’s work,
Upstone argues the novel centers on domestic spaces, which both prompt other remembrances
and resist the smooth incorporation into a national allegory advocated by colonialism.
Consequently, Upstone argues that postcolonial representations turn away from the metaphorical
toward a (magical-realist) literalization.
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11

“It was also an economic proposition which would put young Bengali leaving the portals of a

school or college at serious disadvantage in comparison with his counterpart in West Pakistan”
(Ayoob and Subrahmanyam 31).
12

Sukhbir Choudhar’s Indo-Pak War and Big Powers reads as a screed rather than history but

evinces the strong anti-US and China sentiment among Indian diplomats. Choudhar characterizes
West Pakistan’s leadership as a military junta, China’s cultural revolution as Han chauvinism
using the same repressive measures as their Pakistani allies, and comically, cites an editorial that
derides Henry Kissinger as Dr. Strangelove. He also praises Indira Gandhi’s decisiveness and
unflinching Soviet support. Choudhar’s work caricatures history without intending to.
13

Jameson articulates his thesis on "third-world literature" in “Third-World Literature in the Era

of Multinational Capitalism." The dictum "Always historicize!" opens The Political
Unconscious: Narrative as a Socially Symbolic Act.
14

Paul Fussell’s The Great War and Modern Memory offers a brilliant account of the First

World War’s cultural affects on Britain. He says nothing of the colonies or colonial soldiers.
15

Patrick Colm Hogan’s “Midnight’s Children: Kashmir and the Politics of Identity” offers a

rare account of these early chapters in Kashmir, reading Tai the boatman as a representative of
Kashmiri traditions and customs while Aadam figures the transition to new modes of identity
that both bind and rend the new nation. So far, Salman Rushdie’s best aesthetic negotiation of the
Kashmir conflict is Shalimar the Clown (2002).
16

Subramanian Shankar places two poles of postcolonialism, vernacular and transnational, along

a continuum. The key entailment of this model reorients a theoretical practice in which “the point
of departure for analysis is the global, in whose context the local and the traditional, if present,
must be understood.” Consequently, “any idea of the local and traditional as a point of departure
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for understanding the global” is “unthinkable” (84). Shankar’s model, on the other hand, insists
that the vernacular can explicate the transnational.
Chapter 2
17

“International community” here signifies more than NATO or Security Council powers, which

are the usual referent of this term. This essay investigates those Western powers—US, France,
Belgium—as well as the role of Egypt and South Africa in weapons trafficking.
18

Philip Gourevitch takes it up in part three of his book. David Reiff argues that the

humanitarian response obfuscated the conflict’s politics and the especially the United States’
deliberate stall strategies.
Fiona Terry’s Condemned to Repeat? puts this disaster in the context of a history of
militarized refugee camps. Terry also offers a detailed analysis of the weapons purchased,
shipped, and circulated through the refugee camps in Zaire.
19

Gourevitch’s formulation recalls Thomas L. Haskell’s canonical two-part essay “Capitalism

and the Origins of Humanitarianism,” in which Haskell argues that humanitarianism depends on
recipes, understood as a series of routine steps one can take to alleviate the pain of the starving
stranger. These recipes are functional actions that lead causally from A to E. For Haskell, the
spread and increasing ordinariness of global market transactions—buying tea from the colonies,
for example—provides the ground for perceiving the causation necessary for humanitarianism,
as well as the concrete mechanisms by which my simple action (e.g., a donation) will help the
one suffering far away.
Although I do not use Haskell’s language in this chapter, I both endorse and apply his
insight by following the material transactions already in place between the international
community and Rwanda.
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20

Uvimana’s final affirmations mesh well with his profession as a history teacher. His pupils in

Djibouti never believed Rwanda’s beauty because “the word Rwanda evokes only blood and
endless killings for everyone” (141). Even his girlfriend “had the same old stereotypes in her
head: two ethnic groups who’ve hated each other since time immemorial” (65). Both Uvimana
and the novel seek to redress these misconceptions held by the international community, from
Djibouti to Paris to Washington. Michel Serumundo, the novel’s opening focalizer, laments,
“Even Africans would say, during half-time of [the World Cup] match[es], ‘They’re
embarrassing us, they should stop killing each other like that.’ Then they’ll go on to something
else” (9-10). The novel’s critique of African nations advances beyond the Eurocentrism of other
perspectives. This essay augments this critique by noting that Egypt, Uganda, and South Africa
also overinvested in Rwanda by supplying arms.
21

The French military built a volleyball court atop a mass grave.

22

Joseph Slaughter argues that the “figurative act of human rights incorporation”—“how

contemporary human rights law images and produces the human rights person”—“fulfills itself
when the incorporated person acquires human rights literacy: the capacity to read itself and
others as human rights persons, as creatures of dignity and bearers of international rights and
responsibilities” (24-25). I would only add that such literacy and the resulting writing often
doubles as a pedagogical practice that reminds others of violence that interrupts incorporation.
23

In her article, “Writing on Bones: Commemorating Genocide in Boubacar Boris Diop's

Murambi,” Nicki Hitchcott pays sensitive attention to the problem of representing genocide.
However, Hitchcott repeats the narrative of global indifference only to review French military
and political backing of Hutu Power a paragraph later.
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24

Bret Benjamin offers a rich account of the World Bank’s role in subsidizing development

narratives. On its turn to literary representational strategies, Benjamin summarizes: “The
Banking bildungsroman announces itself as consistent with, in fact constitutive of, the
development of the ethically refined, socially conscious, liberal, global citizen—a citizen who is
figured by a character from the Global South but who is more likely embodied by the consenting,
consuming subject in the overdeveloped North” (163).
25

Barnett writes a more comprehensive history in his book Eyewitness to a Genocide: The

United Nations and Rwanda. However, his article offers a potent summary of the main argument
and a deeper insight into his own role and thinking during those debates at the Security Council.
Barnett’s article appears in 1997, only a few years after the genocide and a solid five years
before his book. The article reads as a rawer response, complete with some accounting errors.
26

Such indifference relies on a “secular theodicy” that invokes the transcendental good of a

given organization—the nation state or the UN. This bureaucratic faith believes in the “principle
of the elect as an exclusive community, whose member individuals’ sins cannot undermine the
perfection of the ideal they all share” (Herzfeld 10). Barnett believes the Security Council
debates evinced such secular theodicy when member states argued for the best interests of the
UN as an ethical demand that, however unfortunately trumped Rwandan lives.
27

Barnett refers to New Zealand and Czechoslovakia as “‘the conscience of the council’ in both

derision and admiration” for their support of military intervention to stop the genocide but failure
to offer any troops for the mission. A tragic joke circulates: “the international community
seemed willing to fight down to the last US citizen” (572).
28

In the final chapter of his book, Barnett both extends and qualifies this argument. While he

continues to scold the Secretariat and the DPKO for failing to pass on relevant information,

!

147

Barnett also argues that the UN narrated Rwanda as a civil war and read all incoming data in that
framework. Dallaire’s cables never reached the Security Council partly because they were taken
as evidence of an ongoing civil war, complete with arms caches and violence. Moreover, Barnett
argues that the US “could not have predicted the genocide” while conceding that both Belgium
and France “knew more than they revealed at the time” (161).
29

Alison Des Forges’s definitive history verifies Dallaire’s claims. “Belgium, the U.S., France,

and Germany all had good sources of information within the Rwandan community and
frequently consulted with each other, even though there was little formal interchange among
their military intelligence services” or UNAMIR, which was not mandated to gather its own
intelligence (113).
30

Human Rights Watch, Arming Rwanda - The Arms Trade and Human Rights Abuses in the

Rwandan War, 1 January 1994, A601, available at:
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6a7fc8.html [accessed 19 June 2012].
This report also accounts for weapons shipments directly from France in response to the 1990
RPF invasion. Rwanda imported arms from South Africa including “a wide range of light arms,
machine guns and ammunition.” Although some of these weapons spread to the RPF from
captured government forces, the former were supplied through Uganda.
31

Dallaire also negotiates the colonial attitudes of the Belgian troops whose racism belongs

neither to a historical past nor to fictive imaginings of novels; rather, these attitudes belong to a
militant present that sees in Africans a chance for target practice. As the former colonial power
in Rwanda, the UN does not want to deploy Belgium troops, but they must because no other
nations step forward. The Belgian soldiers come to Rwanda after completing a tour in Somalia, a
chapter-seven mission that allowed them to make peace rather than simply keep it.
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Consequently, these troops are “very aggressive,” bragging that they “killed over two hundred
Somalis” and “knew how to kick ‘nigger’ ass in Africa” (113). An infuriated Dallaire tells the
Belgian commander that he will tolerate no “racist sentiments, colonial attitudes, [and]
unnecessary aggression” (113). But these attitudes persist and infiltrate the mission’s already
bare logistical capabilities.
Dallaire assigns the Belgian troops to secure the airport—a key link in a landlocked
country—and needs them to “live out of camp garrisons” (120). Although he already provided
guidelines that troops come prepared with basic camp stores, the Belgians refuse to live under
canvas “as per national policy” (120). Dallaire learns of a “national Belgian army policy
directive” stipulates that Belgian soldiers would never camp under canvas “in Africa.” They
must be housed in hard buildings, “not necessarily for the sake of comfort or hygiene but
because it was imperative that they maintain a correct presence in front of the Africans” (12021). The Belgian troops’ colonial baggage leaves no room for camp stores.
32

Mahmood Mamdani’s brilliant analysis in When Victims Become Killers hinges on the

construction of alterity. He contends that the genocide’s roots lay in colonial logics that produced
various constructions of Hutu and Tutsi. Mamdani understands these as political identities that
transformed under Belgian colonialism, which billed “Hutu as indigenous Bantu and Tutsi as
alien Hamities” (16). The Tutsi were no longer ethnic minorities but racial outsiders that helped
buffer and enforce colonial rule. Decolonization not only failed to overcome this understanding
but rather empowered these identities. Consequently, the genocide pitted native Hutu against
settler Tutsi whose armed return to Rwanda, in the form of the RPF, represented the return of
foreign domination. This model allows Mamdani to explain, partly, the popular character of the
genocide.
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In her essay “Global Humanitarianism, Race, and the Spectacle of the African Corpse in
Current Representations of the Rwandan Genocide,” Heike Härting extends Mamdani’s account
of racialized power dynamics by acknowledging that such political identities depend on the
“management of the colonial subject’s body, gender, and sexuality” (69). Härting reads Guy
Courtemanche’s novel A Sunday at the Pool in Kigali as a “necropoetic and pornographic
narrative” that instrumentalizes brutal scenes of rape to “projects a particularly violent but
apparently truthful reality of Africa as a place of rampant sexual depravity” (69, 71). In
Courtemanche’s dark continent, the rape victim Gentille serves “as both an allegory of the
Rwandan nation and the ultimate victim of international indifference and patriarchal
opportunism” (70).
33

Recent French interventions in Libya and Mali have proven Dr. Karekezi wrong,

unfortunately. For an excellent analysis of the militant humanitarianism in Libya, see Vijay
Prashad’s Arab Spring, Libyan Winter.
34

Sara Guyer’s “Rwanda’s Bones” offers an insightful account of the role smell plays in the

narration of memorial visits. She cites New York Times reporter Andrew Blum’s experience of an
intense odor that “exempted us from the need for imagination. It relieved us of the need for
understanding” (cited in Guyer 166). By contrast, Gourevitch does not smell anything and
consequently, Guyer argues, “is arrested, rather than informed” by the memorial (169). Guyer
elaborates that the contradictions inherent in Rwanda’s memorials produce such seizure, leading
to “confusion, despondency and even senselessness” (169). She concedes that such memorials
“provide a permanently visible ground for the victims’ claim to power” and can be used to
enable political violence; Guyer has in mind the ruling RPF’s misuse of the genocide to
exonerate their own crimes and shield themselves from voices critical of their political policies.
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However, by reducing Gourevitch’s account of stepping on a skull to “an allegory for the
impossibility of good conscience,” she misses his anger and the international violence that such
memorials may enable (170).
Chapter 3
35

Stephanie Jones’s “The Politics of Love and History: Asian Women and African Men in East

African Literature” applauds Vassanji’s text for taking on the “deepest taboo” of sexual
relationships between Asian women and African men. Jones reminds us of central place
diasporic women play in the reproduction of community, which in turn polices their bodies and
relationships so that they remain ideal representatives and transmitters of homogenous (pure)
traditions. Such policing, however, cannot be dismissed as internalized colonial logics but as part
of conservative “Indian” culture in its diasporic iteration. This is not to dismiss the importance of
colonial ideology or its use of the Asian diasporas as a settler class, but to map more vectors of
(conservative) determinations and the (racist) agency they produce. Jones goes a step further in
her analysis of Vassanji’s fiction—among the rare works to address this taboo directly—to indict
the diasporic mother as the ultimate policemen. The most sophisticated iteration of this character
occurs in Vikram Lall, in which the mother both loves Njoroge as her own son and absolutely
prohibits her daughter Deepa’s relationship with him. Lall’s mother deploys a series of
contradictory arguments, at once evoking the lovers' childhood friendship—“he’s like a brother
to you”—ostensible tolerance—“I have nothing against Africans”— and absolute difference—
“But we are different” (247-48). Jones is right in all this but strangely omits another piece that
would bolster her argument; Lall’s mother decries that she too has dreams, having Asian
grandchildren she can raise to understand their culture. Vassanji allows her to voice both
individual and communal desires, as if no slippage exits, so that she protects the community’s
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unity and ensures the transmission of a culture that values community unity, racist or otherwise.
All of this serves as a reminder that the diasporic community’s conservatism does not merely ape
imperial ideology but represents a dark agency, policing the boundaries of fair skin and its
communal homogeneity.
36

Jones rightly notes that Lall’s father’s coupling with an African woman points to a more

tolerant future even while being entirely “traditional,” insofar as the Malabouxs—an Asian man
and African woman—are already a representative part of the Asian East African genealogy.
37

Marie Louise Pratt's Imperial Eyes remains the canonical text on this subject.

38

Through her historical research, Savita Nair argues that the East African Indian community

claimed belonging on equal terms with the British and even saw themselves as rival colonists by
dint of their history in the area and their work building its infrastructure. Lall’s claims, in
contrast, route through a presentism that his forefathers would not have recognized; he belongs
in Kenya as a national-citizen while East African Indians in the 1920s, according to Nair,
claimed more. They saw themselves on equal footing with the British and drew on their long
history of trading in the region as obvious evidence to support their claim. Even Winston
Churchill agreed that the Indians were right in these claims. Unfortunately, so did Idi Amin.
Amin readily acknowledged the long history of Indian traders, laborers and merchants in East
Africa and, like 1924 British district commissioner Campbell, blamed the Indians for ruining the
African and stunting native development.
39

The British described their civilizing mission as a policy of "native paramountcy," which

placed the improvement of the natives above all else. The Indian (Asians) were called on to be
role models for the Africans and were especially hated for this patronizing role.
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40

Simatei’s essay offers a broad overview of various East African Asian writers and their

relation to postcolonial nationalism. He argues convincingly that diaspora and nation state are
not oppositional but synthetic terms that coalesce uneasily for those generations of East African
Asians born in Africa. Scanning all of Vassanji’s novels, Simatei has little time to focus on the
particular tensions of The In-Between World of Vikram Lall, and offers nothing in the way of a
material analysis. Railways, shops and bazaars, for him, symbolize modernity and nation
building that, if accepted by new Kenya, have Asians as their chief architects. While this is
useful for decentering dominant narratives of the nation, it does little to explain the chief conceit
of Lall’s narrative; his facilitation of il/legal development by financial alchemy while claiming to
be aiding the national project.
41

Siundu, Godwin. “Locating Cultural Ambivalence and Afropolitanism: Nairobi and Dar-es-

Salaam as Heterotopia in the Fiction of Dawood and Vassanji,” 259-80.
42

For Ojwang the Thousand and One Nights represents the ur-text of encountering exotic

Africans. Ojwang discuss the text in relation to the Indian Ocean trade in African slaves.
43

For more on the conflation between the Mau Mau resistance and Kikuyu nationalism, see

Bethwell Ogot's article "Mau Mau and Nationhood: The Untold Story," in Mau Mau &
Nationhood: Arms, Authority and Narration.
44

When Seema, Lall's Canadian lover, accuses him of using the same complacent logic as the

Rwanda genocidaires, Lall admits to trafficking weapons. He argues that he also sent money to a
girl from a massacred village so that she may attend school. Lall recognizes the absurdity of
equating those two actions: gun running and meager education aid. As I argued in chapter 2,
however, these two actions—war mongering and humanitarianism—continually clash to produce
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indifference. But the weapons are merely capital in the form of “certain metal goods,” abstracted
from their functions as agents of death.
45

David A. Perocx's "Mau Mau & the Arming of the State" offers a detailed history of British

efforts to arm and re-arm Kenya. These efforts include supplying Kenyatta's early independence
regime "in the hope that Kenya would remain in the Western sphere of influence, in line with
Britain's vital interests."
Chapter 4
46

Glancing at an Indian newspaper will provide daily testimonies to caste-based violence.

47

Elizabeth Hewitt offered this analysis during a lecture at the Frei Universität in Berlin on June

20th, 2013. I have included the full essay from which her talk drew in the works cited page.
48

I have chosen to cite the open access version of The Annihilation of Caste in solidarity with the

boycott against Navayana/ Verso India who republished this work with an introduction by
Arundathi Roy, a non-Dalit writer. Like the choice of Roy for the author of the introduction, the
book cover features a silhouette of Ambedkar inside a much larger silhouette of Gandhi. Some
are using the former to "revaluate" the latter, which only repeats the very subservience
Ambedkar fought. One does not need to rethink caste as Gandhi attempted but to annihilate it
entirely.
49

I cannot recap the full breadth of the debate between Ambedkar and Gandhi nor the thorough

annihilation of the latter by the former.
50

Such transnational flows also remind the reader of "the conditions of production and

distribution of the novel, a Booker Prize-winning work in Indian English, to a worldwide
audience" (Joseph 81). To my mind, this reading of the novel's attention to multinational capital
contradicts the more banal critiques of "Adiga’s staging of a Dark India as a new-fangled object
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of exoticist discourses" (Mendes 276). The latter can only frame caste as the subject of an
orientalist fantasy rather than a living problem. Moreover, the attention to international flows
refutes one critic's argument that the novel "cuts India off from the larger international world and
its values, placing it in a kind of moral quarantine" (Goh 337).
51

For a reading of Halwai's violence as Fanonian, see Sara D. Schotland's "Breaking Out of the

Rooster Coop: Violent Crime in Aravind Adiga's White Tiger and Richard Wright's Native Son."
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The emergence of South-South relations in politics and economics refracts strangely
through the literature produced in these postcolonial regions. Two primary worldviews emerge in
these texts. The first focuses on the continued presence of imperial powers in the South and their
culpability in eruptions of violence. The second shifts to modes of domination emerging within
South-South interactions. Salman Rushdie's canonical Midnight's Children examines the
Bangladeshi genocide through a variety of literary strategies, especially hyperbole, to produce a
crisis of history that indicts the Cold War arms trade on equal terms with a war criminal.
Similarly, Boubicar Boris Diop's novel Murambi, The Book of Bones helps contextualize the
Rwandan genocide within the circuits of international attention—weapons supplies, political
support and humanitarian aid—that put the lie to the world's supposed "indifference." On the
contrary, Murambi's fragmented and polyvocal form evinces the multiple and contradictory
investments Rwandans suffered through. East Africa is also home to a South Asian diaspora that
arrived before the European powers and now advance India's exponential trade relations with
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Africa. M.G Vassanji's The In-Between World of Vikram Lall caricatures one of these "Asian
Shylocks" to critique the diaspora's class politics and, simultaneously, the racism and xenophobia
that led to their 1969 mass deportation from Uganda by Idi Amin. Vassanji's focalizer
weaponizes capital accumulation to claim that it protects against such racism, even if it confirms
racist caricatures. This argument is not unlike that made by emergent economies from the
postcolonial South, which have turned to neoliberal developmental policies to guarantee their
independence. Despite the unsustainability of such policies, both Vassanji's novel and Aravind
Adiga's The White Tiger take seriously capitalism's ability to nullify old hierarchies even while
building new ones. Adiga's focalizer breaks free of his place in the caste system on the strength
of capitalism's ability to profane this scared hierarchy. Such anticaste politics challenge the
category of 'radical politics' as espoused by anticapitalists and adherents of Gandhi, who fought
feverishly for the preservation of caste. Taken together, these two novels represent emergent
Southern businessmen who fight local antagonisms through international capital, producing a
complicated situation that helps us understand the allure of accumulation in emergent economies
and its impact on South-South relationships.
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